Criminal Law

Defendant pled guilty to distribution of harmful material and sexual exploitation of a minor and was sentenced to 18 months in prison. Defendant challenged his convictions and sentence on appeal, arguing that the sexual exploitation of a child conviction was void because the State’s factual basis did not establish “virtual presence,” his convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule, the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and that the court’s order should be corrected to reflect that defendant was only required to register as a sex offender because of the conviction on Count 2 and not on both counts. The State conceded this issue. The appellate court accepted the State’s concession and Defendant’s argument and corrected the certification to reflect that defendant was required to register as a sex offender based solely on his conviction for sexual exploitation of a child but otherwise affirmed the judgment and sentence entered by the trial court. (ZENOFF, concurring and TURNER, specially concurring)

Defendant appealed from his conviction of first-degree murder and argued on appeal that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his trial counsel’s per se conflict of interest, that the State did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting gang evidence, and that the trial court committed manifest error in denying his post-trial motion raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where trial court failed to call witnesses to impeach prosecution witnesses. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant’s waiver of his counsel’s per se conflict was knowing and intelligent where he understood the conflict and its consequences and was adamant that counsel continue to represent him, that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, and that the trial court did not err in the admission of evidence or in the denial of the post-trial motion. (LYLE and NAVARRO, concurring)

Appeal challenging the constitutionality of emergency administrative orders entered by the Supreme Court to address disruptions to the court system caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and that allowed circuit courts to toll the time restrictions set forth in section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, also known as the speedy-trial statute. The Supreme Court found that because section 103-5(a) involves the scheduling of trials, the statute is a matter of court procedure and, as a result, is within the court’s constitutional authority over all statute courts and held that the order tolling the speedy-trial statute did not violate the separation-of-powers clause. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery in a place of public accommodation and appealed, arguing that his conviction should be reduced to simple battery because it was not committed “on or about a public place of accommodation.” The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, finding that the stoop where the victim was battered was a public place of accommodation pursuant to section 12-3.05(c) of the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and vacated defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery and entered a conviction for simple battery. The court found that the legislature did not intend for the term “public place of accommodation or amusement” to be so broadly constructed “as to include any place accessible to the public no matter how limited that access or minor the convenience.” (THEIS, OVERSTREET, and HOLDER WHITE, concurring. CUNNINGHAM and O’BRIEN took no part in the decision.)

Defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated battery of a child and defendant appealed, arguing that the jury instructions on accountability and parental accountability were directly conflicting instructions. The appellate court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s convictions, finding that any conflict in the required knowledge element in the accountability instruction was harmless error because defendant’s knowledge was not an essential element when defendant was proven guilty of aggravated battery of a child beyond a reasonable doubt. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, and CUNNINGHAM, concurring. ROCHFORD took no part in the decision

Defendant was convicted of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon and sentenced to 10 years in prison. He appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a firearm and that the trial court erred by sentencing him to a Class 2 felony rather than a Class 3 felony because his prior attempted robbery conviction was not a “forcible felony.” The appellate court affirmed the guilty finding, but agreed with defendant’s argument that his prior conviction was not a forcible felony and vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for re-sentencing. (HOFFMAN and MARTIN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order denying him leave to file a successive post-conviction petition arguing that case law decided after the resolution of his initial petition created good cause for a successive petition and because evidence to secure his conviction was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional arrest. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument and case law finding that a warrantless arrest made pursuant to an investigative alert violates the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution and, as a result, defendant could not establish that he was prejudiced and the trial court did not err when it denied his petition for leave to file a successive petition. (ROCHFORD and MARTIN, concurring)

Defendant, who was 16 years old at the time of the offenses, was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder with a firearm and was sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 97 years in prison. The Supreme Court found the sentence unconstitutional and remanded for re-sentencing where defendant was sentenced to 66 years in prison. Defendant appealed again and the appellate court remanded for re-sentencing. The trial court imposed the same sentence of 66 years and defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court ignored the appellate court mandate as well as state and federal law when it imposed a de facto life sentence without finding that he was permanently incorrigible. The appellate court vacated and remanded, finding that the trial court improperly considered the factors of aggravation and mitigation in sentencing. The appellate court also noted that the trial court ignored the “blackletter law” that it must obey a mandate issued by the reviewing court and directed that the case be assigned to a new judge for resentencing on remand. (McLAREN, concurring and BIRKETT, concurring in part and dissenting in part)

Defendant appealed from the trial court’s order denying him leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. The Office of the State Appellate Defendant withdrew as counsel after determining that defendant’s appeal lacked arguable merit. The appellate court affirmed the trial court order and ordered defendant to show cause as to why sanctions should not be entered against him for filing a frivolous appeal. (CAVANAGH and KNECHT, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a pro se successive post-conviction petition. Defendant argued in his petition that newly discovered evidence corroborated his claim that his confession was coerced by the police, that his trial court was ineffective for failing to call a supporting witness at his suppression hearing and at trial, and that his 45 year sentence was unconstitutional because he was 19 years old at the time the offenses were committed. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the newly discovered evidence did not provide sufficient similarity to defendant’s claims of misconduct, that defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were barred by res judicata, and that defendant could not meet the cause and prejudice test to file a successive post-conviction petition. (REYES and BURKE, concurring)