Defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated battery and appealed, arguing that he was prejudiced by the substitution of a juror after deliberations had begun where the original jurors had already voted and signed the verdict forms, there was a significant disparity in the length of the deliberations before and after the substitution, and where the alternate juror was not questioned before rejoining the jury. The appellate court agreed and reversed and remanded for a new trial. (CATES and VAUGHAN, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of one count of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to four years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the version of section 5-4.5-100 of the Code of Corrections under which he was sentenced violated the due process and equal protection clauses. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence was not so unsatisfactory, unreasonable, or improbable to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt and that the version of the statute under which defendant was sentenced was not unconstitutional. (ROCHFORD and MARTIN, concurring)
Defendant appealed from his conviction for first-degree murder arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not justified in the amount of force that he used to protect a shed from burglary, that the State committed error during closing argument, that the jury was presented with improper and prejudicial evidence, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court failed to admonish defendant of his right to testify in his own defense. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and the trial court did not err in the admission of evidence or instruction to the jury. (WELCH and WHARTON, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 120-month term of incarceration, after finding that defendant qualified for career offender treatment under section 4B1.1 of USSG based on prior Wisconsin convictions for possessing tetrahydrocannabinol and for manufacturing/delivery of cocaine.. Ct. rejected defendant’s invitation to reconsider holding in Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, where court held that underlying offense need not involve substance controlled by Controlled Substances Act in order to qualify as predicate “controlled substance offense” for purpose of career offender enhancement under section 4B1.1 of USSG. Ct. further found that Dist. Ct. adequately and meaningfully considered defendant’s mitigation evidence that concerned his substance abuse, his adverse childhood upbringing and mental health struggles.
Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 120-month term of incarceration on various drug offenses, where Dist. Ct. based said sentence, in part, on finding that 55.6 grams of methamphetamine found in defendant’s home was 100 percent pure. Record showed that chemist affidavit submitted by defendant was “some evidence” sufficient to call purity finding into question, where defendant’s chemist explained that exact purity could not be determined with DEA’s method, and that purity level of defendant’s drugs could be substantially lower than what DEA had reported. While Dist. Ct. held belief that defendant had failed to present sufficient evidence that DEA’s protocols were not reliable so as to shift burden on government to establish purity level, Ct. of Appeals found that remand for new sentencing hearing was required, where: (1) reliability of DEA’s finding was sufficiently questioned by defendant’s chemist; (2) government chose to rest on assumption that DEA had reliable and generally accepted methods of testing drug purity; and (3) instant unsupported assumption did not indicate whether test results in defendant’s particular case can be reasonably relied upon. Fact that defendant had failed to carry out his own purity test did not require different result. (Dissent filed.)
Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and armed robbery and sentenced to 85 years. Defendant appealed the sentence and the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed the jury to receive testimony regarding defendant’s refusal to provide a DNA sample, when it precluded the jury from receiving testimony from a defense witness, and when it allowed the jury to view defendant’s “booking photo” during closing argument. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the defendant did not establish that the trial court’s decisions regarding the evidence presented at trial or the sentence imposed were reversible error. (TURNER and BRIDGES, concurring)
Defendant appealed from an order dismissing his amended successive Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition for relief from his first-degree murder conviction. Defendant argued that he did not receive reasonable assistance from post-conviction counsel because counsel did not argue that defendant’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant did not identify a meritorious basis for a proportionate-penalties claim where he did not establish that his sentence was a de facto life sentence. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 76 years of imprisonment. He subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging a claim of actual innocence that was summarily dismissed by the trial court at the first stage as being frivolous and patently without merit. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the record definitely rebutted defendant’s post-conviction claims and that the trial court did not err in dismissing his petition at the first stage. (DeARMOND and STEIGMANN, concurring)
Defendant appealed from his convictions for first-degree murder, aggravated discharge of a firearm, conspiracy to commit aggravated discharge of a firearm, and two counts of perjury. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress clothing that was seized by the police when they obtained the clothing without a warrant while he was in the hospital because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his trauma room located in the emergency department of the hospital. Defendant also argued that his conspiracy conviction and one of his perjury convictions should be vacated. The appellate court affirmed the denial of his motion to dismiss, vacated one of his perjury convictions, and vacated his conviction for conspiracy to commit aggravated discharge of a firearm. (CATES and WHARTON, concurring)
In prosecution on wire fraud and unlawful use of forced labor charges arising out of defendant’s scheme to recruit religious followers and then force them to work multiple full-time job and then give defendant all of their wages, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s fourth motion to continue trial made by one of his substitute counsel. Instant continuance motion came at end of 2.5 year period of trial preparation, and after substitute counsel took defendant’s case with explicit understanding that he would have four months to prepare for case. Moreover, defendant failed to establish any prejudice, where defendant was able to retain expert, and where counsel met with defendant and developed cogent defense. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in refusing defendant’s proposed jury instruction that told jury not to consider way in which defendant exercised or practiced her religion when determining question of guilt, where proposed instruction was not accurate statement of law because it would have excused her criminal conduct based on her religious assertions. Too, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in calculating restitution by relying on opinion of expert, who determined costs to treat victims, who suffered from PTSD arising out of defendant’s conduct, by calculating costs as overall group of victims, as opposed to making individual assessment of each victim.
