Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 6 out of 10 counts of sexual assault and abuse of his girlfriend's 11-year-old granddaughter. Court sentenced him to 37 years in prison followed by an indeterminate period of mandatory supervised release (MSR); and informed him that he was required to register as a sex offender. The MSR conditions included a total prohibition on accessing social networking websites, pursuant to subsection (a)(7.12) of section 3-3-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections. That subsection is overbroad and facially unconstitutional, as it is not narrowly tailored to serve the substantial governmental interest of foreclosing sex offenders on MSR from identifying or contacting victims through social networking websites. Persons on MSR may still be subject to more specific limitations on their Internet access or use without violating a person's 1st amendment rights. (KNECHT, concurring; TURNER, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 2 counts of retail theft and 2 counts of burglary. Defendant attempted to steal packs of men's underwear from a retail store in February 2016; and he was charged with retail theft and burglary by unauthorized entry of a retail store in December 2015 and January 2016. The two cases were consolidated for trial. No error in court sentencing Defendant to 13 years. Court appropriately took into account Defendant's lifelong history of retail thefts and burglaries ad that this crime spree involved multiple thefts over several weeks. Court did not err in admitting 3rd-party testimony about noneyewitnesses' prior identification of Defendant as perpetrator of the burplaries and thefts under section 115-12 of Code of Criminal Procedure.(HUDSON and BIRKETT, concuring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder. Conviction was reversed on direct appeal and remanded for new trial, based on improper admission of Facebook evidence. After closing arguments in 2nd trial, jury found Defendant guilty of 1st-degree murder and that he personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused victim's death. Witness Wesley, age 13 on date of murder, the only eyewitness to the shooting, testified at 1st trial that he witnesses the shooting and saw the shooting at the park earlier that evening. Although evidence was sufficient to support conviction, Defendant is entitled to a new trial because court committed reversible error in admitting Wesley's testimony from the 1st trial. Court abused its discretion in ruling that Wesley was an unavailable witness under Rule 804(a)(5).  State's proffer was unsupported by affidavit or sworn testimony, State did not establish the number of attempts to serve Wesley, never advised court as to any additional attempts at service, and never asserted that further attempts to serve him would be futile and instead stated that it would continue such attempts. Record reflects no efforts by State to procure Wesley's attendance by other reasonable means. Court erred in granting State's motion in limine to admit Wesley's testimony from 1st trial. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 10 counts of 1st-degree murder for stabbing and slashing his friend's parents. He was initially sentenced to natural life in prison, but was resentenced to 2 concurrent 90-year prison terms, which constitute de facto life imprisonment. Court properly considered Defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the sentences and specifically enumerated and weighed the Miller v. Alabama factors during resentencing.(BRIDGES and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Defendant, who is black, was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery, unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and the lesser-included criminal trespass, and was sentenced to 2 consecutive 7-year terms, to be served "day-for-day." Defense counsel inserted Defendant's race, with harmful stereotypes and personal bias, including describing the likely fears Defendant felt being "a black man in a white community", that were not based on evidence and lacked merit.  opinions, into closing arguments. These actions were outside the bounds of sound trial strategy and show deficient performance by counsel, falling below the standard of reasonable assistance and prejudicing the Defendant. (LYTTON, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring.)

Defendant was charged with intentionally setting fire to an apartment building and was convicted, after jury trial, of 7 counts of 1st degree murder and sentenced to natural life in prison. No violation of Defendant's 5th amendment rights in court conditioning the admission of psychiatrist expert testimony as to Defendant's mental state when he gave an inculpatory statement upon Defendant's submission to an examination by a State expert. Court had legitimate and well-founded concerns about the introduction and use of defense expert's report and proposed testimony in the manner desired by defense counsel, without the State having any opportunity to meaningfully respond to or test that evidence. Court did not err in failing to strike State's expert arson investigator's testimony that the fire was intentionally set using an accelerant and open flame. State provided sufficient evidence to show that facts or data expert relied upon were of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of fire investigation, and there was adequate foundation for expert's opinion. (ELLIS, concurring; HOWSE, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st-degree murder of one person and aggravated batteries of 2 persons, and sentenced to total 32 years. Prior to trial, a psychologist had evaluated Defendant and found that he had an IQ of 61, indicative of "mild mental retardation." The facts of the offense itself are not indicative of mental illness or impairment, but are indicative of being bent on revenge for a prior beating. Defendant failed to state the gist of an ineffectiveness claim for his counsel's alleged failure to request a fitness hearing. Trial transcript demonstrates Defendant's knowing and active participation in trial, and does not indicate lack of confidence in the interpreter by Defendant or his trial counsel. No indication that interpreter violated statutory and ethical obligations to translate accurately.Court thoroughly explained to Defendant the difference between bench and jury trial, and he participated actively and competently in bench trial. No indication that Defendant's intellectual disability prevented him from knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to a jury trial. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.) 

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault fo a child and criminal sexual assault of his daughter and stepdaughter. State committed clear error when, during closing argument, it misstated the law regarding hearsay and then compounded that with the implication that was why the witnesses were not called. It is error to suggest that evidence of guilt existed which, because of Defendant's objection, cannot be brought before the jury. Credibility of both victims was challenged in that the defense elicited testimony that both had denied that the abuse occurred when they were questioned about it 7 years earlier; there was no physical evidence; and there was no 3rd-party testimony putting Defendant with either victim. Evidence was closely balanced for purposes of plain error analysis. (McDADE, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of one person and the attempted 1st degree murder of another person. Court properly granted State's 2nd-stage motion to dismiss Defendant's postconviction petition. No ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue that court violated Defendant's constitutional right of presence by responding, in Defendant's absence, to a jury note requesting clarification about the meaning of a defendant's "unreasonable" belief in the need for deadly force. Defendant failed to make a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that appellate court would have found that the State could not show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant could not show, by preponderance of evidence, his own actual and subjective though unreasonable belief in the need for deadly force. Evidence of Defendant's guilt was overwhelming. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)