Eight years after respondent was civilly committed pursuant to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, respondent filed an application for discharge/conditional release as well as a motion for appointment of an independent evaluator. The trial court denied both motions and respondent appealed. The appellate court affirmed finding defendant’s due process rights were not violated by the denial of an independent evaluator. (BOIE and CATES, concurring)
Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 200-month term of incarceration on drug conspiracy charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that defendant was responsible for 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. Defendant admitted to having role in only 500-grams quantity of methamphetamine, and government failed to present any evidence to support prosecutor’s last-minute claim that defendant was responsible for 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. As such, defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing based on lower guideline range based on 500-gram quantity, and government will not be permitted to present new evidence to support higher quantity finding. Fact that instant sentence fell within lower guideline range applicable to 500-gram quantity finding did not require different result.
Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence regarding defendant’s involvement in robbery of two cell-phone stores (to which defendant had pleaded guilty) in attempt to establish defendant’s modus operandi with respect to charged third cell-phone store robbery to which defendant had not pleaded guilty. Although defendant argued that admission of said evidence constituted improper propensity evidence, Dist. Ct. could properly find that said evidence was properly admitted to show identity through modus operandi, where all three robberies showed sufficient commonalities with respect to pattern of conduct when robbing stores, similarities in clothing, similar theft of items and similar retreats from store after robbery. Moreover, facts from each robbery closely resembled each other, which reduced risk that evidence of robberies to which defendant had pleaded guilty would be inflammatory. Also, Dist. Ct. provided appropriate limiting instructions that mitigated any potential for unfair prejudice.
Defendant was found guilty of attempted first-degree murder of a peace officer and was sentenced to 30 years in prison, plus an additional 20 years for using a firearm during the commission of the offense. Defendant appealed his conviction arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request for a second expert to evaluate his mental state at the time he committed the offense and that the 20-year firearm enhancement did not apply to his case. The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court’s decision not to approve additional funds for further psychiatric evaluation was not an abuse of discretion. The appellate court also found the sentence enhancement was appropriately applied and that precedent to the contrary was “wrongly decided.” Justice Lytton dissented on the latter issue finding precedent on the question to be "well reasoned." (HOLDRIDGE, concurring and LYTTON, dissenting.)
Defendant was charged with two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a video recording made by a confidential informant and the informant’s testimony. The State appealed and the appellate court affirmed; however, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled that decision and directed the appellate court to consider the effect of its opinion in People v. Davis, 2021 IL 126435 where the court ruled that testimony of a confidential informant is admissible even where video of the transaction was recorded illegally. Based on the Supreme Court’s Davis opinion, the appellate court reversed the trial court order granting defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that the informant’s testimony and the video, without audio, were admissible. (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring)
Defendant was found guilty of aggravated domestic battery and argued on appeal that admission of hearsay statements at trial violated his right to confrontation, that the trial court erred in not conducting a preliminary inquiry into his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his 16-year sentence was excessive. The appellate court affirmed finding the out-of-court statements were not testimonial because they either were in response to questions intended to resolve an ongoing emergency or that defendant had waived objection under the doctrine of invited error. The court further found that the trial court’s failure to inquire into defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was harmless error and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant. (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s section 2241 habeas petition that challenged his enhanced life sentence under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), where defendant asserted that his prior Minnesota and North Dakota convictions for drug conspiracy and delivery of marijuana, respectively, used to support instant enhancement, did not qualify as predicate felony drug offenses for purposes of ACCA. Record showed that defendant had filed prior unsuccessful section 2255 and section 2241 habeas petitions that did not raise instant claim, and Ct. of Appeals found that defendant could not pursue instant relief under section 2241 via savings clause contained in section 2255(e), since he had been able to raise instant arguments under relevant 8th Circuit case law at time of his original section 2255 petition, where 8th Circuit case law was not squarely against defendant from seeking instant relief.
Defendant, who was a minor at the time of the offense, was found guilty of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 48 years’ imprisonment, but was later re-sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed the sentence arguing the truth-in-sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied because it requires him to serve the entirety of his sentence without the possibility of parole and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 40 years’ imprisonment in light of his expression of remorse and rehabilitative potential. The appellate court affirmed finding the truth-in-sentencing statute did not violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution and that the trial court properly took mitigating factors into account in sentencing the defendant. (JORGENSEN and BRENNAN, concurring)
Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion for reduction of his 300-month sentence under section 404(b) of First Step Act on his convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin and crack cocaine, where said section permits Dist. Ct. to use discretion in reducing punishment for crack cocaine offenses that occurred prior to August 3, 2010. While Dist. Ct., in denying defendant’s request, found that defendant was not legally eligible for his requested relief because he had been found guilty of quantity of heroin that qualified him for mandatory minimum sentence, Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct.’s ineligibility finding was in error, where defendant’s conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine conviction was covered offense that was subject to sentence reduction even though defendant was also convicted of offense that was not covered under First Step Act. Moreover, Dist. Ct. failed to address intervening case law that had potential to disqualify defendant’s prior 1999 Illinois conviction as predicate offense that had been used to enhance his original sentence. Too, remand was required, where Dist. Ct.’s decision not to use discretion to consider intervening case law amounted to abuse of discretion, where Dist. Ct. held belief that he had no such discretion to exercise.
Ct. of Appeals addressed appeals by three defendants, who challenged their sentences in connection with their membership in Latin Kings gang. With respect to one defendant, Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 108-month term of incarceration, where said sentence was based, in part, on two misdemeanor convictions under Illinois “street gang contact” statute that were added to defendant’s criminal history score. While under relevant guidelines, all prior felony and misdemeanor convictions are presumptively counted in criminal history score, prior convictions are counted only if: (1) their sentences involved terms of probation of more than one year or sentences that concerned 30-days or greater; or (2) prior offense was similar to certain enumerated offenses. Here, defendant’s misdemeanor convictions did not involve either instance. With respect to second defendant, whose sentence was enhanced by Dist. Ct’s finding that defendant had murdered rival gang member by preponderance of evidence, defendant noted that he was acquitted of criminal charge related to said murder and argued that Dist. Ct. improperly relied on certain post-arrest statement by third-party that attributed murder to defendant. Ct. of Appeals, though, held that said statement could be used by Dist. Ct. to support it’s preponderance of evidence finding. Dist. Ct. could also reject defendant’s request for downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, where defendant had denied murder allegation. With respect to third defendant, Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that his 200-month sentence was substantively unreasonable given his depression diagnosis and his strong employment history, since Dist. Ct. could have based said sentence on defendant’s extensive gang activity and leadership. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s inclusion of two non-violent marijuana convictions in defendant’s conviction score did not require different result, where deduction of said convictions from his score would still have produced guideline range of 210-262 months, which was greater than actual sentence.
