Criminal Law

Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition but voluntarily withdrew it during the second stage of proceedings. Less than a year later, defendant filed a motion to refile and reinstate an amended pro se post-conviction petition. The court granted the motion and dismissed the amended petition at the first stage of proceedings. Defendant appealed arguing his petition should have been reinstated at the second stage and that his petition set forth the gist of a constitutional claim. The appellate court affirmed, finding under general civil practice rules that while defendant was entitled to re-file a post-conviction petition it was not a “reinstatement” of his prior petition and, as a result, was properly treated by the trial court as an original petition under the Act and the trial court did not err when it dismissed it during the first stage of proceedings. (CAVANAGH and STEIGMANN, concurring)

Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in finding that the prosecutor’s unobjected-to comments about hearsay during rebuttal closing argument were reversible plain error. The Court explained that the prosecutor’s statements regarding hearsay, while incomplete, were not improper because they captured “the core of the rule.” Because it was not improper it did not constitute clear and obvious error. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring)

Petitioner appealed the second-stage dismissal of his post-conviction petition and sought to have his petition remanded for second-stage proceedings because the attorney appointed to represent him at the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss did not independently demonstrate compliance with SCR 651(c) although prior appointed counsel had filed a Rule 615(c) certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court and trial court, finding that Rule 651(c) does not require that every attorney who represents a post-conviction petitioner show compliance with the rule. (ANNE M. BURKE, THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring)

Defendants appealed trial court judgment holding them in direct criminal contempt, contending that the trial court erred in holding the defendants in contempt when it was necessary to consider extrinsic evidence to reach a factual conclusion as to whether defendant’s absence from trial was the result of willful misconduct. The appellate court agreed and reversed, noting that in order to find defendant in direct contempt the trial court relied on proof of matters outside of its immediate knowledge and, as a result, any contempt finding could only be indirect and that the trial court did not follow the procedural safeguards required for entry of indirect contempt. (WELCH and CATES, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of multiple felony offenses, including first-degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and sentenced to consecutive terms of 65 years, 15 years, and 7 years, respectively. Defendant appealed arguing he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder, the jury verdicts were legally inconsistent, cumulative error, and his sentences were excessive. The appellate court agreed that the sentences were inconsistent and affirmed his convictions and sentences for felony murder and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, reversed his conviction for aggravated battery with a firearm, and vacated the jury’s finding of guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm and remanded for a new trial on the aggravated battery with a firearm charge. (O’BRIEN and HAUPTMAN, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and in his direct appeal argued there were deficiencies in the eyewitness testimony leading to his conviction. The appellate court affirmed, but noted in its opinion that defendant did not attempt to call a witness at trial regarding the psychology of witness identifications. Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or call an expert witness on the issue of eyewitness identification. The trial court dismissed the petition and defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed, finding the claim of ineffective assistance arguable because an expert on eyewitness identification could have undermined witness credibility, creating the probability of a different outcome. The court remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (PUCINSKI and WALKER, concurring)

Defendant appealed circuit court denial of leave to file a second post-conviction petition. Defendant argued on appeal that his petition sufficiently presented a claim that his 51-year sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to him where he was 23 years old at the time of the offense. The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court gave sufficient consideration to defendant’s capacity for rehabilitation and mitigating factors in imposing the sentence and did not err when it denied his motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. (PIERCE and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and domestic battery and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Defendant argued on appeal that no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt because he acted reasonably and with justification in using lethal force. The appellate court analyzed the case under section 7-2(a) of the Criminal Code regarding the defense of a dwelling, concluded that no rational trier of fact could have found defendant’s use of force was not justified, and vacated his conviction for second-degree murder. (SCHMIDT and HAUPTMAN, concurring)