Child Law

Limitation period for revocation of consent to a failed adoption within 12 months is absolute. Thus, general consent of adoptive mother, who had adopted child from Ethiopian orphanage, to allow child's adoption by another couple was a surrender of parental rights, and her consent was not timely revoked under section 11 of Adoption Act, which clearly bars any action challenging a consent or surrender after 12 months. Adoptive mother did not reasonably rely on social worker's urging to allow child to be adopted by another family, and persuading her to not seek to regain custody; consent was not taken by that social worker, but by another person at that agency. To set aside consent to adoption, fraud and duress must have been done by the person before whom consent or surrender is acknowledged.

Court was authorized in addressing change of placement motion and determining whether it was in best interest of minor to remove her from foster care of maternal grandparents. Order of change of placement was not void, as it was not ordering a specific placement with a specific foster family. Foster parents, who have the right to be heard by the court, waived issue of adequate notice by participating at the hearing and failing to object to inadequate notice at that time.

Respondent in abuse and neglect proceeding did not supplement record on appeal with recordings of DCFS investigator, and raised ineffective assistance of counsel issue first in appellate court, thus no hearing yet on issue. Court cannot assume that trial court would have ruled the same way as another trial judge did in criminal matter. Remanded for hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claims as to defense counsel's failure to object to investigator's testimony about child's statements or to aggressively cross-examine about interview techniques.

Respondent minor was adjudicated delinquent for two counts of aggravated battery. One-act, one-crime act applies in juvenile proceedings, thus one conviction must be vacated as both counts were based on single act. DNA indexing statute not unconstitutional on grounds of unreasonable search and seizure, or violations of right to privacy under federal or state constitutions. Statute does not authorize gathering of uniquely private genetic facts; and Illinois State Police regulation allows use of genetic marker grouping information only if all personal identifying information is removed.

Finding of medical neglect as to foster mother for not obtaining immediate medical treatment for mentally and physically handicapped 10-year-old boy with spina bifida, who suffered burns on chest, neck, and back from scalding bathwater. Foster mother, who is an LPN, had cleaned burned area with soap and applied cream, and intended to take child to doctor when child's father arrived and took him to ER three days after incident. Medical testimony established child had first and second degree burns, and that his condition, if untreated, could have caused serious or long-term harm due to risk of infection, thus supporting finding of medical neglect.

During permanency review hearing as to mother's fitness to parent her three children, trial court asked that recordings of telephone conversations between parents be played. State alleged unfitness was evidenced by mother's use of abusive, vulgar language which was in presence of her child, as a child's voice could be heard in background. Court erred in admitting recordings, as they lacked proper foundation, as no testimony as to whose voices were on recordings, and whether they were unaltered and accurate recordings.

Mother arrested for child endangerment of her infant daughter, and made inculpatory statements to ASA. Motion to suppress properly denied because at time of statements, mother was not represented by counsel. Rule 4.2 of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits attorney representing a client from communicating with a party on the subject of the representation if attorney knows that party is to be represented by another lawyer in that matter, is inapplicable because civil juvenile proceeding and criminal proceeding are different, even though they were based on same incident, and attorney appointed in child-protection case was not representing the mother in the criminal matter.

Miranda warnings not required during police questioning of 12-year old residential burglary suspect; questioning occurred in kitchen of minor's grandmother's house, where minor resided, and with grandmother present, for 30 minutes, thus was not "custodial interrogation". Trial court properly denied motion to suppress minor's admission, during questioning, that he took jewelry and bicycle.

"Close confinement" conduct which is considered child abuse is dependent upon circumstances, including factors of length of time children are confined, whether children are deprived of food and water and bathroom use, purpose, and space. DCFS Policy Guide 2000.14, which has not been properly promulgated with period for public comment, is not a rule for purposes of Section 1-70 of Administrative Procedure Act, and thus cannot form basis for court's analysis of alleged abuse and neglect. Trial court improperly adopted ALJ's findings of abuse and neglect, as confinement of children with serious behavior disorders in outdoor enclosure for brief periods of time while foster parent was doing farm chores or tending to horses was not unreasonable close confinement.

Time for parent to make reasonable progress toward return of child, under Adoption Act, is not tolled by parent's incarceration, as Act includes no exception for time spent in prison. Court may consider evidence occurring only during the relevant nine-month period described in section 1(D)(m) of Act.