Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to quash his arrest that was based on investigative alert issued by Chicago Police Dept. and to suppress incriminating statement that defendant made while under his warrantless arrest. While trial court found that use of investigative alert rather than arrest warrant was unconstitutional, especially where there were no exigent circumstances at time of defendant’s arrest, Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that trial court erred in ruling that defendant’s arrest was unconstitutional simply because it was based on investigative alert. Moreover, Appellate Court found that there was probable cause to arrest defendant, where: (1) witness identified defendant near scene of shooting with handgun in his hand and driving away after witness heard gunshots; and (2) video evidence corroborated fact that witness was at scene of crime.

This case presents question as to whether in instant murder prosecution trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his apartment on ground that officers’ warrantless entry into his apartment immediately after murder was not justified by community caretaking exception to warrant requirement. Trial court found that officers’ second trip to defendant’s apartment at 4:15 a.m. after neighbor reported hearing sounds of wrestling and screams coming from defendant’s apartment and after defendant had failed to respond to officers’ knocking on door for five minutes fell squarely within community caretaking function to support instant warrantless entry and search of defendant’s apartment, which revealed murder weapon and blood evidence linking defendant to said weapon. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that emergency aid exception applied, where police had reasonable grounds to believe that there was emergency at hand, and where police had reasonable basis to associate emergency with area to be searched.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion seeking leave to file successive post-conviction petition that challenged his 90-year sentence on murder charge, where defendant alleged that his sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him because trial court had failed to take into account his intellectual disability, fetal alcohol syndrome, borderline personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder during sentencing. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that defendant could not demonstrate prejudice necessary to warrant leave to file successive post-conviction petition, because under Loty, 2020 IL 123972, intellectually disabled adult defendant’s natural life sentence violated neither U.S. nor Illinois Constitutions. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether defendant is entitled to new trial on murder charge, where, upon defense counsel’s request to poll jury, trial court asked only 11 out of 12 jurors whether signed verdict forms represented their verdict, and where trial court dismissed jury without polling 12th juror. Appellate Court, in remanding matter for new trial, found that leaving even one juror out of jury poll calls into question integrity of judicial process, and thus trial court’s failure to ask 12 juror whether verdict forms represented his verdict constituted second-prong plain error that required reversal and remand for new trial. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether defendant is entitled to remand for new consideration of his petition for post-conviction relief, where defendant claimed that his appointed post-conviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance that led to forfeiture of his post-conviction claims and dismissal of his petition. Appellate Court, in remanding case with directions to appoint new counsel and to allow defendant to replead his post-conviction petition, found that defendant’s post-conviction counsel failed to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and thus allowed said claims to be forfeited. Moreover, Appellate Court noted that while there is no constitutional right to assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, instant post-conviction counsel failure to allege appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, especially where it was properly alleged in defendant’s pro se petition, was patently unreasonable. It also found that post-conviction counsel’s failure to overcome forfeiture of defendant’s claims was itself “palpable prejudice.”

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed defendant’s post-conviction petition that challenged his conviction for unlawful possession of firearm by street gang member, even though defendant argued that unlawful possession of firearm by street gang member statute is unconstitutional, because it impermissibly criminalized defendant’s gang member status in violation of 8th Amendment. Appellate Court, in finding no 8th Amendment violation, held that plain language of relevant statute (720 ILCS section 24-1.8) punished conduct and not defendant’s status as gang member. It also concluded that section 24-1.8 was not triggered by gang membership, because section 24-1.8 concerned only with voluntary associations rather than any status or condition. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed defendant’s section 2-1401 petition to vacate his 2006 conviction for unlawful use of weapon by felon (UUWF), where predicate felony for his UUWF conviction was 1992 murder conviction that was vacated in 2019. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, observed that: (1) defendant’s 1992 conviction was based upon constitutionally valid statute; (2) at time of his 2006 arrest and conviction for UUWF, defendant’s murder conviction had not been vacated or reversed; and (3) at time of his arrest in 2006, defendant was convicted felon and his guilty plea established his possession of weapon. As such, both elements of UUWF statute had been satisfied, and subsequent vacation of defendant’s 1992 murder conviction provided no basis for defendant’s proposed collateral relief from his UUWF conviction.

This case presents question in instant aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude police officer prosecution as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for mistrial, where, according to defendant, prosecutor violated defendant’s right to remain silent by commenting on fact that defendant did not ask why arresting officer was detaining him after high-speed chase and eliciting same testimony from arresting police officer. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court and remanding matter for new trial, found that evidence of defendant’s silence during and after arrest was categorically inadmissible as substantive evidence against him. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that evidence of defendant’s silence during and after his arrest is not categorically inadmissible when not induced by Miranda warnings, but is subject to same admissibility standards as any other piece of evidence.