Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to file successive petition for post-conviction relief, where defendant argued that his 59-year sentence for his 1st degree murder and attempted armed robbery convictions violated 8th Amendment. Defendant argued that his juvenile status and his de facto life sentence required sentencing court to reconsider his sentence in light of Miller, 567 U.S. 460. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that defendant had established cause and prejudice to raise 8th Amendment challenge to his de facto life sentence in instant successive post-conviction petition because trial court did not consider fact that defendant was 14 years old at time of charged offenses and other related circumstances when it sentenced defendant to 59 years imprisonment.

This case presents question as to whether defendant was entitled to reversal of his convictions for predatory criminal sexual assault due to defect in his indictment, where indictment alleged that period in which alleged acts took place included time prior to effective date of statute that created charged offense. Appellate Court found that while relevant counts in indictment were legally defective, it further noted that instant argument was raised for first time on appeal. Moreover, it held that defendant was not entitled to reversal of his convictions, since: (1) indictment apprised defendant of precise offense with enough specificity so as to allow him to prepare defense; and (2) allegations in indictment, along with record of proceedings, were sufficient to allow defendant to plead judgment to bar any subsequent prosecution for same conduct.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s pre-trial motion to dismiss indictment that charged defendant with crime of predatory criminal sexual assault of child by alleging existence of “an act of contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of another person and the part of the body of another” without alleging “for the purpose of sexual gratification.” Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction, found that indictment did not meaningfully depart from language of statute, where, under Oxford English Dictionary, “sexual contact” as stated in indictment is conduct done for purpose of sexual gratification or arousal.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed defendant’s second petition for post-conviction relief at second stage of proceedings, even though defendant asserted that he did not receive reasonable assistance from his post-conviction counsel, whom he had retained after his appointed attorney had withdrawn pursuant to Greer, 212 Ill.2d 192, and Rule 651(c). Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that defendant’s retained counsel had provided unreasonable assistance. In its petition for leave to appeal, government argued that Appellate Court improperly expanded defendant’s limited statutory right to counsel provided by Post-Conviction Hearing Act by finding that defendant was entitled to reasonable assistance from two attorneys he had hired after his appointed counsel was granted leave to withdraw. It further contended that Appellate Court erred in concluding that defendant could hire another attorney after his appointed counsel was granted leave to withdraw.

This case presents question as to whether trial court abused its discretion in failing to give defendant’s tendered non-IPI instruction that told jury that if it found that officer intentionally did not capture recording of defendant’s encounter with police, then it could consider said fact when resolving charge of unlawful use or possession of weapon by felon. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction, found that trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give said instruction, where said instruction contained inaccurate statement of law by omitting statutory language “unless the State provides a reasonable justification.” Appellate Court further found that any error in refusing to give said instruction was harmless, where evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, and where issue of officer’s failure to turn on body camera was addressed by defendant’s counsel during closing arguments.

This case presents question in instant prosecution on charge of aggravated battery of child whether trial court incorrectly instructed jury on accountability under circumstances where government contended that defendant was guilty of said offense both as principal and under doctrine of accountability, where co-defendant was also charged with same offense. While defendant argued that jury received contrary and conflicting instructions on accountability doctrine with respect to appropriate mental state, where one instruction told jury that defendant could be accountable if she did not know, but should have known of actions taken by co-defendant against child, Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction, found that there was no confusion or inconsistency in instant issue instructions, where: (1) prosecutor explicitly argued that defendant was aware of child’s injuries and had failed to act to protect child from co-defendant; and (2) evidence overwhelmingly established that defendant was actually aware of child injuries, and that defendant was principal just as much as she was accountable for co-defendant’s acts against child.

This case presents question as to whether defendant was denied fair trial or effective assistance of counsel, where trial court responded to jury question regarding definition of “knowingly possessed firearm ammunition” by failing to give IPI instruction on term “knowledge” and instead sending back note that read “the word knowingly should be given its plain meaning within jury’s common understanding,” under circumstances where counsel for both defendant and government agreed not to give IPI instruction. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction on charge of unlawful possession of ammunition by felon, found that defense counsel’s decision not to give jury IPI instruction was matter of sound trial strategy, where counsel’s decision was meant to minimize attention regarding defendant’s culpability, and where giving IPI instruction may have prejudiced defendant given his testimony. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that trial court was required to give IPI instruction, where relevant IPI instruction would have answered jury’s question.

This case presents question in prosecution on residential burglary charge, whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion in limine to preclude government from introducing into evidence two nonconsecutive iPhone video clips generated by owner of victim’s building that depicted defendant walking away from victim’s apartment after touching doorknob and then exiting victim’s apartment about 20 minutes later. While defendant argued that instant iPhone clips violated best evidence rule, because iPhone clips were not duplicates where they were not accurate reproduction of entire original surveillance footage, Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction, found that trial court did not err in admitting said iPhone clips, where: (1) there was no evidence suggesting that police purposefully designed to prevent original footage from being admitted at trial; (2) government verified accuracy of iPhone clips through owner of building, who explained that he could not transfer entire original footage from surveillance video to CD; and (3) there was no evidence that police lost or destroyed original footage in bad faith. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question in prosecution on charge of predatory criminal sexual assault of child as to whether trial court erred in quashing defendant’s subpoena requesting records from Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) without first reviewing requested material in camera. Appellate Court found that trial court did not abuse its discretion in quashing instant subpoena, since defendant had failed to establish basis for his claim that subject unfounded report by DCFS contained material evidence. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that under Escareno, 2013 IL App (1st) 110152, he was entitled to in camera review of subpoenaed documents for materiality, and that he was entitled to remand for such review, if, as here, trial court had refused to conduct in camera review of subpoenaed documents.

This case presents question as to whether in instant aggravated driving under influence prosecution government failed to prove that defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) was at or above .08 grams per 100 milliliters of blood, where: (1) government presented no direct evidence of defendant’s whole BAC; (2) government produced evidence that four hours after accident at issue in charged offense defendant’s serum alcohol concentration was 155 mg/dl; and (3) government presented lay testimony from police officer concerning conversion factor in section 1286.40 of Title 20 of Ill. Admin. Code to convert results of defendant’s serum alcohol concentration test into its whole blood equivalent. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction, found that admitting officer’s testimony was not abuse of discretion, where officer’s testimony was predicated on his training and familiarity with section 1286.40. (Dissent filed.)