Criminal Law

Petitioner-appellant filed a claim with the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission (TIRC) alleging that his convictions in two underlying matters were the result of police torture. The TIRC referred his claims to the circuit court. Petitioner moved for substitution of judge as of right. The trial court denied his motion and then granted the State’s motion to dismiss the TIRC referral. The appellate court found that the trial court erred when it dismissed the referral without first holding an evidentiary hearing and that the court erred when it denied his motion to substitute judge. (HYMAN and WALKER, concurring)

Defendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the offense, filed a post-conviction petition challenging his 80-year sentence for murder arguing that it was unconstitutional pursuant to Miller v. Alabama and its progeny. The trial court dismissed the petition at the first stage and defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant’s sentence was not a de facto life sentence where he was subject to day-to-day credit that would reduce the amount of time served to 40 years. (PIERCE, concurring. ODEN JOHNSON, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and burglary and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 33 years. He appealed arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress inculpatory statements when he was prevented from making a phone call for 24 hours after he was arrested during which time he invoked his right to counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court found that lengthy incommunicado detention is a form of police coercion and that under the facts of the case the defendant’s inculpatory statements were involuntary and should have been suppressed. However, the court conclude that the admission of the statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the judgment entered by the trial court. (ANNE M. BURKE, THEIS, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring. MICHAEL J. BURKE and GARMAN, specially concurring.)

The Illinois Supreme Court held that the firing of a single shot in the direction of multiple peace officers does not support multiple convictions for aggravated discharge. The court explained that the number of “victims” does not control the unit of prosecution. The court looks instead to the language of the statute to determine the intent of the legislature and will resolve any doubt against construing the statute in a manner that supports multiple instances of the same offense for the same singular act. With regard to aggravated discharge, the court found no express definition of the unit of prosecution contained in the language of the statute and, applying the doctrine of lenity, the court concluded that a single discharge in the direction of multiple peace officers constitutes a single offense.  (ANNE M. BURKE, THEIS, MICHAEL J. BURKE and OVERSTREET, concurring. CARTER and NEVILLE, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault and sentenced to 14 years in prison. Ten years later defendant filed a motion for forensic testing of evidence only to discover that all forensic evidence had been destroyed. Defendant moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the police department failed to comply with section 116-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pertaining to the preservation of forensic evidence. The circuit court denied the motion and the appellate court reversed and vacated defendant’s conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that post-conviction access to forensic testing is not a constitutional right and found nothing in the plain language of section 116-4 indicated that the legislature intended a conviction to be vacated for a failure to comply with the statute. As a result, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred when it vacated the conviction. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, and MICHAEL J. BURKE, concurring. NEVILLE, dissenting. CARTER took no part in the decision.)

In a consolidated appeal, Defendant appealed from multiple felony convictions and alleged that the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial on one of the two cases that were consolidated when it granted the State’s pretrial motion for continuance to obtain DNA results. The appellate court found that the trial court order granting the motion was an abuse of discretion because it did not follow the “clear” procedures required by statute and case law and that this created a scenario where defendant was compelled to move for a continuance because he was reassigned appointed counsel who needed time to prepare for trial. The appellate court held that under these “unique circumstances,” the delay was not attributable to the defense and because the delay prevented the case from going to trial within 120 days, defendant’s speedy-trial right was violated. (SCHMIDT, concurring. LYTTON, specially concurring.)

On remand from the appellate court, defendant filed a second-amended successive post-conviction petition challenging his de facto life sentence under Miller v. Alabama and the State conceded he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. The defendant, who was a minor at the time of the offense, then appealed his subsequent re-sentencing, arguing the circuit court abused its discretion when it increased his first-degree murder sentence from the statutory minimum based, in part, on the aggravating factor of deterring others. The appellate court affirmed, holding that sentencing courts can consider deterrence of others in imposing a discretionary sentence on a juvenile offender. (KNECTH and CAVANAGH, concurring)