Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery of a peace officer for spitting at a corrections officer while he was being detained pretrial for an attempted murder charge that the State subsequently dismissed. The trial court sentenced defendant to 18 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued his sentence was disproportionate to the offense and violated the proportionate penalties clause and that the trial court erred when it considered two prior convictions that were void, which resulted n the court misstating the number of his prior convictions. The appellate court found that the void convictions and the resulting miscalculation of the number of prior convictions was clear and obvious error, vacated defendant’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing. (PIERCE and HARRIS, concurring)

Petitioner appealed from the circuit court’s first-stage summary dismissal of his pro se post-conviction petition, arguing that his petition stated an arguable basis of a meritorious claim that the Truth-in-Sentencing Act was unconstitutional as applied to him as a juvenile offender and that his 32-year sentence for first-degree murder violated the proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court affirmed, finding that petitioner waived his claims by pleading guilty in exchange for an agreed sentence. The appellate court further found that the truth-in-sentencing statute requirement that a juvenile offender serve 100 percent of a non-life sentence does not violate Miller v. Alabama or the Eighth Amendment and that petitioner forfeited his argument regarding the proportionate penalties clause because he raised it for the first time on appeal. (HARRIS and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)

Defendant alleged that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of reckless homicide and reckless driving when “unrebutted testimony” established that he suffered a focal seizure with loss of awareness prior to hitting the victims’ vehicle. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty because there was evidence that defendant continued driving after an initial collision, drove at speeds of more than 100 miles per hour, and the jury heard testimony from an accident reconstruction witness that defendant was in control of his vehicle immediately prior to impact. (DAUGHERITY and SCHMIDT, concurring)

The Illinois Supreme Court resolved a conflict between section 11-501.4(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code and Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6) by striking the provision in IRE 803(6) excluding medical records in criminal cases from the business exception to the hearsay rule, saying that the exclusion was “not logically defensible.” Applying the amended Rule 803(6) to the appeal and noting that changes to evidentiary rules do not create ex post facto concerns, the court held that the circuit court did not err in admitting chemical blood tests taken while defendant was in the hospital. (GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, and OVERSTREET, concurring. CARTER took no part in the decision.)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 46 years in prison. On direct appeal, he argued that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury to keep deliberating despite a holdout juror, that the trial court erred when it did not deliver a Prim instruction sua sponte, and that his sentence was unconstitutional because he was 19 years old at the time of the offense. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s response to the jury’s note regarding a holdout was not coercive. The appellate court further found that while giving IPI, Criminal No. 26.07 was permissible, the failure to give it was not an error under the circumstances. Finally, the appellate court found that there was not sufficient evidence to support defendant’s claim that his sentence was unconstitutional under the as-applied analysis and that the proper vehicle for a young adult to raise this issue is through a postconviction proceeding where the trial court can hold an evidentiary hearing. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI involving death and aggravated DUI involving great bodily harm. He appealed arguing the trial court improperly considered a factor inherent in the offense when it considered in aggravation that defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm. The appellate court affirmed, finding that while the trial court considered the degree of harm inflicted on the victims and the threat of harm to persons other than the victims, both of these factors were proper aggravating factors. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of resisting a police officer and appealed arguing the waiver was invalid because the trial court erroneously admonished him that the waiver was irrevocable. The appellate court affirmed, finding that while the trial court’s admonition was misleading, it did not affect the validity of the defendant’s jury waiver because defendant was not prejudiced by the waiver. The appellate court noted the admonishment could have impacted defendant’s post-waiver decision-making, but found that it was subject to plain error review and the alleged error was not of the same character or quality as errors that have been deemed structural.  (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and sentenced to five years imprisonment. He appealed arguing that the conduct for which he was charged and convicted fell outside the statute of limitations. The appellate court affirmed, finding that while defendant was charged in 2015, the relevant statute of limitations did not expire until 2018. (DELORT and CONNORS, concurring)