Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. He appealed alleging that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements, that the State failed to prove the aggravating factor that was the basis for the sentence of natural life imprisonment, and that the trial court improperly considered factors in his sentencing that were “unproven.” The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant’s statements were voluntary and pursuant to a valid waiver of his Miranda rights, that a rational trier of fact could find the aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the facts considered were reasonably inferred from the facts. (HARRIS and STEIGMANN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal. He appealed arguing that the State did not prove he possessed a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt and that the case should be remanded for a Krankel hearing regarding defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate witnesses. The appellate court affirmed finding the evidence supported the conviction where an officer testified to seeing defendant in possession of a firearm and that the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (PIERCE and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of attempted murder after a jury trial and his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant filed a post-conviction petition raising multiple allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the trial court denied after a third stage evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed alleging the trial court erred when it did not grant defendant’s petition after the second stage where the State did not file an answer and that his post-conviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance. The appellate court affirmed, finding that while the State was permitted to file a response at the second stage, it was not required to do so and the trial court did not err by advancing the petition to the third stage. The appellate court further found defendant failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness created by the SCR 615(c) certificate. (BOIE and MOORE, concurring)

Appellate court reviewed the proper procedure for appointed counsel to withdraw from postconviction proceedings pursuant to People v. Kuehner and held that a motion to withdraw cannot be granted unless the record shows that defendant has had an opportunity to respond to it. (JORGENSEN and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty after a jury trial of home invasion, residential burglary, and unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant appealed arguing that it was plain error when he was placed in restraints during cross-examination. The appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not hold the mandatory Boose hearing prior to placing defendant in restraints. However, the court found that defendant did not meet his burden of proving that the error affected the fairness of the trial or impeded the integrity of the judicial process and affirmed defendant’s conviction. (HAUPTMAN and HOLDRIDGE, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of domestic battery; however, the circuit court failed to administer a trial oath to the jury prior to the verdict. Defendant did not object and raised the issue for the first time in her posttrial motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding the error was harmless. The appellate court affirmed on the basis that defendant forfeited the issue. The Supreme Court reversed, exercising its discretion under the second prong of the plain error rule on the basis that upholding a conviction before an unsworn jury would undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system. The court remanded for a new trial, finding that a second trial was not precluded by double jeopardy because jeopardy did not attach where the jury was not administered a trial oath. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, and CARTER, concurring)

Defendant entered an open plea of guilty to residential burglary and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. He appealed arguing that the sentence was excessive and an abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed, finding that while the trial court’s sentence was toward the high end of the sentencing range it was supported by the evidence and, as a result, that the trial court’s determination that defendant had failed to demonstrate rehabilitative potential was not an abuse of discretion. (TURNER and HARRIS, concurring)