Criminal Law

Court imposed sentence of 6 years on Defendant for his violation of an order of protection after he made a blind admission to a probation. By focusing on Defendant's probation conduct in resentencing Defendant, all of which concerned the victim of the original offense, court was addressing Defendant's lack of rehabilitative potential as evidenced by his continued abuse of the original victim. Thus, Defendant's resentence was for the original offense, rather than the probation conduct. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 2/1/2021.) Defendant, age 18 years 2 months at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and sentenced to 51 years. Jury found that Defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death of victim. Court did not err in admitting dying declaration by victim, identifying Defendant as the shooter, as exception to hearsay rule. Victim had suffered several gunshot wounds and expressed the belief he was dying. Dying declarations do not violate 6th amendment right to confrontation. Defendant was not denied fair and impartial trial because jury foreman had a work and familial relationship with victim's father which he did not reveal in voir dire. They worked for the same company in different departments and had minimal interaction with each other, did not often see each other at work, and never socialized together outside of work; and their familial relationship was remote, as victim's father was married to foreman's sister for only 8 months before foreman had ever met victim's father. At sentencing hearing, Defendant did not offer any evidence as to how emerging science as to juvenile maturity and brain development that formed the basis for Miller v. Alabama applies to him. Thus, no evidentiary record to support Defendant's claim that his sentence is a de facto life sentence and violates Illinois proportionate penalties clause. (WELCH and MOORE, concurring.)

(Court opinion modified 1/28/21.) Defendant, age 27 at time of offense, was convicted, after bench trial,of the 1st degree murder of his roommate, who was stabbed. No argument was made at trial or on appeal of self-defense or mutual combat, and there was no evidence of a 3rd person being involved. Thus, no merit to Defendant's argument that State failed to prove that victim's death was produced by a criminal agency. There was evidence establishing Defendant's presence at the scene, his knowledge of the offense, and evidence of Defendant's flight on 2 occasions. Neighbor testified about wrestling and screaming; and DNA evidence which court found was "damning". Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a factfinder to find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted of 1st-degree murder and sentenced to 54 years. The de facto life sentence does not comport with U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 Miller v. Alabama decision, because court failed to evaluate whether Defendant is irretrievably depraved, permanently incorrigible, or irreparably corrupt beyond possibility of rehabilitation. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim rejected, as Defendant provided no independent, objective confirmation that he did not timely accept the State's offer due to his counsel's erroneous advice. (SCHOSTOK and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated domestic battery and aggravated battery, and was sentenced to 25 years and 10 years, to be served consecutively. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to inform Defendant that he was eligible for Class X sentencing for the aggravated domestic battery conviction. Defense counsel admitted that he was unaware that section 5-4.5-95(b) of Unified Code of Corrections applied to the conviction, and admitted that he had not informed Defendant of his Class X sentencing eligibility. Counsel's erroneous advice, advising Defendant that in a worst-case scenario he faced a Class 2 sentence with the possibility of parole, was the deciding factor leading him to reject State's 6-year plea offer. Thus, Defendant was prejudiced by counsel's advice.  (O'BRIEN and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Although state's attorney must make a finding of reasonable cause to allow the eavesdrop execution under section 14-3(q)(1), plain language of Section 14-3(q)(2) of Criminal Code establishes that the written memorialization need only include reasonable cause finding in writing if the requesting officer does not provide a name and physical description of the person the officer believes will commit a qualified offense.  In this case, memorializations of officer's eavesdrop requests contained names and description of the eavesdrop subjects. (DAUGHERITY and McDADE, concurring.)