Defendant, who was 16 years old at the time of the offense, pled guilty and was sentenced to consecutive sentences of 90 years and 20 years for first-degree and second-degree murder, respectively. Defendant filed a successive post-conviction petition alleging his constitutional rights were violated by the de facto life sentence. The trial court dismissed the petition at the second stage and defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding defendant waived his constitutional claim when he pled guilty and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in deciding the length of the sentence. (LYTTON and SCHMIDT, concurring)
Defendant, who was 15 years old at the time of the offense, was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder and was sentenced to a total of 35 years. Defendant appealed claiming that the juvenile court erred in transferring the case to adult criminal court, the trial court failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 431(b), and the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements under the course-of-investigation exception to the hearsay rule. The State conceded that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 421(b), but argued that the evidence was not closely balanced and that the error was forfeited. The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it balanced the statutory factors to be considered to transfer the case to adult court. The appellate court further found that while the trial court failed to comply with Rule 431(b), the defendant did not meet his burden of showing that the evidence was closely balanced. The court also found that the hearsay statements that were admitted went beyond what was required to explain the officer’s course of investigation, but that there was no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different if the hearsay had been excluded. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his conviction on fraud and money laundering charges to which he had pleaded guilty, on ground that his trial counsel, who had advised defendant to plead guilty to said charges, labored under conflict of interest because counsel also represented one of defendant’s victims in his alleged fraudulent scheme. Both parties agreed that counsel labored under conflict of interest. However, defendant could not receive any relief, since instant conflict did not result in adverse effect on defendant’s representation, where: (1) record showed that trial counsel took steps to vigorously defend defendant on instant fraud and money laundering charges; and (2) counsel’s advice to defendant to plead guilty to said charges was reasonable in view of the fact that there was damaging evidence against defendant, and fact that three of defendant’s co-defendants (including his brother) had pleaded guilty to said charges and had agreed to testify against him. Also, Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that counsel compromised its advice to defendant in order to secure additional restitution for counsel’s other client and to avoid exposing other client’s potential misconduct.
Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings. Defendant argued in the petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental health history in support of his defense. The petition also claimed newly discovered evidence that would have corroborated defendant’s testimony. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a third stage evidentiary hearing, finding that the failure to investigate defendant’s mental health satisfied both prongs of Strickland and, as a result, made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Justice Coghlan dissented, arguing that the evidence regarding defendant’s mental health could only have been used in support of a diminished capacity defense, which is not recognized in criminal proceedings in the state of Illinois. (HYMAN, concurring and COGHLAN, dissenting)
Defendant appealed his conviction as an armed habitual criminal arguing he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The appellate court reversed and vacated, finding that the gun and other evidence used to support the conviction were recovered as the result of an illegal seizure and, if defense counsel had argued the issue, the trial court would have suppressed the evidence. (HYMAN and PUCINSKI, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in his representation of defendant in defendant’s first-degree murder and related firearms’ charge trial, where, according to defendant, his trial counsel: (1) failed to adequately investigate defendant’s claim of self-defense; (2) inappropriately advised him not to testify in support of his self-defense claim; and (3) neglected to prepare defendant to testify at trial. Record showed that trial counsel made adequate investigation of defendant’s self-defense claim, where trial counsel inquired about said claim from others, including defendant’s mother and learned about prior violent history between victim and defendant’s brother. Moreover, trial counsel made reasonable strategic decision to recommend that defendant not take witness stand, where: (1) portion of defendant’s proposed testimony actually cut against his self-defense claim; and (2) trial counsel could establish defendant’s self-defense claim through testimony of others. Also, trial court made probing inquiry of defendant regarding his decision not to testify to ensure that defendant concurred in decision not to testify. Too, record indicated that defendant had information he needed to make intelligent decision not to testify, such that trial counsel could not be faulted for failing to prepare defendant to take witness stand.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 96-month term of incarceration on charge of unlawful possession of firearm by felon, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that defendant qualified for enhanced sentence under section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) of USSG, where defendant’s prior Iowa conviction on charge of intimidation with dangerous weapon qualified as “crime of violence.” Defendant’s Iowa conviction required finding that defendant had placed someone in “reasonable apprehension of serious injury,” and said element necessarily included “threatened use of physical force,” which is sufficient for offense to qualify as crime of violence under relevant Guidelines. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that Iowa conviction could not qualify as crime of violence because said conviction could occur through use of force against property.
Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 360-month term of incarceration on drug distribution charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that defendant was responsible for 31,638.6 kilograms of additional drugs, which increased defendant's offense level from 30 to 36 and his sentencing range from 210 to 262 months to 360 months to life. Government conceded that record lacked sufficient evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s drug quantity finding with respect to 31,638.6 kilograms of additional drugs. Moreover, while Dist. Ct. made additional finding that it would impose same sentence absent any error with respect to calculation of additional drugs, Dist. Ct. failed to make required detailed findings that would explain why any potential error would not affect ultimate sentence. Also, new sentencing hearing was required, since Dist. Ct.’s statement suggesting that even 180-month sentence would have sufficed ran contrary to factors set forth in section 3553(a) and failed to give Ct. of Appeals confidence that instant error was harmless. Too, fact that Dist. Ct. chose sentence at bottom of applicable sentencing range that Dist. Ct. adopted suggested that guideline calculation actually affected its sentencing decision.
Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot defendant’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order denying his request for compassionate release under 18 USC section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), where, during pendency of appeal, defendant was released from prison and placed on home confinement. Defendant’s release from prison rendered moot his pursuant of compassionate release, where all that Dist. Ct. could have done under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) had been accomplished by his release to home confinement. Fact that defendant hypothetically could return to prison through violation of conditions of either his home confinement or his supervised release did not require different result.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 130-month term of incarceration on drug distribution charge, after Dist. Ct. had found that defendant qualified as career offender under section 4B1.1(b) of USSG. While defendant argued that his prior Wisconsin conviction on charge of child abuse did not qualify as predicate crime of violence, Seventh Circuit precedent has consistently held that instant Wisconsin offense that required showing that defendant intentionally inflicted bodily harm on child was crime of violence. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals declined defendant’s invitation to reconsider its precedent in light of fact that other Circuits have found that similar offenses could not be considered violent felonies because they did not necessarily require proof of physical force.
