Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 3 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, who was his niece, under age 13 at time of offenses. Trial court made partial and temporary closure and exclusion of spectators from courtroom during minor victim's testimony, without making an express determination as to whether each spectator asked to leave during the closure had a direct interest in the case. Trial court did not violate section 115-11 of Code of Criminal Procedure, nor did it violate Defendant's 6th amendment right to a public trial when it effectuated a partial and temporary closure of a courtroom during a minor sex victim's testimony pursuant to section 115-11. Trial court did not "close" the trial, and court did not exclude the media. Spectators were only temporarily excluded during victim's first round of testimony. (A. BURKE, THEIS, M. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offenses (in 1999), entered a fully negotiated guilty plea at age 17, pleading guilty to 1 count each of 1st degree murder and residential burglary and 2 counts of armed robbery in exchange for State dismissing remaining numerous serious charges. He was sentenced to 50 years. No one can be certain of outcome of case if Defendant had chosen to proceed to trial. It is speculative to conclude that Defendant was doomed to be convicted of the most serious charges and to be sentenced to mandatory life without parole. Defendant's knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any constitutional challenge based on subsequent changes in the applicable law. As the trial court had the option to accept or reject the plea agreement, its decision was an exercise of its discretion. Thus, Miller v. Alabama is inapplicable, and it was not error to deny Defendant's motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition. (GARMAN, THEIS, M. BURKE, and OVERSTREET, concurring; NEVILLE and A. BURKE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of murder and concealment of a homicidal death. State failed to overcome the presumption of inadmissibility for Defendant's unrecorded statements to police. Court violated Rule 431(b) in failing to question the venire about their understanding and acceptance of the principle that they must not hold against Defendant his decision not to testify. Medical examiner could not establish cause of death with medical certainty, and thus evidence was closely balanced on issue of whether State proved a criminal agency caused the death. (HYMAN and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of the 1st-degree murder of her girlfriend and housemate and sentenced to 50 years. More than 2 years later, Defendant filed a pro se section 2-1401 petition seeking relief from her sentence. Appointed counsel amended the petition twice. Defendant did not claim that she was under a legal disability because of incompetence, serious mental disorder, or minority, but claimed that she was under a legal disability until section 2-1401(b-5) took effect.  Legislative intent was to limit the relief under section 2-1401(b-5) to the 2-year limitations period in section 2-1401(c). (ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated assault and resisting a peace officer and sentenced to 1 year of conditional discharge with fines and fees. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss charge of aggravated assault. The statute cited in the complaint apprised the defense of the other elements of the offense charged, despite their not being mentioned in the complaint. Had trial counsel filed such a pretrial motion and it succeeded, State could have refiled the charge with any flaws remedied. Thus, Defendant was not prejudiced. A reasonable trier of fact could find Defendant guilty of both charges. (PIERCE and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/10/21.) After jury trial, Respondent was found to be a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Respondent had waived his right to be present.  Although court could have properly asked prospective jurors whether they could be impartial after hearing that Respondent had been convicted of a sexually violent offense involving a child, the failure to ask the question was not an abuse of discretion. Although some of the trial court's comments during trial and during closing argument were improper, they did not prejudice jury by displaying a bias against Respondent or his counsel. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring.) 

Defendant was charged by information with being an armed habitual criminal (AHC). Defendant pled guilty based on a partially-negotiated plea agreement to plead guilty to AHC, a Class X felony, in exchange for State capping their recommendation for sentence of not more than 17 years. Defendant had rejected a prior plea offer from the State. Court sentenced Defendant to 17 years, to be served at least 85%. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate judgment. At the time, in 2016, Defendant committed the underlying conduct (selling a gun) which resulted in the AHC charge, he had a conviction for burglary or residential burglary, and both of those offenses are forcible felonies under subsection (a)(1). The fact that Defendant was 17 at time of that offense is of no consequence. Even if that would have resulted in a discretionary transfer to juvenile court, and juvenile adjudication, if it were committed in 2016, it was a conviction for an offense described in subsection (a)(1). Defendant did not allege that he did not understand court's admonishments about possible penalties or that he would not have pled guilty had he known about the 85% requirement, and thus he did not establish a basis for withdrawal of his plea. (DeARMOND and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of being an armed habitual criminal. Officers had a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was illegally possessing a firearm. Defendant had stowed his gun in his car, in close proximity to the passengers, and then walked into the store. Officers took 2 separate actions: securing the gun and then detaining Defendant. Officers were not required to leave the gun unsecured while they pursued Defendant, due to reasonable concerns for the safety of themselves and of others. Officers' search for the gun was within the scope of a permissible Terry search. The gun was immediately visible to officers, once they opened the rear doors to remove the back seat passengers. Officers could then confiscate the gun, as a protective measure, and they were justified in permanently seizing it once they determined that Defendant did not legally possess the gun. Officers had sufficient reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry detention of Defendant, which allowed them to obtain his identification, which they then used to check his criminal history. No ineffective assistance in counsel's failure to file motion to suppress gun or evidence of Defendant's criminal history, as such motions would have been denied. No prejudice in counsel not filing motion to suppress his inculpatory statement made to officer inside the store, as exclusion of that evidence would not have made an acquittal reasonably likely. No abuse of discretion in court limiting Defendant's cross-examination of officer as to their failure to follow Police Department's body-worn camera directives, and in denying proposed non-IPI instructions on the topic, as the instructions did not accurately state the law. (GORDON and BURKE, concurring.)