Criminal Law

Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, pleading guilty to 1 count of aggravated battery in exchange for receiving the minimum available sentence of 2 years. At sentencing, defense counsel stated, without caveat or exception, that Defendant was entitled to 283 days of sentencing credit, and court found that a 283-day credit applied, but DOC did not subsequently apply the credit against this sentence. Defendant did not suffer any prejudice from counsel's misinformation. Defendant did not show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, and that a decision to reject the offered plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. Defendant had been convicted of murder and the battery victim was a correctional officer, and thus a plea to a guaranteed minimum sentence appears highly rational, as no other countervailing facts were shown. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring).

Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Defendant failed to prove that she was entitled to the limited immunity in Section 414(b) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, which grants limited immunity from prosecution for a person seeking medical assistance for someone experiencing an overdose. As this  is an affirmative defense of statutory immunity, the person claiming the affirmative defense bears the burden to properly raise and prove their immunity, and must show evidence to indicate that person was either seeking or obtaining emergency medical assistance for an overdosing victim. Defendant testified that she had no idea where she was going that the passengers in her vehicle were directing her to drive toward the highway, not toward a hospital. There is no evidentiary basis to conclude that Defendant was seeking medical attention for the passenger suffering from an overdose. (WELCH and MOORE, concurring.)

A timely written objection is required before a trial court can consider factors set forth by parties entitled to notice of a petition to expunge. IN the absence of a timely, written objection it was error for State to participate in a court proceeding on a petition to expunge. (McDADE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of violating armed habitual criminal statute. Trial judge improperly relied on unsupported assertions about the effects of police training on the ability to identify a face seen for a few seconds from 150 feet away. Because of trial judge's pronounced bias in favor of police testimony, cause remanded with instructions to assign case to a different judge on remand. (HYMAN, concurring; PIERCE, dissenting.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 4/27/21.) Defendant was convicted of home invasion. Court denied Defendant's motion for new trial, entered an order of protection (OP) against him, and assessed fines, fees, and costs,  The purported lease constitutes unrefuted admissible evidence that the lease named Defendant as a tenant. The victim, his former girlfriend, had thrown Defendant out of the house, changed the locks to keep him out, and Defendant broke a window to gain entry against her wishes. Such evidence supports conviction for home invasion. Court did not meet the statutory requirement for entry of OP, as court did not comply with Section 214 of Domestic Violence Act. (PIERCE and COGHLAN, concurring.)

(Prior court opinion withdrawn 4/21/21.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of his former girlfriend. Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a witness, who emerged after trial, to testify on Defendant's behalf without revealing his identity to the public. Court was not required to close its proceedings to the public. Defendant's generic allegation that witness feared retaliation does not overcome constitutional presumption of openness. Court properly allowed State's argument that if victim's friend had made prior inconsistent statements to detective, defense would have introduced those statements to impeach her, just as it sought to do with another detective. Pathologist, as an expert witness, was properly allowed to testify about findings and conclusions of a non-testifying expert that he used in forming his opinion, and he testified that the peer-review process is a standard procedure for reaching a final determination as to cause of death. A jury could reasonable infer from evidence, and State could reasonably argue, that Defendant would consider killing another former girlfriend, even if he ultimately  decided to kill this victim. (HOWSE and BURKE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 4/27/21.) Defendant and a co-defendant were convicted, after bench trial, of the 1993 armed robbery and murder of a college basketball star. Governor commuted Defendant's sentence in 2015. State then nolle prosequi the charges against Defendant and co-defendant. Defendant's petition for certificate of innocence and attached exhibits met the pleadings requirements to state a claim for issuance of a certificate of innocence. Defendant testified that he did not kill or rob the victim, and established a prima facie case that he was entitled to a certificate of innocence. With no contrary evidence presented at hearing, and with State refusing to participate, circuit court was not free to disregard Defendant's testimony. Circuit court erred in failing to limit its consideration to the testimony, pleadings, and exhibits filed in this section 2-702 proceeding. Preponderance of evidence established that Defendant more likely than not did not commit the offenses underlying his petition.Remanded for issuance of a certificate of innocence. (WALKER and COGHLAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of possession of child pornography, based on images police recovered from his computer. Detective obtained from Comcast, which was Defendant's Internet service provider (ISP), the name and address of the person whose Internet protocol (IP address corresponded to the computer on which the pornographic images were found. Detective used the information to obtain a warrant to search Defendant's residence. Detective's actions, in obtaining a search warrant and securing charges before appearing before grand jury, violated grand jury subpoena rules, in violation of Illinois law. However, detective's conduct did not violate 4th amendment, as Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information supplied by the ISP. Information that detective obtained did not enable him to track any person's movements but only to learn the physical location of a computer and its ISP subscriber's identity.Defendant did not establish prejudice from the subpoena. (McLAREN and BRENNAN, concurring.)