(Court opinion corrected 2/26/21.) Court properly denied Defendant leave to file his successive postconviction petition based on his claim that his confession to participation in murder was coerced by police abuse. Where a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty, he waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including any claim that his confession was coerced by police torture. Defendant's guilty plea resulted in waiver of his claim of a coerced confession. (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring.)
Court ordered Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) to pay attorney fees for attorney who represented Defendant in a proceeding, which occurred in Pulaski County, under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. The proceedings were held after Defendant had been adjudicated a sexually dangerous person. The Act requires that the county in which a proceeding under the Act is held, and not DOC, is responsible for the costs of legal representation of an indigent respondent. (BOIE and VAUGHAN, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not commit procedural error in denying defendant-prisoner's motion for compassionate release under 18 USC section 3582(c)(1)(A), even though Dist. Ct. failed to specifically address defendant's argument that his skin color elevated his risk for contracting COVID-19. While defendant cited to three articles discussing disparities in health care outcomes based on race, said articles did not support his motion for compassionate release, since: (1) said articles relied on multitude of broad societal factors that were not relevant to defendant's individual situation in prison; and (2) instant broad societal factors did not support proposition that black federal prisoners are at higher risk of contracting severe COVID-19 complications than federal prisoners of other races. As such, Dist. Ct. was not required to address instant argument when denying defendant's motion on other grounds. Also, defendant failed to submit any evidence that his perceived skin color rendered him especially vulnerable to virus in his prison.
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of failing to register in accordance with requirements of the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act. State failed to prove that Defendant was in Aurora on or about 6/1/2017, and that he lacked a fixed residence at that time. A person may obtain a fixed residence even before he or she spends 5 days at that location. When Defendant was arrested, officers found him at an address that he twice told the Aurora Police Department in 2017 was his fixed residence. State failed to prove that Defendant violated the Act's registration requirements. (BRIDGES and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)
Defendant, age 22 at time of offenses, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and aggravated battery. Court erred in allowing State to present testimony as to the contents of Defendant's cell phone records. State failed to present any evidence to establish the 4 foundational elements that are specific to a computer-generated record which are required for admission of such record under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule. As phone records testimony was a crucial piece of evidence, erroneous admission of that testimony substantially prejudiced Defendant and affected outcome of trial. Reversed and remanded for new trial. (O'BRIEN, concurring; WRIGHT, dissenting.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 114-month term of incarceration on attempted armed robbery charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on six-level enhancement under section 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) of USSG, where other individual involved in attempted robbery had "otherwise used" firearm. Defendant conceded that he aided and abetted attempted robbery of gas station by trying to open door of gas station while individual who had pulled gun on cashier attempted to leave gas station. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly impose enhancement, where there was evidence that defendant was in on other individual's plan to rob gas station, and that defendant continued to help other individual after said individual had brandished gun. Also, individual's use of firearm was within scope of plan to rob gas station and was foreseeable to defendant given details of attempted robbery, as well as defendant's and other individual's involvement in six armed robberies that had preceded instant charged offense.
Record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction on drug distribution charge, where said charge alleged that defendant aided and abetted third party to distribute heroin that resulted in serious overdose to ultimate buyer of said drugs. Record contained no evidence that defendant herself distributed heroin to victim on day of overdose, and record failed to show that defendant affirmatively acted in furtherance of third-party's sale of drugs to victim and intended to facilitate commission of said sale. Moreover, there was no evidence to show that defendant knew third-party or victim, knew of their drug transaction or even cared whether it had occurred. Also, defendant was entitled to remand for resentencing without imposition of serious-bodily-injury enhancement with respect to defendant's drug conspiracy conviction, where jury issued general verdict on existence of said enhancement that did not indicate whether it unanimously found that victim's overdose injury resulted from either defendant's vacated drug distribution charge or his valid drug conspiracy conviction. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in finding existence of two-level leadership enhancement on drug conspiracy charge, where, with respect to single drug transaction at issue in said charge, defendant prearranged logistics of drug sale, maintained near constant contact with another individual to pick up drugs and provided step-by-step instructions throughout drug sale.
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder and home invasion. Court did not err in summarily dismissing his postconviction petition. Defendant failed to state the gist of a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mental health expert due to effects of his prolonged alcohol abuse. Defendant does not allege that he suffered from a mental illness at time of offenses or that he ever asked counsel to request mental health evaluation. Defendant claimed that at the time of the offenses, he was so intoxicated that he blacked out. Evidence at trial shows that Defendant knew that what he did was wrong, and that he did not suffered from a "fixed" or "settled" insanity. (HUDSON and BRENNAN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of burglary and arson, and sentenced to 24 years and 6 months on each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered Defendant to pay victim $117,230 in restitution. No error in admonishments given to prospective jurors pursuant to Rule 431(b). The rule does not require that responses by potential jurors be conveyed orally rather than by a show of hands. Court recited the 4 specific principles in the rule verbatim and then asked specific questions about whether jurors accepted and understood those principles. Restitution order was entered erroneously without sufficient evidentiary support. Remanded for a new hearing on restitution. (A. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring; NEVILLE, dissenting.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. Court properly denied Defendant leave to file successive postconviction petition. Defendant's supporting documents relating to police misconduct do not warrant further proceedings on his claim of witness intimidation, as they are not relevant to determine whether there was a pattern and practice of police misconduct or witness intimidation. Defendant's affidavits offered for his actual innocence claim are repetitive of their trial testimony and thus are not new evidence. (GARMAN, THEIS, M. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring; NEVILLE, specially concurring.)
