Defendant filed postconviction petition alleging that his pretrial statements were the product of police coercion and for relief he requested a new suppression hearing. Court's denial of request was manifestly erroneous. Defendant's new evidence established that detective McDermott, who was one of his arresting officers and one of the detectives investigating his cases, worked from Area 2 while Jon Burge was commander there ad that he also engaged in abusive practices. Defendant's allegations of the specific physical abuse and torture that McDermott used are similar to findings in others reports about McDermott. This new evidence was conclusive enough that the outcome of the suppression hearing likely would have been different if McDermott had been subject to impeachment based on the new evidence. (CONNORS and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial on stipulated evidence, of 1 count of child photography by a sex offender, under section 11-24 of Criminal Code. That section requires that a child-sex offender, before taking a photo or video of a child, first obtain verbal consent of the child's parent or guardian; it does not require the person seeking consent to disclose that he or she is a child-sex offender. Section 11-24 is not overbroad, and is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant. The class of people who are child-sex offenders is an adequate proxy to identify persons from whom children need to be protected. (McLAREN and BRENNAN, concurring; BRENNAN, specially concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder. Court did not err in failing to sua sponte order a hearing on Defendant's continued competency to waive counsel. The shortcomings Defendant recognized in his self-representation relate to lack of legal knowledge and skill, not his mental ability to competently choose to represent himself. No evidence that Defendant lacked any mental ability to make a meaningful decision to represent himself or to understand the ramifications of such a decision. A lack of legal sophistication, knowledge, or experience is not a basis on which to find a Defendant incompetent to waive counsel or his waiver of counsel ineffective. (FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring.)
Defendant, age 18 at time of offense, pled guilty to 3 counts of 1st degree murder in stabbing death of female victim in her apartment. Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing discretionary sentence of natural life in prison. Court determined that Defendant's conduct showed he was beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. Court found that Defendant had attacked another female in her apartment only a few weeks before the murder, indicating that the behavior leading to murder was not an aberration and was likely to recur. Sentencing hearing was in compliance with U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama. (KNECHT and DeARMOND, concurring.)
Court entered judgment of commitment of Respondent as a "sexually violent person" (SVP) under Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Respondent's diagnosis of OSPA (other specified paraphilic disorder), formerly labeled PNOS (paraphilia not otherwise specified), is generally accepted in the psychological and psychiatric communities. Thus, a Frye hearing was not necessary to establish that Respondent's diagnosis was valid and generally accepted in the scientific community. State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Respondent's mental disorder made it substantially probable that he would engage in future acts of sexual violence; both State experts testified that his disorders are congenital or acquired condition and affect his emotional or volitional capacity. (LAVIN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)
In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge arising out of scheme in which defendants used cell-phones to obtain orders for heroin, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress real-time GPS location data for cell-phone, where police had applied to state court for said cell-phone's tracking data, and where state court entered order that: (1) found existence of probable cause to believe that user of cell-phone had engaged in illegal drug possession and trafficking, and that precise tracking of cell-phone location would facilitate user's apprehension; and (2) cited to Rule 41, as well as Stored Communications Act and federal statutes governing mobile tracking devices. While defendants argued that police could not track cell-phone without search warrant, and that instant state-court orders authorizing cell-phone tracking were not valid warrants because they cited to Stored Communications Act that required lesser showing than probable cause, instant orders satisfied warrant requirement, where orders cited to Rule 41 and found existence of probable cause to obtain cell-phone tracking data. Fact that orders also cited to Stored Communications Act did not require different result. Moreover, state court properly found existence of probable cause, where affidavit cited to several controlled purchases of drugs that used cell-phone to facilitate said purchases. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly calculate drug quantities for purposes of sentencing that were based on number of phone calls received by cell-phone and on conservative estimates as to how many phone calls would result in drug sale at specified quantity of drugs per sale.
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion seeking compassionate release under First Step Act, 18 USC section 3582(c)(1)(A), even though defendant argued this his underlying medical conditions made him vulnerable to serious illness from spread of COVID-19 in prison, where Dist. Ct. found that defendant had agreed to waive his right to seek any modification of his sentence as part of his guilty plea deal. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that instant waiver was knowing and voluntary, and that it was enforceable against defendant (so as to preclude defendant from seeking instant relief or filing instant appeal) based upon his Rule 11 plea colloquy, and on fact that defendant had already received substantial benefit under his plea agreement. Fact that there was change in circumstances brought on by pandemic did not render defendant's prior waiver unknowing or involuntary, since said circumstances occurred after defendant's sentencing. Ct. of Appeals further rejected defendant's contention that instant waiver should not be enforced because it is contrary to public policy and unconscionable.
Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant's habeas petition that challenged his murder conviction on grounds that trial evidence failed to support his conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Confession by co-defendant that implicated defendant in murder contained inconsistencies, and no physical evidence linked defendant to murder, while record contained evidence linking three other individuals to charged murder, that included corroborated confessions from said individuals that contained facts that were not known by general public. As such, record established as objective matter that no rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, state court improperly precluded defendant from introducing evidence of victim's cocaine dealing, where said evidence established motive for said three individuals to rob victim prior to instant shooting, while defendant and others charged with instant murder did not have such motive.
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. No ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress drug evidence seized, as such a motion would not have been granted on basis of the record. Prosecutor's closing argument did not deny Defendant a fair trial, and matter-of-fact comments were not used to inflame jury's passions or dissuade jury from fulfilling its nonpartisan role. It is not improper for a prosecutor to refer to Defendant's profit motive, where evidence shows that Defendant sold narcotics. Prosecutor's statement was a reasonable inference to draw on the evidence. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder. Affidavit of witness, offered in support of Defendant's claim of actual innocence, was newly discovered, material, and noncumulative. As witness did not speak with anyone about the shooting under 8 years after trial, Defendant's failure to discovery this witness's information prior to trial was not due to a lack of diligence. This witness's assertion that Defendant was not one of the 3 people in the car at time of shooting is relevant and supports his claim that he is innocent. Court applied the wrong standard when concluding that proposed new evidence must provide complete vindication and total exoneration for an actual innocence claim. Remanded for a new 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing. (HYMAN, concurring; PIERCE, dissenting.)
