Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Defendant's pro se postconviction petition claims actual innocence based on affidavits of 2 newly discovered witnesses who identified another person as the person who shot and killed victim. State concedes that affidavits are material and noncumulative. The 2 new eyewitnesses did not previously admit to witnessing the shooting, and it is unlikely that Defendant or others would have observed or noticed them, and they insured their anonymity by immediately fleeing the scene. Thus, Defendant has satisfied the low bar at this stage for newly discovered evidence. Court erred in denying Defendant't motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)
Defendant pled guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 30 months probation. At sentencing, judge admonished him that he was required to register for life as a sex offender. Defendant appealed his conviction, claiming that requirements particular to sex offenders, such as registration, constitute punishment and are unconstitutional as applied to him. Appellate court cannot adjudicate an as-applied claim because there is no fully developed record, and no evidentiary hearing or findings of fact. Illinois Supreme Court, in 2018 BIngham decision, held that challenges to sex-offender requirements must be raised in a separate civil proceeding and may not be raised in an appeal from a defendant's criminal case. Defendant may file a civil suit seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality and relief. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs seized from his RV following discussion that defendant had with police officer at truck stop. Record showed that: (1) officer observed defendant driving RV on Interstate with dirty license plate and followed defendant into truck-stop parking lot; (2) after store employee told officer that defendant and his passenger were acting strangely, officer asked defendant if he could speck with him and told him that he could leave at any time; (3) defendant agreed to speak with officer, and officer eventually asked for defendant’s driver’s license and rental agreement for RV; (4) defendant gave officer his driver’s license and said rental agreement, and officer asked defendant for consent to search RV and defendant agreed; (5) officer thereafter called for K-9 dog unit; (6) when K-9 unit arrived defendant consented to dog sniff of RV; and (7) dog quickly alerted to presence of drugs and officer thereafter searched RV and found large quantity of marijuana. While defendant argued that instant search violated his 4th Amendment rights because he was effectively seized when officer had retained his driver’s license and RV rental agreement, Dist. Ct. could properly find that : (1) defendant had voluntarily consented to both external dog sniff and search of RV during encounter that lasted approximately 15 minutes; and (2) defendant’s encounter with officer did not become seizure until dog alerted to presence of drugs. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that consensual encounter with officer necessarily became seizure as soon as officer took possession of his driver’s license.
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) and AUUW (aggravated unlawful use of a weapon). State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant constructively possessed the firearm and was guilty of UUWF (unlawful use of a weapon by a felon). Defendant's UUWF and AUUW convictions derive from the same physical act, possessing the firearm discovered in the van. Thus, AUUW conviction is vacated, as it is a lesser offense than the UUWF offense. Sentence of 10 years for UUWF is within statutory range and is not excessive. Sentence of 10 years for AHC is not an abuse of discretion; court stated that it was not considering Defendant's pending attempted murder charge as a factor. (HOLDRIDGE, concurring; McDADE, specially concurring.)
Defendant pled guilty to 2 counts of criminal sexual of his minor stepdaughter, and was initially sentenced to total 16 years. Court granted Defendant's motion to reduce his sentence, and resentenced him to total 15 years. Appellate court then remanded for filing of a valid Rule 604(d) certificate and for opportunity to file new motion to withdraw guilty plea and/or reconsider sentence. As Defendant has not filed motion to withdraw his plea and wishes to appeal only the denial of his sentencing motion, he is not seeking withdrawal of his plea. Sentence was not an abuse of discretion. The crimes were extraordinarily serious, involving repeated sexual abuse of his stepdaughter nearly every day. Court did not err in considering the degree of harm to victim. (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC). The Terry stop of Defendant was supported by requisite reasonable suspicion, and thus court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress. Evidence was insufficient to establish Defendant's guilt of AHC. State's proof included no evidence that Defendant's aggravated battery resulted in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement. (A. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring; NEVILLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant-Sheriff to 151-month term of incarceration on wire fraud and bribery charges arising out of scheme to extract money from towing companies to stay on defendant’s list of eligible companies to tow vehicles pursuant to police directions. While defendant argued that Dist. Ct.’s calculation of benefits to tow companies was inaccurate because said companies received no benefits arising out of scheme, record showed that said companies received benefits by being able to stay on defendant’s list and by maintaining their exclusive territories. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly adopt findings in pre-sentence report for its conclusions on benefits-received issues and did not err in imposing instant guideline sentencing range, where Dist. Ct. acknowledged that it had discretion to impose different sentence. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that he was entitled to lower sentence due to unwarranted sentence disparities among other defendants, where: (1) instant within Guideline sentencing range complied with section3553(a)(6); and (2) Dist. Ct. may pass over in silence defendant’s argument that court failed to consider disparities when imposing Guideline-range sentence. (Partial dissent filed.)
Circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion in instructing jury with a modified version of IPI Criminal No. 3.17, the accomplice witness instruction, when the alleged accomplice witness provided exculpatory testimony for Defendant. An accomp0lice witness's testimony may be treated with skepticism, whether the witness testifies for the State or for the defendant. The modified instruction given is an accurate, impartial, and nonargumentative summation of the law, and warned the jury to be cautious of witness's testimony as an accomplice, but because witness did not testify that he committed the crime with Defendant, court appropriately adjusted the wording of the instruction. (GARMAN, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring; M. BURKE, A. BURKE, and NEVILLE, dissenting.)
