Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether defendant was properly convicted on charge of attempted vehicular hijacking under circumstances where defendant claimed that his voluntary intoxication precluded trial court in bench trial from finding that he had requisite intent to commit charged offense while in back seat of Lyft rideshare vehicle. Record showed that defendant believed that driver was driving in wrong direction and then grabbed back of driver’s shirt and threatened to kill him. Appellate Court, in noting that voluntary intoxication is no longer included as affirmative defense under 720 ILCS 5/6-3, found that voluntary intoxication is no longer excuse for criminal conduct. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argues that Appellate Court’s decision conflicts with Slabon, 2018 IL App (1st) 150149, which held that state of voluntary intoxication may be relevant to negate mens rea in trial on specific intent offense. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s post-conviction petition that challenged trial court’s amended Judgment-Sentence that changed defendant’s 3-year mandatory supervised release (MSR) term that had been imposed with respect to his two criminal sexual assault convictions to “3 years-natural life.” While defendant argued in his petition for post-conviction relief that Rule 472 did not give trial court jurisdiction to enter order changing MSR term, Appellate Court, in affirming instant denial, found that change in defendant’s MSR term concerned only clerical error, and that Rule 472 allowed trial court to make instant change to defendant’s MSR term.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress warrantless seizure of drugs found in cab of defendant’s truck during traffic stop, after canine unit gave positive alert near driver’s side of truck while conducting “free air sniff” on outside of truck. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, rejected defendant’s contention that instant canine unit cannabis alert that occurred in 2018, when state law allowed possession of medical marijuana, did not give cause to search his truck due to legality of marijuana possession. Defendant also argued in his petition for leave to appeal that Appellate Court decision improperly would allow police search of vehicle, as long as cannabis remained illegal in some form.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant’s post-conviction counsel to withdraw as counsel and then subsequently denied defendant’s post-conviction petition under circumstances, where defendant alleged that his counsel failed to ascertain one of defendant’s pro se contentions in his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court and remanding matter for appointment of new post-conviction counsel, found that defendant’s post-conviction counsel did not provide reasonable assistance under Rule 651(c) by failing to address defendant’s due process claim that jury’s second note indicated that not all jurors concurred in ultimate guilty verdict. Ct. further observed that fact that counsel generally stated that he had reviewed all of defendant’s pleadings did not satisfy Rule 651(c), where counsel did not mention specific jury note issue in his motion to withdraw.

This case presents question in instant prosecution on attempted murder of police officer, aggravated discharge of weapon and possession of defaced firearm charges, whether trial court properly admitted video recordings of witness’s interrogation and gang-related evidence, where said evidence was not objected to at trial. Appellate Court found under plain-error standard that neither piece of evidence, although improperly admitted, constituted plain error when considered separately. However, Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction and remanding matter for new trial, held that both pieces of evidence, when considered together, amounted to cumulative error that deprived defendant of faire trial. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that Appellate Court’s decision conflicted with Hall, 194 Ill.2d 305, where Hall court found that where forfeited claims do not individually amount to plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel, they cannot be joined together to support finding of cumulative error

This case presents question as to whether jury properly found defendant guilty of violating armed habitual criminal provisions of Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7), where said finding was based, in part, on defendant’s 2002 juvenile conviction on drug delivery charge. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction, found that defendant’s prior juvenile conviction on drug delivery charge that was committed when defendant was 17, does not qualify as kind of conviction that can support charge of being armed habitual criminal. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argues that instant delivery of narcotics offense, which is classified as Class 1 offense, qualifies as predicate offense under section 24-1.7 of Criminal Code for purposes of armed habitual criminal statute, and that fact that defendant committed said offense at age 17 is irrelevant.