Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm and was sentenced to 25 years. During the trial, the trial court judge allowed the State to present scent trail and DNA testimony linking the defendant to the crime, but subsequently held that the DNA evidence lacked sufficient foundation and instructed the jury to disregard it. During deliberations, the jury sent out questions relating to the scent trail evidence and indicated it could not reach a verdict. The court gave the Prim instruction. Defendant appealed arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper dog-tracking evidence. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court’s failure to grant defendant’s motion for a mistrial was plain error where the court gave the Prim instruction and the jury later said it could not reach a unanimous agreement. The court also noted that on remand the parties should follow the Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the use of dog-tracking evidence, which was prohibited in People v. Cruz. (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of home invasion, armed robbery, and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant alleged in his post-conviction petition that the items found in his pocket that linked him to the crime were planted by the police and that the investigating officers committed perjury at trial. In support of his due-process claim, defendant referenced an affidavit of one of his co-defendants where the co-defendant swore that the police officers found the items on him when he was arrested. The affidavit did not appear in the record and the trial court order denying defendant’s petition did not mention the affidavit. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant failed to meet his burden where there was no evidence of the existence of the alleged affidavit, but noting that it defendant could produce a fresh affidavit he could raise the issue in a subsequent post-conviction petition and would be entitled to second-stage proceedings.(HOWSE and COBBS, concurring)

Defendant entered an open plea of guilty to aggravated driving under the influence, which was a Class 1 felony because he had three prior convictions for DUI and one for aggravated DUI. Defendant was sentenced to 10 years. Defendant appealed from the circuit court’s orders denying his motion to withdraw his plea and to reconsider the sentence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the State’s failure to find one of the predicate convictions earlier in the process and the State filing a new charge after finding this information did not result from vindictiveness and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 10-year sentence. (TURNER and CAVANAGH, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and sentenced as a Class X offender to six years in prison. On appeal, the appellate court held that defendant’s first felony offense, committed when he was 17 years old, was not a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing and vacated his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the offense committed when defendant was 17 years old was not a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing under section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections as it existed at the time defendant was sentenced. Two justices dissented. (THEIS, NEVILLE and CARTER, concurring and OVERSTREET and BURKE, dissenting. HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision)

Defendant appealed from an order of the circuit court granting the State’s motion to dismiss his amended petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Defendant argued on appeal that he did not receive reasonable assistance from post-conviction counsel because, more than 16 years after defendant filed his pro se post-conviction petition, counsel submitted an amended petition that disregarded his pro se claims and instead raised a new, meritless claim. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant was no worse off where post-conviction counsel chose to pursue a single issue that was not successful instead of the meritless issues raised by defendant in his pro se petition. The appellate court also declined to find that delay alone constituted non-compliance with Rule 651(c). (McLAREN and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant appealed from his convictions for armed habitual criminal, operating an uninsured vehicle, driving while license revoked, and obstructed registration. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that where the defendant was willing to stipulate to the two prior convictions that qualified him to be charged as an armed habitual criminal, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the names of those convictions. (BRENNAN and SCHOSTOK, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of harassing a witness and sentenced to 120 days and 30 months’ probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the court committed reversible error when it responded to a question from the jury during its deliberation, that she was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial error, and that her defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file an assessment waiver. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s intent to promote or facilitate a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury was properly instructed, that the prosecutor’s statements during closing were not improper, and that defendant had failed to establish that she was entitled to an assessment waiver. (DeARMOND and STEIGMANN, concurring)