Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in revoking defendant's term of supervised release and sentencing him to 24 months of incarceration, followed by 24-month term of supervised release when he admitted to use of cocaine and methamphetamine during his term of supervised release. On appeal, defendant argued that he was entitled to new sentencing hearing, because Dist. Ct. had: (1) disregarded his mitigation arguments that involved fact that he had paid child support that had accrued during his prior incarceration on drug conspiracy charges; and (2) failed to consider certain sentencing factors under section 3553(a). Ct. of Appeals, though, held that during revocation sentencing hearing, Dist. Ct. need not explain how every potential mitigation point affected Dist. Ct.'s reasoning in imposing instant sentence, and record otherwise reflected that Dist. Ct. had actually considered his mitigation arguments. Moreover, record reflected that Dist. Ct. actually considered sentencing factors under section 3553(a). Also, sentencing at high end of guideline range was not substantively unreasonable, where defendant had failed to abide by prior terms of probation or supervision, and where Dist. Ct. noted that defendant had already received prior sentencing break, since Dist. Ct. had given defendant below-guideline range sentence when imposing defendant's original sentence.

In prosecution on charge of distribution of 50 or more grams of methamphetamine, Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 135-month term of incarceration that was based, in part, on two-level enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(1) of USSG for possession of firearm in relation to charged drug offense. While Dist. Ct. found that another individual's possession of firearm during specific drug transaction satisfied requirements for enhancement under circumstances, where defendant was seated in vehicle in which drug transaction occurred, record showed that no one in vehicle had possessed firearm during said transaction. As such, enhancement was improper, because there must be actual possession of firearm during transaction for enhancement to apply. Fact that there was testimony that one participant in vehicle regularly carried firearm during drug transactions did not support imposition of enhancement under instant record. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to above guideline, 171-month term of incarceration on robbery and firearm charges, even though applicable guideline range was 135-147 months’ term of incarceration. Dist. Ct. correctly determined applicable guideline range and explained that upward deviation from guideline range was appropriate due to defendant’s violent conduct during robbery and impact that said conduct had on robbery victims. Moreover, Dist. Ct.'s comment that guideline range for certain counts was “ridiculous” did not constitute procedural error. Also, Dist. Ct. provided adequate explanation for exceeding applicable guideline range. Too, instant sentence was not substantively unreasonable, given defendant’s violent conduct and impact that said conduct had on victims.

In prosecution on firearm and drug charges, defendant waived any objection to Dist. Ct.’s denial of his motion to suppress seizure of drugs and firearms, where defendant entered into unconditional guilty plea in open court, since entry of unconditional guilty plea in open court waives all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to entry of guilty plea. Moreover, while prior to entry of said plea, defendant submitted pro se letter to court, indicating that he wished to “reserve all [his] appeals,” such letter did not contain reservation of any specific pretrial motion or contain consent of government and Dist. Ct. to accept any conditional guilty plea as required by Rule 11(a)(2), However, defendant was entitled to remand for new sentencing hearing, where Dist. Ct. based enhanced sentence on two state court convictions, one of which (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2)) did not qualify as “felony drug offense” under Ruth, 966 F.3d 642.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy, murder for hire and money laundering charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying multiple defendants’ motions to suppress guns and firearms seized from their homes through use of court-approved wiretaps. Dist. Ct. could properly find that government’s explanation for use of first wiretap was sufficient, even though defendants argued that government had failed in this regard, where traditional investigational techniques had proved fruitful at time of wiretap application. Government’s explanation that wiretap was needed to help investigate nature and methods of defendants’ drug trafficking business and location of drugs, as well as to determine identities and roles of various accomplices to conspiracy was sufficient to justify wiretap. Also, government provided sufficient explanation for second wiretap, where continued use of confidential informant was deemed too dangerous, where there was still need to confirm true nature of many visits to one defendant’s home, and where traditional investigation techniques had proved to be limited in their usefulness. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying second motion to suppress filed by one defendant with regard to search of his home, where defendant argued that search warrant was not supported by probable cause. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that there was insufficient facts to establish that stated address in affidavit was his address, or that drugs would be located in his home, where intercepted communication indicated that said defendant had ordered drugs some 10 days prior to warrant application. Fact that Dist. Ct. had failed to conduct evidentiary hearing on motion did not required different result.

In prosecution on sex-trafficking charges to which defendant had pleaded guilty and received life sentence, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, even though defendant argued that his guilty pleas were invalid, because: (1) he was without counsel at time he entered into guilty pleas at start of trial; (2) he was denied his right to counsel because his waiver of counsel was made under circumstances where he did not know his appellate rights at time of his waiver; and (3) his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Ct. of Appeals, in rejecting defendant’s claims, noted that: (1) defendant was appointed several counsel, who were either removed at defendant’s request or who had filed motions to withdraw; and (2) Dist. Ct. subjected defendant to two thorough Faretta hearings, where defendant confirmed that he understood charges against him and severe penalties he faced if convicted on said charges, and that he understood that Dist Ct. could not advise him on how to try his case; and (3) Dist. Ct. reminded defendant that legal counsel would represent him far better than defendant could represent himself. Record also showed that Dist. Ct. fully complied with requirements set forth in Rule 11(b). Dist. Ct. also did not err in denying defendant’s pro se request for court-funded expert to investigate certain settings on defendant’s cellphone, where: (1) defendant failed to produce any credible evidence that police had tampered with settings in his cellphone to obtain incriminating evidence; and (2) defendant’s request failed to identify expert or expert’s likely testimony and did not estimate expert’s cost.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy, murder for hire and money laundering charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants’ Batson challenge to government’s use of peremptory challenges to two African-American jurors. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendants’ argument that government’s use of three of its six peremptory challenges on African-American potential jurors, which resulted in exclusion of 43 percent of eligible African Americans compared to only 13 percent of white venire members, was, by itself, evidence of racial discrimination. Ct. further observed that Dist. Ct. actually noted government’s strike rate at step one of Batson process, and that fact that Dist. Ct. did not repeat said strike rate at step three of Batson process did not require different result. Moreover, government could justify use of peremptory challenge on one juror, who expressed concern that he would lose clients if he had to miss work to attend trial and expressed pro-defense bias by suggesting that defendants were not guilty under all circumstances. Also, government could use peremptory challenge with respect to second juror, who suggested that her attendance at trial might create hardship for her because of her need to take care of her son. Said juror also stated that family member was in prison, which can be valid race-neutral justification for using peremptory challenge.