Child Law

After parents stipulated to finding of neglect as to their two children, ages 8 and 4, court terminated guardianship of maternal grandmother, finding that she, and parents, were unable to care for children. Grandmother had not challenged her removal as guardian, minors' placement with DCFS, or the finding that she was unable to care for minors. Grandmother appealed ruling dismissing her as a party and discharging her court-appointed counsel. Under Juvenile Court Act, a former guardian no longer has party status upon dismissal and is no longer entitled to court-appointed counsel. Court erred in considering best interests in determining necessary parties. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

(Dissents added on denial of rehearing 11/28/11.) A minor, then age 16, was convicted of criminal sexual assault and attempted robbery, alleged in delinquency petition, and was adjudicated delinquent. Evidence on sexual assault charge was sufficient for finding of guilt. Defense counsel failed to object to shackling during trial, and record does not indicate that trial judge had been aware of shackling until Defendant was called to testify and shackles were then ordered removed. U.S. Constitution does not guarantee right to jury trial to minors in state court juvenile proceedings, and nor does Illinois Constitution except in very limited circumstances. (GARMAN, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring; KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, and BURKE, dissenting.)

Court was within its discretion, under Section 2-22 of Juvenile Court Act, in entering order restricting mother's access to case documents from minors' wardship adjudication cases. Record suggested that mother was posting damaging, embarrassing and confidential information about the minors on the Internet, and court was within its discretion to prevent disclosure and publication of confidential information and case materials. (GARCIA and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Court adjudicated minor physicially abused because of substantial risk of physical injury under Juvenile Court Act. At age 22 months, minor was diagnosed with life-threatening second- and third-degree burns to 30% of his body. Preponderance of evidence showed that minor was abused, given doctor's notes that injuries were not accidental, and severity of injuries. Mother presented no evidence or expert testimony that injuries were accidental. (R.E. GORDON and GARCIA, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed class action suit for breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act violations from Defendant appliance company's inclusion, on form invoice, for "Gov't Processing Req." charge against each customer. Plaintiff alleged that company misrepresented charge as a government fee when it was actually profit-seeking device. Court properly granted class certification as Defendant's uniformly applied billing practices predominate over any individual questions among class members, thus satisfying commonality requirement. Common issues include whether Defendant made actionable misrepresentations or omissions of material fact by including GPR charge. (R.E. GORDON and CAHILL, concurring.)

After adjudicatory hearing at which respondent mother made admission, court adjudicated eight-month-old infant an abused minor. Mother stipulated to State's factual basis for minor to be adjudicated as abused minor, including that infant, at age three months, sustained five fractured ribs and other injuries while in care of parents or grandmother. State is not required to provide factual basis prior to a parent's admission that a child is abused. Court properly relied on shelter-care report as factual basis before it accepted mother's admission. State provided substantially more than minimum amount of evidence required to support mother's admission, and court appropriately considered shelter-care report to find that factual basis existed for admission. Thus, evidence properly established factual basis for mother's admission. (APPELTON and POPE, concurring.)

Father's parental rights were terminated in 2008, but State failed to make diligent inquiry of current and last known address as required for serving father by publication. State and DCFS had additional knowledge that may have led them to contact information for father. Diligent inquiry of Section 2-16(2) of Juvenile Court Act requires a good-faith attempt at acquiring contact information for a parent, including inquiry about potential leads, and unequivocally requires a diligent inquiry whenever service by publication is used. State's service by publication was defective, and thus court lacked personal jurisdiction over father for termination of his parental rights. (THOMAS, GARMAN, and KARMEIER, concurring; BURKE, FREEMAN, and THEIS, specially concurring.)