Criminal Law

The Supreme Court considered whether a delay can be attributable to the defense for the purposes of a speedy trial if the defendant’s action did not result in the postponement of a pending trial date. The defendant had argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it attributed a delay to defendant for his delayed disclosure of an alibi defense despite it not resulting in a change of trial date. Defendant also argued his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal of the charges based on a speedy-trial violation. The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, which found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that defendant received effective assistance of counsel. The court held that under the plain language of the speedy-trial statute, a delay of the 120-day speedy-trial term can be attributed to the defendant irrespective of whether the delay postponed a date set for trial. (ANNE M. BURKE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring. NEVILLE, dissenting. HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision.)

Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated battery and was sentenced to 60 years. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court violated his right to present a complete sentence and challenged his sentence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it prohibited evidence of the prior statement of a witness where it was cumulative and the jury was made aware the witness had made inconsistent statements, and where the evidence against the defendant was “overwhelming.” The appellate court also found that the trial court sentence was not excessive and that the trial court properly considered the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in determining the sentence. (DAUGHERIT, concurring and PETERSON, specially concurring)

Defendant was convicted with criminal sexual abuse and aggravated criminal sexual abuse and argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce into evidence two photos from the defendant’s cell phone. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the admission of the photos was an abuse of discretion because they had the primary effect of casting a negative light on defendant due to his sexual orientation and that it invited the jury to decide the case based on an improper propensity inference. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring)

In 2012, the plaintiff, a water reclamation district, stopped paying rent pursuant to an agreement to dispose of water and wastewater on property owned by the defendant and filed a complaint to have the agreement declared void as unconscionable and against public policy. The defendant filed a complaint seeking damages for unpaid rent and the circuit court consolidated the matters. The trial court found that the district had breached the agreements and awarded damages to the defendant. The trial court also held that the defendants had also breached the agreement and awarded damages in favor of the district. The parties then cross-appealed. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the trial court erred in finding that the defendants breached the agreement and awarding damages to the plaintiffs but affirming the trial court’s award of damages in favor of the defendants. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of domestic battery and sentenced to five years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury when the court required that all jurors wear masks during voir dire because it prevented him from seeing jurors’ facial expressions. The appellate court affirmed, finding that there was no evidence that the wearing of masks undermined the jury selection process and noting that the majority of U.S. jurisdictions that had considered the question had come to the same result. (SCHOSTOK and HUDSON, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and being an armed habitual criminal. The trial court merged the unlawful weapon by a felon count into the armed habitual criminal count and sentenced defendant to 7 ½ years in prison. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds that the State improperly presented audio recordings from a body-worn camera that were subject to exclusion as hearsay and the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction. The supreme court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal which raised the issue of whether the Law Enforcement Officer Body-Worn Camera Act provided that recordings are admissible regardless of whether the recordings hearsay. The supreme court dismissed the appeal finding that the State did not address that question and had abandoned its argument that body camera audio recordings were automatically admissible and did not constitute hearsay. (THEIS, ANNE M. BURKE, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, CARTER, and HOLDER WHITE, concurring)

Defendant appealed his sentence to two concurrent terms of mandatory life imprisonment, arguing on direct appeal that his life sentences were unconstitutional because their mandatory nature did not allow the trial court to consider that he was 19 years old at the time of the offense. The appellate court found that the record was insufficient and instructed the defendant to develop the record in post-conviction proceedings. Defendant pursued a post-conviction petition, which was summarily dismissed by the trial court. The appellate court observed that the law on the level of corroboration needed to establish that Miller v. Alabama applies to a young adult “is in disarray.” Despite this, the appellate court concluded it could not determine that defendant had failed to present an arguable claim and reversed and remanded for further post-conviction proceedings. (PUCINSKI, concurring and LAVIN, dissenting)

Petitioner challenged the second-stage dismissal of his post-conviction petitioner contending that he was denied of his right to procedural due process when the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss without giving him notice and an opportunity to respond. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the procedural due process violation was harmless error and the supreme court affirmed the opinion of the appellate court. (THEIS, ANNE M. BURKE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, OVERSTREET, CARTER, and HOLDER WHITE, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery. On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated battery because a cellblock in a maximum-security prison that is not accessible to the public is not “public property” for the purposes of the aggravated battery statute and the State failed to prove ownership of the property at issue. The supreme court affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence, finding that the prison was public property for the purposes of the aggravated battery statute and that it was proper for the court to take judicial notice of an element of the offense where the fact was readily verifiable “from sources of indisputable accuracy” and that there was no question regarding the ownership of the prison where the offense occurred. (THEIS, ANNE M. BURKE, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring. HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision.)