Criminal Law

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, under an accountability theory of 1st degree murder in 1991 shooting death of a high-ranking member of a street gang; he was sentenced to 60 years, a de facto life sentence. Until discharged Defendant remains subject to the remainder of the 60-year sentence, which is well over the 40-year benchmark for de facto life sentences as set forth in Illinois Supreme Court's 2019 decision in People v. Buffer. Court, in imposing sentence, was required to first consider Defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics, but failed to do so, noting Defendant's age only in passing a few times. Remanded for new sentencing hearing. (BRIDGES and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member and aggravated discharge of a weapon. The statute defining the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member (720 ILCS 5/24-1.8) is constitutional under 8th amendment because it does not enhance criminal liability based on mere gang member status. State must prove substantially more than mere gang member status; it must prove specific criminal offenses directly related to or in furtherance of the gang's objectives and thus an explicit nexus is required between illegal firearm possession and gang-related activity. (PIERCE, concurring; WALKER, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of murder. Defendant presented compelling documentation undermining the scientific foundation of bite mark comparison evidence, including whether Board-certified forensic odontologists can reliably identify an injury as a human bite mark. Defendant made a prima facie showing that the conclusive nature of the State's expert witnesses' testimony deprived him of his right to due process.  State presented circumstantial evidence of Defendant's guilt, even absent the State's expert testimony on bite mark analysis.(MOORE and WHARTON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted on 1 count of 1st degree murder. In amended successive postconviction petition, Defendant alleged actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. Parties entered into agreed order whereby court granted petition, vacated conviction and sentence, and ordered a new trial. Defendant then filed petition for certificate of innocence, which court denied, finding that he had not proved that he was innocent of the murder by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant could not satisfy elements of section 2-702(g) because he cannot show that the "entire indictment" was dismissed, as State nol-prossed count I and agreed to amend count II to reckless discharge of a firearm. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 4/20/21.) Defendant, proceeding pro se, was convicted, after jury trial of possession with intent to deliver over 900 grams of cocaine, aggravated battery of a peace officer, and aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer. There was prejudicial error in the manner in which trial court played the video for jury during deliberations, and it was egregious enough to be 2nd-prong plain error. The failure to allow for proper jury deliberations and the resulting prejudice was clearly serious, undermined fairness of trial, and challenged integrity of the judicial process. The video's poor quality required that jury be given at least some control over the replay, and court's admonishment not to overemphasize the video invaded the jury's exclusive factfinding role. A vest with police markings can, under certain circumstances, constitute a police uniform under the statute. There was sufficient evidence on this element to sustain Defendant's conviction. (McLAREN adn BRENNAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder. Court erred in allowing State to introduce at trial, as substantive evidence, the transcript of Defendant's testimony from a prior trial during which Defendant was impeached with statements that were excluded as substantive evidence pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.  This evidence undoubtedly contributed to the verdict in the 2nd trial, and the error was not merely cumulative to the other evidence at trial. Transcript from 1st trial included many suppressed inculpatory statements (including his confession that he told detectives that he shot the victim), and court gave no limiting instruction on the purpose for which jury could consider the suppressed statements. (MOORE and VAUGHAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of being an armed habitual criminal (a Class X felony) and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (a Class 2 felony). No ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to pursue a necessity defense where Defendant found a loaded firearm lying on the ground and used it to prevent victim from attacking him with a dumbbell. Defense counsel sought to present the defense of self-defense based on the same evidence, and decision on which defense to pursue is a matter of trial strategy. No error in State using Defendant's 2 prior Class X felony convictions, granting State's petition for adjudication as a habitual criminal, and sentenced him to natural life. Legislature intended that prior 2 Class X felony offenses be used as elements of the armed habitual criminal offense and to sentence to natural life imprisonment as a habitual criminal.  Sentence is not unconstitutional, as Defendant squandered multiple opportunities to self-correct and instead continued committing serious crimes. Although Defendant committed one of the felonies (armed robbery) when he was 17, even after amendment to Juvenile Court Act, conviction by a 17-year-old of that offense faces possible discretionary transfer to adult court. (KNECHT and STEIGMANN, concurring.)