Defendant was found guilty of two counts of domestic battery. Defendant appealed arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel where counsel promised testimony during opening statements that was not presented to the jury and by failing to object to remarks in rebuttal argument that shifted the burden of proof. The appellate court affirmed, finding that unforeseen events forced counsel to change legal strategy and that the State’s comments during rebuttal were not prejudicial. (McLAREN and BIRKETT, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his conviction on two counts of possession of drugs with intent to deliver on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine government witness by impeaching said witness regarding: (1) alleged quantity of drugs witness purchased from defendant; (2) statements evincing witness’s motive to lie; (3) witness’s alleged drug dealing; and (4) witness’s prior criminal convictions. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant suffered no prejudice as result of trial counsel’s representation, where there existed overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, since: (1) police uncovered on defendant’s person at time of arrest nearly 30 individual plastic bags containing drugs; (2) police officer testified drug contained in said bags was consistent with street sale; (3) police also uncovered from defendant more than $1,100 in small bills that suggested that defendant was in business of selling drugs; (4) another witness testified that he drove government witness to defendant’s home town to purchase drugs; and (5) text messages from government witness’s phone confirmed that she had planned on purchasing drugs from defendant, and that government witness had communicated with defendant to confirm her plan.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and attempted armed robbery and sentenced to a total of 80 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition, contending that his sentence was an as-applied violation of the proportionate penalties clause because he was 18 years old at the time of the offense. The appellate court affirmed, finding the defendant did not meet his burden of alleging facts showing that his particular circumstances fell under Miller. (PIERCE, concurring and MIKVA, dissenting)
Defendant was found guilty of two counts of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury and death and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 15 years’ imprisonment. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court failed to properly answer a jury question, the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial, and that the trial court committed plain error by sentencing him to an extended term of 15 years imprisonment for his conviction of a Class 2 felony. The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury to rely on the jury instructions and that defendant had forfeited his argument regarding his motion for a mistrial because he did not raise it in his post-trial motion. The appellate court found the extended term for the lesser offense was improper and reduced his sentence on that count to seven years’ imprisonment. (ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed arguing she was denied effective assistance of counsel, her sentence was excessive, and the restitution order was erroneous. Defendant argued she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because her trial attorney did not subject the evidence against her to a meaningful adversarial hearing by conceding defendant’s guilt during opening statements. The appellate court affirmed finding trial counsel did not concede defendant’s guilt and that the sentence was not excessive, but remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to set time limit and terms for payment of restitution. (BRIDGES and ZENOFF, concurring)
In prosecution on charges that defendant-doctor engaged in conspiracy with others in weight loss clinic to distribute controlled substances outside usual course of professional practices and without legitimate medical purpose, Dist. Ct. did not err in giving jury “ostrich” instruction under circumstances where defendant testified that he was unaware that others (non-doctors) at clinic were dispensing said drugs to patients without physician review, and that he did not knowingly become member of conspiracy with intent to advance conspiracy. Ostrich instruction was proper, since there was ample evidence that showed that defendant subjectively believed that there was high probability that he was participating in criminal activity, and that he took specific deliberate actions to avoid learning of said criminal activity, where defendant: (1) physically avoided front desk of clinic and clinic’s file storage; (2) came to clinic only once per week and reviewed only handful of patients files to determine whether patients qualified for drug treatment; (3) was aware that clinic initially ordered under defendant’s DEA number 40,000 pills, and he re-routed future pill shipments to clinic; and (4) admitted that drug suppliers sent 520,000 pills under defendant’s DEA number. Moreover, jury could conclude that defendant suspected that meager number of patient files he reviewed could not consume great quantity of drugs ordered on defendant’s credit. Defendant also attempted to hide his affiliation with clinic from his own employer and IRS.
Dist. Ct. committed plain error in denying defendant’s motion to reduce his 360-month sentence on certain crack-cocaine offenses pursuant to First Step Act. Defendant originally had been given life sentence on said offenses, which was reduced in 2014 to 360-month sentence based on retroactive sentencing guideline amendments. In 2019, defendant filed instant request for reduced sentence under section 404 of First Step Act, and Dist. Ct. denied said request, after finding that reprehensibility of defendant’s offenses outweighed defendant’s youth at time of offenses, lack of significant criminal history and near perfect disciplinary record in prison. However, remand was required for reconsideration of defendant’s request, where Dist. Ct. failed to calculate new statutory ranges for defendant’s three offenses, which deprived defendant of benefit of any anchoring effect that new statutory ranges could have had on Dist. Ct.’s decision.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 20-year term of incarceration on drug conspiracy and two other drug related charges, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. made certain erroneous factual findings that caused Dist. Ct. to calculate incorrect guideline range and to improperly designate him as “career offender” that overstated his past criminal conduct. Record supported Dist. Ct.’s finding that: (1) defendant sold drugs that caused death of third-party; (2) defendant had obstructed justice by attempting to influence witness’s testimony by attempting to alter her testimony; (3) defendant did not accept responsibility for his conduct, and thus was not entitled to reduction in his offense level based on his guilty plea, where defendant contested in his allocution presentence report’s conclusions that he sold drugs that led to third-party’s death; and (4) defendant qualified for “career offender” treatment, even though one of his predicate convictions was over 25 years old, where defendant met technical requirements for career offender treatment, and where circumstances of charged offenses and defendant’s decision to deal in particularly dangerous drugs that led to third-party’s death supported imposition of instant sentence
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana arising out of scheme to rob drug house, where defendant asserted that plan to commit said robbery and to resell marijuana obtained during robbery was devised outside his presence, and that there was no evidence that he had agreed to participate in said plan. Jury could properly find that it was unlikely that defendant would have endeavored to carry out dangerous operation requiring armament if reward was merely obtaining marijuana for recreational use as opposed to reselling marijuana obtained during robbery. Moreover, defendant’s actions in providing coverage fire for others at drug house also support instant conspiracy conviction. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly sentence defendant to 36-year term of incarceration, where sentence fell below applicable guideline range, and where: (1) defendant’s release just prior to his 57th birthday was not tantamount to de facto life sentence; and (2) Dist. Ct. adequately explained need for said incarceration.
Defendant appealed his conviction for one count of drug-induced homicide and two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. He appealed arguing that the trial court erred when it allowed cell phone records into evidence under the business record exception to hearsay as self-authenticating records. The appellate court found the records did not comply with IRE 902(11) because they were not accompanied by a certification entered under oath, but affirmed on the basis that the evidence was cumulative and their admission was harmless. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring)
