Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of violating section 11-9.3(a) of the Criminal Code, which makes it unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly be present “on real property comprising any school” when children under the age of 18 are present, due to his presence in a parking space adjacent to a high school field house. Defendant argued on appeal that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because it did not present any evidence of the layout of the grounds of the high school The appellate court affirmed finding that because the field house and the parking spot were part of the high school grounds the parking space was on high school real property. (ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring)

Defendant pled guilty to three counts of aggravated driving under the influence and one count of driving with a revoked license and was sentenced to consecutive six-year prison terms for two of the DUI counts. The judge later determined the multiple convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule. A successor judge re-sentenced defendant to a nine-year prison term on one of the aggravated DUI counts. Defendant appealed arguing the trial court erred when it increased his sentence from six to nine years. The appellate court agreed and vacated his sentence, finding the nine-year sentence was an impermissible increase pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(c). (McLAREN and SCHOSTOK, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty in a bench trial of misdemeanor driving under the influence and improper lane usage. The trial court subsequently granted defendant a new trial because of the absence of a jury waiver. Defendant appealed alleging the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at his first trial and that double jeopardy precluded retrial. The appellate court affirmed, explaining that when the trial court granted defendant’s motion for a new trial for reasons other than the sufficiency of the evidence it nullified the conviction and, as a result, double jeopardy did not bar retrial. (BRIDGES and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant appealed the order of the circuit court dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, defendant argued that the court erred when it recharacterized his petition, which was brought pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a post-conviction petition without the proper admonishments, and when it dismissed his petition despite his assertion that his 70-year sentence for a crime committed when he was a juvenile violated his constitutional rights. The appellate court affirmed finding the trial adequately admonished the defendant and that defendant was not subject to a de facto life sentence as he is eligible for day-to-day credit and could be released in 35 years. (DELORT and ROCHFORD, concurring)

Appeal from a second-stage dismissal of defendant’s post-conviction petition challenging his first-degree murder conviction and 65-year sentence. In his petition, defendant argued actual innocence and that his sentence was a de facto life sentence that violated the proportionate penalties clause because he was 19 years old at the time of the offense. The appellate court reversed, finding defendant’s petition and supporting documentation made a substantial showing of constitutional violations requiring a third-state evidentiary hearing. The appellate court reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to first hold a hearing on the question of defendant’s actual evidence and then, if necessary, an evidentiary hearing on the youth-based proportionate penalties claim. (ODEN JOHNSON and PIERCE, concurring)

Defendant appealed his conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse on the basis that the trial court erred when it did not dismiss his case for a six-year pre-indictment delay. Defendant also alleged errors relating to the admission of evidence and challenged his conviction on jurisdictional grounds. The appellate court affirmed, finding defendant failed to show actual and substantial prejudice as a result of the six-year delay between the alleged offenses investigation and the indictment, that the trial court had jurisdiction based on circumstantial evidence of the location of the alleged crime, and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings. (PIERCE and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)