Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. He argued sentencing as a Class X felon violated the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and moved the trial court to sentence him instead for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a Class 2 felony. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to 16 years in prison and defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the elements of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse are not the same and, as a result, the disparate sentences for the two offenses are proper and do not violate the proportionate penalties clause. (McLAREN and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant was the driver in a single-vehicle accident that resulted in the death of his passenger and was found guilty of two counts of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol. The court merged the aggravated DUI counts and sentenced defendant to six years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove his whole blood alcohol concentration was at or above 0.08 because it relied on the lay testimony of one of the officers who investigated the case to convert the results of Defendant’s blood serum alcohol concentration to its whole blood equivalent. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, but found the circuit court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s post-trial motion to substitute counsel. The Supreme Court, however, found that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the officer’s testimony and that this merited reversal of defendant’s conviction on the first count, but that it was harmless error regarding the second count. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the appellate court opinion finding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s post-trial motion to substitute counsel. (THEIS, NEVILLE, HOLDER WHITE, and CUNNINGHAM concurring. ROCHFORD and O’BRIEN took not part in the decision.)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that she was denied a fair trial, and that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the evidence supporting the conviction was sufficient because a rational trier of fact could have found defendant had control over the vehicle where the ammunition was located because she was the only registered owner of the vehicle. The court further found that defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to give the jury IPI Criminal No. 5.01B, which defines the term “knowingly,” because that language was potentially harmful to the defendant’s case. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, and CUNNINGHAM, concurring. HOLDER WHITE and O’BRIEN took no part in the decision.)

Plaintiffs brought an action for declaratory injunctive, and monetary relief challenging the City of Chicago’s authority to enact an ordinance imposing administrative penalties on the owners of impounded vehicles. Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance was an invalid exercise of the City’s home rule authority because it preempted section 11-208.7 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. The circuit court dismissed the complaint and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal and affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, finding that the imposition of a penalty was a valid exercise of the city’s home rule authority and did not constitute a criminal penalty for the purposes of double jeopardy. (NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, and HOLDER WHITE, concurring. CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD and O’BRIEN took no part in the decision.)

Defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery in violation of section 12-3.05(d)(4)(i) of the Criminal Code and was sentenced to three and a half years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not present any evidence that his conduct insulted or provoked the victim. The appellate court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court also affirmed, finding that the State was not required to prove that a victim of battery subjectively felt insulted or provoked, but instead that a reasonable person would have felt insulted or provoked by the physical contact. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET and HOLDER WHITE, concurring. CUNNINGHAM And ROCHFORD took no part in the decision.)

Petitioner pleaded guilty in the circuit court to unlawful possession of a firearm by a gang member and was sentenced to four years in prison. Defendant argued on appeal that section 24-1.8(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Conduct was unconstitutional because it impermissibly criminalized his status as a gang member and violated substantive due process. The appellate court affirmed his conviction, and the supreme court granted his petition for leave to appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the statute is constitutional and comports with both the 8th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (THEIS, NEVILLE and OVERSTREET, concurring. CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN took no part in the decision.)

Defendant was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol and his driving privileges were summarily suspended by statute. Defendant petitioned to rescind the summary suspension, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe he was under the influence of alcohol. At the hearing on the motion, the State presented no evidence but asked that the court consider the arresting officer’s official reports under section 2-118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. The court did not consider the official reports as evidence and granted the defendant’s motion. The State appealed, arguing that the court should have considered the reports. The appellate court agreed, vacated the order granting the defendant’s petition to rescind, and remanded for a new rescission hearing. (HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion and ordered the court to dismiss defendant’s motion for lack of jurisdiction because his pro se motion was filed more than 30 days after the court entered judgment on his conviction. (MOORE and McHANEY, concurring)

State appealed from a trial court order granting defendant’s motion for an automatic rescission of defendant’s suspended driving privileges subsequent to a DUI ticket on the basis that the hearing was not held within 30 days from the date of the filing of the petition to rescind and that 34 days of delay were attributable to the State. The State argued on appeal that the defendant invited error when he agreed to a hearing date beyond the 30-day deadline and that the days attributed to the State should have been attributed to the defendant. Defendant argued that the State had forfeited its invited-error argument. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that at least some of the delay was improperly attributed to the State so that automatic rescission was not proper and declining to find that the State forfeited its invited-error argument. (JORGENSEN and KENNEDY, concurring)