Criminal Law

In prosecution on Hobbs Act robberies, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through warrantless search of his cellphone. Under Riley, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), police normally need warrant to search contents of cellphone that had been seized incident to arrest, and Riley retroactively applies to instant case. Moreover, while there was no binding authority at time of instant search that would have permitted instant warrantless search, items of evidence government found in cellphone had independent source, and thus were admissible at trial on that ground.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to drug distribution and unlawful possession of firearm charges, even though defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to enter guilty plea without counsel having filed any motion to suppress firearm discovered by police in his vehicle. While defendant argued that police lacked warrant to search his vehicle, any motion to suppress would not have been granted, since automobile exception applied to allow police to search defendant's vehicle, where: (1) police had already conducted controlled drug purchase involving defendant and had scheduled another controlled purchase on day of defendant's arrest; and (2) totality of circumstances leading up to instant stop of defendant's vehicle demonstrated fair probability that defendant's vehicle contained contraband. Also, record did not support defendant's claim that trial counsel pressured him to plead guilty, where defendant gave sworn testimony to contrary during plea colloquy. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for evidentiary hearing, where instant motion to suppress would not have been successful. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant qualified for career offender sentencing enhancement under section 4B1.1 of USSG, based, in part, on his prior drug conspiracy conviction under 21 USC section 846, since said conviction constituted "controlled substance offense" for purposes of imposing said enhancement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing series of sentences on several defendants, who pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy and drug distribution charges involving large quantities of drugs, as well as money laundering charges, even though they argued that Dist. Ct. misinterpreted need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under section 3553(a)(6) and failed to adequately consider their arguments on said issue. Dist. Ct. did not misapprehend its discretion under section 3553(a)(6) nor expressly state that section 3553(a)(6) barred consideration of lower sentences given to others, who had initially played roles in charged conspiracy but subsequently left said conspiracy to participate in another drug conspiracy. Also, record showed that Dist. Ct. had properly calculated sentencing guideline range for all defendants and imposed sentences either within or below said ranges. As such, Dist. Ct. had necessarily complied with need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under section 3553(a)(6). Dist. Ct. also, also did not err in failing to apply minor-role reduction under section 3B1.2(b) of USSG as to one defendant, even though said defendant was drug courier for conspiracy, where said defendant transported large quantities of drugs and recruited members into conspiracy. Remand, though, was required with respect to two written conditions of supervised release that were different from conditions orally announced at sentencing hearing. Said written conditions must be modified to reflect what Dist. Ct. had orally announced at sentencing hearing.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress shotgun found in defendant's vehicle, where two police officers encountered defendant in his vehicle after having received complaint that defendant was living in his car behind Goodwill store, and where: (1) defendant told police that he was waiting for third-party who was away in nearby neighborhood; and (2) police saw open knife, crowbar and walkie-talkie in plain view in defendant's vehicle. Record showed that defendant was told not to leave scene while other officer looked for and discovered third-party in nearby backyard, with walkie-talkie set to same channel as defendant's walkie-talkie, as well as bolt cutters, shotgun ammo and methamphetamine. While defendant argued that he was under arrest at time police told him he could not leave scene, and that police lacked probable cause to arrest him at that time, police could make Terry stop, since police had reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity based on what they saw in defendant's vehicle. Moreover, 90-minute delay, between time defendant was stopped and until time he was arrested after second officer encountered third-party, was reasonable, where police were diligent in pursuing investigation to confirm or dispel their suspicions about defendant's criminal activity. Also, police had probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of burglary tools in violation of Wisconsin law at time officer encountered third-party, which, in turn, allowed police to search defendant's vehicle.