Defendant was convicted of 12 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and abused its discretion when it denied his request to appoint the public defender as standby counsel after defendant elected to proceed pro se. The appellate court found no error and affirmed. (BRIDGES and JORGENSEN, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of numerous counts, including First Degree Murder, in connecting with a shooting. Defendant, who was 16 years old at the time of his arrest, argued on appeal that the trial court erred in the admission of evidence of subsequent bad acts and gang-related testimony. Appellate court found that the other-crimes evidence and gang testimony were relevant to the issues of intent and motive and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Defendant also alleged sentencing errors, but the appellate court found the arguments moot because the State agreed to a new sentencing hearing pursuant to a supervisory order issued by the Illinois Supreme Court. (ZENOFF and BIRKETT, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 288-month term of incarceration on charges of drug store robbery and brandishing firearm during robbery, where said sentence was based, in part, on Dist. Ct.’s finding on preponderance of evidence standard that defendant was responsible for murder of individual, who also participated in charged robbery, under circumstances where argument arose between defendant and said individual on splitting up of drugs that had been taken during robbery. While defendant argued that Dist. Ct. could not consider defendant’s conduct surrounding said murder, where jury had acquitted him of said murder, U.S. Supreme Court, in Watts, 519 U.S. 148, found that Dist. Ct. could consider conduct underlying acquitted charge, if Dist. Ct.’s findings were supported by preponderance of evidence. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that murder of associate was act in furtherance of charged robbery, where: (1) dividing up of robbery proceeds was part of plan to obtain said drugs from pharmacy; and (2) victim’s statement that he intended to keep drugs for himself was catalyst for defendant’s decision to shoot victim. As such, murder was relevant conduct that could be used to calculate defendant’s sentence.
Defendant convicted of aggravated driving under the influence and sentenced to six years of imprisonment. The appellate court vacated and remanded for re-sentencing, finding the trial court committed clear error when the sole aggravating factor considered during sentencing was a factor inherent in the offense. Trial court also erred when it allowed victim impact statements not authorized by the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act. (DAUGHERITY and SCHMIDT, concurring)
has been signed by the Governor and took effect on Jan. 7, 2022. It divides the 3rd, 7th, 12th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 22nd judicial circuits and the Cook County judicial circuit into subcircuits.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 168-month term of incarceration on charges of possession and distribution of methamphetamine, where sentence was based in part on enhancements for possessing dangerous weapon under section 2D1.1(b)(1) of USSG and maintaining drug premises under section 2D1.1(b)(12) of USSG. While defendant argued that record did not support Dist. Ct.’s finding that he constructively possessed said gun to support possession of dangerous weapon enhancement, record contained sufficient evidence to support said enhancement, where: (1) drugs and cash were found in safe in defendant’s bedroom; (2) defendant’s personal items, including his identification cards and mail, were close to bedroom closet where gun was located; and (3) gun was in close proximity to defendant’s drugs and cash. Moreover, while defendant argued that record did not support finding that he maintained drug premises because he did not have possessory interest in either third-party’s home or bedroom and did not pay rent to third-party, record was sufficient to support said enhancement, since: (1) defendant had been staying with third-party for four months; (2) defendant was main user of said bedroom; (3) defendant stored his drugs and cash in safe in said bedroom; (4) defendant conceded that he sold drugs out of third-party’s home; and (5) third-party let others into home who asked for defendant.
Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. Argued on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts as well as the hearsay statements of a codefendant, that the prosecution misstated the law in closing arguments, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in the admission of evidence, the evidence presented at trial supported the finding of guilt and that the State did not make any improper arguments. (MIKVA and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in sentencing defendant to 90-month term of incarceration on charges of Hobbs Act robbery and use of firearm during robbery, where sentence was based, in part, on obstruction of justice enhancement under section 3C1.1 of USSG, where Dist. Ct. had found that defendant committed perjury during suppression hearing, and where defendant repeatedly violated no-contact order, which prohibited defendant from contacting girlfriend in effort to have her change her story. Either factor would be enough to support imposition of enhancement, and defendant’s failure to object to enhancement at sentencing hearing allowed Dist. Ct. to adopt findings of presentence report regarding enhancement. Moreover, presentence report contained sufficient facts to support obstruction of justice enhancement, where defendant had instructed girlfriend to alter her story to police and to withdraw her cooperation with police, where instructions took place after no-contact order had been entered.
In prosecution on charge of unlawful possession of firearm, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress seizure of firearm found during warrantless search of his motel room, where Dist. Ct., found that defendant had given consent to search his room. Record showed that: (1) police received arrest warrant for female third-party and tip that third-party was at defendant’s motel room; (2) police knocked on door of defendant’s room, and defendant told police that “she can’t be here,” prior to police explaining they had arrest warrant for third-party; (3) after police explained that they were there for third-party and asked defendant if they could verify that third-party was not there, defendant eventually said “that’s fine;” and (4) police found firearm under second bed in room. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was not seized when officers knocked on door, where officers briefly knocked, defendant knew that officers were not there for him and officers spoke to defendant in conversational tones. Moreover, instant consent was voluntary, where officers did not use or threaten physical force, spoke in conversational tones and asked to verify third-party’s presence only twice. Fact that officers presented defendant with arrest warrant of third-party did not render defendant’s consent to search involuntary. Also, officer’s search of third-party under beds was within scope of defendant’s consent. Fact that defendant told officers that third-party was not under beds prior to officers' search of beds did not require different result.
Defendant was indicted on six charges relating to the alleged sexual abuse of minors, including sexual assault and permitting the sexual abuse of a child. The appellate court found the language of section 11-9.1A(f) of the Criminal Code, which establishes the offense of permitting the sexual abuse of a child, was clear and unambiguous and reversed defendant’s conviction on that count outright because the person alleged to have committed the sexual abuse was not charged, as was required by the plain language of the statute. The court also found with regard to another count that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel did not file a motion to dismiss when the trial took place more than 120 days after the defendant was arrested and taken into custody. The court noted that the count at issue was added after the defendant’s arrest, but the motion would have been successful because the charge was subject to the compulsory joinder rule. Finally, the court found that defendant was denied her due process right to a fair trial on one of the remaining counts, reversed that conviction, and remanded for a new trial on that count only. (HAUPTMAN and MCDADE, concurring)