Child Law

Court's factual findings, that Respondent father/step-father did not torture or abuse his children or step-child, and that even if he had erred in his child-rearing in the past, such errors were not likely to recur, were not against manifest weight of evidence. Although testimony of sons and step-child of Respondent was disturbing, Respondent denied allegations, and trial court was in best position to judge witness credibility. Petitioners (grandmother and step-grandfather of one minor) thus lacked standing to petition for guardianship of minor, as evidence did not rebut the presumption that the father was willing and able to make and carry out day-to-day child-care decisions as to minor. (KNECHT and POPE, concurring.)

Minors were adjudicated as neglected, based on finding that their mother had failed to follow safety plan to keep minors from contact with her live-in boyfriend who was alleged to have committed sexual abuse on mother's four-year-old daughter. Mother appealed court's finding at temporary custody hearing, arguing that the State failed to establish probable cause for the implementation of a safety plan, arguing that the safety plan was based solely on daughter's statements which were neither corroborated nor subject to cross-examination. A finding of probable cause is not equivalent to a "finding" on the merits of abuse, neglect, or dependency. Section 2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act, which requires corroboration and cross-examination of a minor's previous statements as to allegations of abuse or neglect, does not apply to temporary custody hearings (also known as "shelter care hearings"), as such hearings are intended to be preliminary in nature with a focus on the necessity of removal for the immediate protection of the minor. (FITZGERALD, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and KARMEIER, concurring; FREEMAN, dissenting.)

Minor was adjudicated neglected, and at dispositional hearing court minor was made a ward of the court, the mother was found unfit, and custody was granted to father. Father filed a petition for custody in family court, and in juvenile court filed motions to consolidate juvenile and family court cases and to dismiss mother's motion to restore custody. Proceedings which were held before a juvenile court judge who then prepared to transfer matter to family court for proceedings before a different judge were in violation of the plain language of Rule 903, which requires that consolidated custody proceedings must be conducted by a single judge. (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)

Twelve-year-old student was found guilty of battery upon classmate, and was placed on probation for one year. At hearing at which time probation order was entered, the State objected to court supervision, and the court stated that it could not order court supervision because of the State's objection. Minor has no standing to challenge "consent" requirement of Section 5-615 because it was not the State's objection that deprived respondent of the chance to have court supervision, as it was not allowed because a finding of guilt had already been entered; thus, State's objection was irrelevant. Minor was thus not adversely affected by operation of the statutory provision.(FITZGERALD, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and BURKE, concurring.)

Parties were married in Illinois, and Illinois court entered judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding mother sole custody of their minor son. Mother and son, then father, moved to India, and India family court entered ex parte interim order restraining anyone from disturbing the custody of the child, who remained in school in India. The India family court determined that the parties are "now ordinarily residing" in India. This finding necessarily implied that the parties did not presently reside in Illinois; thus, India court acted in substantial conformity with jurisdictional requirements of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Drafters of UCCJEA did not intend that "residence" be equated with "domicile". Thus, Illinois court did not have exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over child custody. (MURPHY and QUINN, concurring.)

Respondent, age 16 at time of incident, was adjudicated a delinquent based on misdemeanor criminal sexual abuse, and sentenced to 24 months probation. Respondent was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his attorney agreed to give up his ability to cross-examine the witnesses in exchange for the State giving up the ability to have live testimony, as this is a matter of trial strategy; live testimony tends to be more persuasive than videotape. Respondent was not denied right to counsel when his attorney acted as both GAL and defense counsel; this "hybrid representation" was neither per se or actual conflict. In Illinois, counsel for juvenile respondents are encouraged to protect the legal rights of minors and the best interests of the minors and society. (McCULLOUGH, concurring; APPLETON, dissenting.)

(Motion to publish granted 8/20/10.) Minor was placed on court supervision after being charged with criminal damage to property and resisting a peace officer, and was ordered to pay $659 in restitution; State alleged that minor threw rocks at a vehicle and that she pulled away from a police officer. Minor appealed, arguing no factual or evidentiary basis that minor caused the $266 damage to the victim's windshield. Court within its discretion in ordering restitution, as minor's testimony that she did not throw rocks at car conflicted with her earlier admission that she threw a rock at vehicle, and as State presented affidavit of victim and car repair estimates. Court has authority to consider appeal of conditions of minor's court supervision per Supreme Court Rule 604(b). (GOLDENHERSH and WEXSTTEN, concurring.)

Notice provisions of Indian Child Welfare Act were not applicable to termination of parental rights hearing where there was some evidence that minor's maternal grandmother may have been affiliated with the Cherokee tribe. Minor's biological mother and father are not members of an Indian tribe, and made only bare assertions that grandmother was of Cherokee descent; thus, there was insufficient evidence that minor was a member of an Indian tribe. Best interest determination is supported by manifest weight of evidence; even though cultural differences between minor and foster parents, a nurturing and positive environment was provided, and biological mother was inconsistent in her participation and contact with minor. (TOOMIN and HOWSE, concurring.)

State filed petition alleging that minor was neglected; natural father received abode service of summons; court found minor neglected and made her a ward of court. Over father's objection, court changed permanency goal from return home to substitute care pending termination of parental rights. Four months later, State filed petition for termination of parental rights, but contrary to service requirements of Rule 11, natural father was not served with petition nor with notice of filing of or of hearing on petition, and his parental rights were terminated by default. Court erred in denying father's petition to vacate default judgment. Lack of notice of filing of petition for TPR did not deprive court of jurisdiction over father, but it did violate his due process rights. (HUTCHINSON, concurring; ZENOFF, dissenting.)