Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 117-month term of incarceration on Hobbs Act and brandishing firearm in connection with crime of violence charges, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. improperly considered his race when imposing instant sentence by relying on false stereotype about black families, as well as failed to adequately consider his argument regarding psychological immaturity of young men in their late teens. While Dist. Ct., in addressing defendant's mitigation argument that he suffered in his formative years due to fact that his father was incarcerated, stated that absence of father in family home was "common thing in our community," such observation was not example of racial stereotype of black family, where Dist. Ct. discounted said observation by noting that defendant had loving mother and other sources of support. As such, Dist. Ct. was merely making clear that sentencing decision was overwhelmingly driven by other factors and was not influenced by perception about absent fathers in black community. Also, Dist. Ct. adequately acknowledged defendant's youth and status of his brain development and could properly conclude that defendant's crimes could not be explained away by his youth.

Dist. Ct. committed plain error in imposing five-year term of supervised release on defendant's drug distribution conviction that involved 5 kilograms of cocaine. Defendant qualified for safety-valve treatment under 18 USC section 3553(f), which granted Dist. Ct. authority to impose sentence without regard to statutory minimum, and defendant's presentence report indicated that defendant's offense carried statutory minimum of at least five years' supervised release, although under safety-value provisions, applicable guideline range for term of supervised release ranged from 2 to 5 years. Accordingly, remand was required because Dist. Ct. erroneously believed that it was required to impose five-year term of supervised release, especially where application note to section 5C1.2 of USSG makes clear that safety-valve treatment applied to defendant's term of supervised release. Upon remand, Dist. Ct. must reconsider length of term of supervised release in view of guideline range as set forth under safety-valve provisions.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's request for compassionate release from prison under 18 USC section 3582(c)(1) under circumstances, where: (1) defendant received life sentence without parole in 1986; and (2) defendant claimed that said release was warranted given his medical condition and being required to live in close quarters during SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Defendant was convicted of underlying crimes prior to November 1, 1987 effective date of Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and (2) compassionate release provisions of section 3582 applies only to offenses committed after effective date of Sentencing Reform Act. As such, given defendant's no-parole sentence, which lacked minimum term of years, defendant retained only possibility of commutation by President in order to obtain release from prison. Ct. rejected defendant's argument that 2018 enactment of First Step Act essentially rendered section 3582(c)(1) applicable to individuals convicted of offenses prior to November of 1987.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's habeas petition under 28 USC section 2254(d)(2) that challenged his murder convictions on ground that he was actually innocent of said charges, where witness at trial recanted his testimony that identified defendant as shooter, and where his conviction rested on said testimony. Illinois Appellate Court could reasonably find that witness' recantation was internally inconsistent and unbelievable with respect to witness' explanation for motive for lying at original trial and for motive coming forth with recantation 15 years after his trial testimony. Also, Ct. noted its recent decision that rejected co-defendant's appeal that raised same actual innocence claim and observed that instant defendant similarly failed to rebut by clear and convincing evidence factual determination regarding instant recantation made by Illinois Appellate Court. Ct. left for another day issue as to whether defendant could ever assert free-standing actual innocence claim under section 2254(d)(2), where defendant was not subject to death penalty, and where defendant had not identified constitutional error that infected original trial so as to warrant habeas relief.