This case presents question as to whether defendant’s four convictions on charge of aggravated discharge of weapon violates one-act, one-crime doctrine, where record showed that defendant fired single shot in direction of multiple police officers. Appellate Court, in vacating three of defendant’s aggravated discharge of weapon convictions, found that single shot directed at multiple officers could not support multiple convictions for aggravated discharge of weapon. In its petition for leave to appeal, govt. argued that Appellate Court decision conflicted with Hardin, 2012 IL App (1st) 100682.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly gave to jury accomplice instruction that told jury to review witness’ testimony with caution, where witness indicated that he had participated in charged offense. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction on home invasion, residential burglary and battery charges, found that said instruction was given in error, since witness’ testimony exculpated, rather than inculpated defendant. In its petition for leave to appeal, govt. contended that accomplice witnesses are subject to same scrutiny regardless of whether witness was called by State or defendant.
Ct. of Appeals granted defendant’s counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel for defendant in appeal of Dist. Ct.’s denial of defendant’s section 2255 petition seeking lower sentence on his drug conviction involving 13 kilograms of crack, where petition was based on First Step Act of 2018. While defendant opposed said motion and asked Ct. of Appeals to compel counsel to continue with his representation, defendant does not have right to assistance of counsel at public expense, and defendant’s counsel, who is lawyer at Federal Defender, initially volunteered to represent defendant in this matter. As such, defendant could not compel his lawyer to continue representing him, and counsel was entitled to seek withdrawal based on his perception that defendant’s appeal was frivolous. As such, Ct. of Appeals granted motion to withdraw and gave defendant new deadline to file his own opening brief, but denied counsel’s proposal to dismiss appeal.
Defendant was charged with 5 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made during a recorded interview. Defendant has a functional IQ of 50 and intellectual disability. His background, experience, and conduct reveal he was incapable of voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights. Admission of Defendant's statements was prejudicial error. It was 1st-prong plain error and a violation of Defendant's Miranda rights for detective to fail to honor Defendant's request for counsel. (KNECHT, concurring; TURNER, dissenting.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 3 counts of armed robbery and was sentenced to 3 concurrent terms of 25 years. Counsel's failure to seek suppression of witness's pretrial identification on grounds of police not following procedural requirements in section 107A-2 of Code of Criminal Procedure did not deprive Defendant of his right to effective assistance of trial counsel because Defendant suffered no prejudice. A violation of procedural dictates of the lineup statute does not necessarily have an effect on reliability of a witness's identification. Even if a motion to suppress would have been successful, it would not have altered outcome of trial, as evidence of Defendant's guilt was overwhelming. (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)
Defendant was charged with 1 count each of identity theft, possession of incomplete card, and altered or counterfeited card. Charges alleged that Defendant possessed blank and altered debit cards and another person's social security number with the intent to use it to commit a felony. After bench trial, court found Defendant guilty of all counts. Officer testified that he arrested Defendant for driving 115 mph in a 70-mph zone As that is a misdemeanor charge, and officer's testimony suggests he took Defendant into custody, it is likely police would have had his vehicle towed and would have done an inventory search. No ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file motion to suppress, as the seized evidence would have inevitably been discovered. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in applying four-level enhancement under section 2B1.1(b)(20) of USSG when sentencing defendant on wire fraud charge stemming from Ponzi scheme, where defendant solicited funds from certain investors and instead of investing said funds, used said funds to pay off losses incurred by original investors, as well as paid off certain of his personal mortgages and rent obligations from funds invested by original investors in hedge funds operated by defendant. Dist. Ct. imposed enhancement following finding that defendant’s offense qualified as “violation of commodities law” by “commodity pool operator.” While defendant argued that enhancement did not apply because he was not “commodity pool operator” under Commodities Exchange Act (Act), since he traded only in broad-based indexes which fit Act’s definition of “excluded commodity,” defendant satisfied Act’s definition of “commodity pool operator,” where private placement memoranda that defendant used to solicit investment funds showed that he solicited investment funds for purposes of trading in any securities futures product. Moreover, defendant’s reliance on definition of “excluded commodity” was misplaced, since it did not relate to Act’s fraud provision or its definition of “commodity pool operator.” Fact that defendant did not actually trade in commodities mentioned in private placement memoranda did not require different result.
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion for compassionate release under 18 USC section 3582(c)(1)(A) from his 15-year sentence imposed on his 2014 drug-trafficking offense, where said motion was based on defendant’s concerns regarding prison’s alleged inability to protect him from COVID-19 pandemic. While Dist. Ct. based ruling on merits of defendant’s motion, government raised timely contention that said motion should be denied based on defendant’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies within Bureau of Prisons prior to filing instant motion. Ct. of Appeals agreed that exhaustion requirement set forth in section 3582(c)(1)(A) is mandatory claim-processing rule and must be invoked when timely asserted, and further found that defendant had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, where defendant had filed his motion for compassionate release just 3 days after prison’s warden had received defendant's request for compassionate release without waiting for either prison’s response (and pursuing any administrative appeal) or lapse of 30 days.
After bench trial, Defendant was found not guilty of 2 counts of criminal sexual assault but was found guilty of 1 counts of distributing harmful material to a minor (his female cousin). He was sentenced to 30 months of probation, and 180 days in county jail with no day-for-day credit, but he did receive credit for 68 days served. A rational trier of fact could have found that State presented sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of distributing harmful material to a minor. As Defendant grew up living among victim's family before she was born, and that family was close knit, reasonable trier of fact could have found that Defendant knew victim was a minor or failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining her true age. Defendant sent to victim's cell phone a photo of an adult male's nude, erect penis, which constitutes material considered harmful to minors. Evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of this offense. Court erred in enhancing offense to a Class 4 felony. Section 11-21(g) of the Criminal Code sets forth a separate offense, not a sentencing enhancement.Conviction reduced from Class 4 felony to a Class A misdemeanor. (WELCH and WHARTON, concurring.)
Defendant, age 17 at time of offenses, was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of 1st degree murder and attempted murder. Defendant's 90-year sentence is a de facto life sentence, but court imposed sentence without considering Defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics. Remanded for resentencing. Defendant was not subject to provisions of Juvenile Court Act at time of incident and subsequent interrogations, as relevant provisions of the Act applied to minors who violated or attempted to violate the law prior to their 17th birthday. Officers were not bound by the Act to contact Defendant's mother or to allow him to speak with a concerned adult during or prior to interrogation. Defendant's statements were voluntary and court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. The issue of fitness had been raised, and court ordered a fitness evaluation to assist in determining whether a bona fide doubt as to fitness actually existed; and nothing in the record supported a conclusion that Defendant was unfit. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring).
