Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in conducting defendant’s sentencing hearing (that pertained to defendant’s felony plea) via videoconference as allowed by Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). Record showed that defendant consented to sentencing hearing by videoconference, and Dist. Ct. made requisite finding that sentencing could not be further delayed without serious harm to interests of justice. While defendant challenged on appeal Dist. Ct.’s CARES Act findings, defendant waived said challenges, where defendant consented to videoconference sentencing and confirmed at sentencing that he had no objection to Dist. Ct.’s findings under Act. Ct. further rejected defendant’s contention that Rule 43(a) mandated his presence in courtroom at sentencing, after finding that CARES Act created exception to rule that defendant must be physically present in courtroom for sentencing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress two kilograms of cocaine found by police officers in defendant’s vehicle, after canine unit dog alerted police to presence of drugs in vehicle that had been stopped for window unit violation. While defendant argued that drugs should have been suppressed because police prolonged his stop by asking questions that were unrelated to “mission” of instant stop, such as inquiries about defendant’s job, gifts for defendant’s child and toys in defendant’s trunk, and by conducting dog sniff without his consent, Dist. Ct. could properly find that said inquiries did not actually prolong stop. Moreover, police need not obtain defendant’s permission to conduct dog sniff, where, as here, dog sniff did not prolong stop, and where record showed that police were still processing paperwork for instant violation when canine unit arrived at scene of stop. Fact that canine unit was rushed to scene of stop, and that one officer urged canine unit officer to “hurry” to scene of stop did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated her due process rights when it fined her $50 for violating ordinance that prohibited plaintiff from parking her car on street if more than 3 inches of snow had fallen in prior day. While plaintiff claimed that due process required that defendant erect sign on every street telling drivers when snow required them to remove their vehicles, Ct. of Appeals found that due process required only that legislature enact and publish law, as well as afford citizenry reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with law’s terms and to comply with said law. Ct. further found that due process does not require that state post signage notifying all those entering state of its laws and regulations, and that existence of instant published ordinance was adequate notice in and of itself, where ordinance was clear. Moreover, defendant could insist that drivers monitor weather for themselves.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to charges of producing and possessing child pornography, even though defendant argued that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to explain elements of production of child pornography charge. Dist. Ct. held hearing and eventually denied defendant’s motion, after finding that contrary assertions made by defendant’s trial counsel were more credible. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s contention that his attorneys were wrong when they told him that he could be convicted on production charge based on evidence that minor, at his request, “took and sent” to defendant sexually explicit photographs, where said evidence was sufficient to establish production charge. Also, defendant failed to establish any prejudice arising out of his trial counsel’s advice, where defendant’s post hoc assertion that he would not have pleaded guilty to production charge but for counsel’s bad advice was insufficient, by itself, to establish prejudice, especially where said advice was not deficient.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed defendant’s appeal that challenged Dist. Ct.’s denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea on conspiracy to commit wire fraud charge, where defendant had entered into plea agreement that waived his right to appeal his conviction. Agreement contained clause that if defendant had breached his agreement to fully cooperate with authorities, U.S. would be completely released from all of its obligations under agreement, but that defendant would not be allowed to withdraw from any previously accepted guilty plea. Moreover, defendant had broken promise of full cooperation earlier in day of his change-of-plea hearing in interview with FBI agent. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that his waiver was not knowing because government had failed to discuss at change-of-plea hearing defendant’s alleged lies he told to FBI agent, and that he would be denied benefits of plea agreement, where Ct. found that defendant knew that he had lied to FBI agent and still elected to go forward with his guilty plea. Fact that defendant was caught in his lies did not create opportunity to allow him to withdraw from his guilty plea, and although government did not recommend acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment for defendant as called for in agreement, said failure was based on defendant’s failure to meet his obligations on cooperation clause.