Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal. Initial seizure was lawful because vehicle in which he was a passenger was pulled over for his failure to wear a seatbelt. Officer first spoke to Defendant after driver had been placed in handcuffs due to his failure to possess ia valid driver's license. Officer's inquiries occurred during course of an active traffic stop, and did not measurably extned duration of stop, as officers were still working to secure the scene and impound the car. Thus, Defendant's search and seizure were not conducted in violation of his 4th amendment rights. Court did not err in denying motion to suppress. Because the traffic stop occurred because of Defendant's own conduct, a reasonable person in his position would not feel free to leave absent interaction with the officers who initiated the stop.Defendant had not yet been ordered out of the vehicle when he was questioned and admitted to possessing marijuana.  (FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant, age 20 at time of offense, was charged by indictment with armed robbery. He was convicted, after jury trial, of the lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery and sentenced to 7 years. Charge alleged that Defendant threatened imminent use of force against victim which being armed with a firearm, which supports a reasonable inference that Defendant specifically used the firearm to threaten victim. Thus, the charge of armed robbery sufficiently stated facts to include the lesser offense of aggravated robbery. Evidence at trial supported conviction of aggravated robbery but acquittal of armed robbery. No indication in record that court did not consider Defendant's status as an emerging adult offender in imposing sentence. Protections in Miller v. Alabama do not apply, as sentence of 7 years is not a de facto life sentence. (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of his niece, who said the abuse started when she was age 8 or 9. Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing victim, age 17 at time of trial, to testify with a service dog under the ADA. At pretrial hearing on Defendant's motion in limine, victim's mother told judge, prior to trial, that dog assisted in coping with a mental illness. Victim testified in clear view of Defendant and was subject to extensive cross-examination. Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated. Court adequately compensated for any potential sympathy for victim from dog's presence, by detailed instructions to jury, such that Defendant's right to fair trial was not violated.Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing victim's testimony that she thought she'd be dead before the abuse came out, because it can logically be interpreted to mean that victim thought  the abuse would never come to light during her lifetime. Defense counsel cross-examined police officer about police responding to a report that victim had been making suicidal comments online. (HUDSON and BRENNAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 3 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of his minor step-granddaughters. Court found minors and their mother to be credible witnesses and found Defendant not to be a credible witness. No ineffective assistance of counsel in not objecting to admission of minors' recorded statements to trained forensic interviewer. Testimony of minors and their mother was consistent and was found credible, and thus outcome of trial would have likely been the same even without the recordings.  No error in Defendant not being present when court viewed the recorded interviews with minors. Defendant made no objection to court viewing videos outside of his presence, he saw the videos himself, witnesses in videos testified in open court where Defendant had opportunity to confront and cross-examine them, and he was aware of all the State's evidence when he decided to testify in his own defense. (STEIGMANN and DeARMOND, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/18/20.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of home invasion, armed robbery, aggravated battery with a firearm, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Defendant and 2 other men claimed to be pizza deliverymen as a guise to enter the home and commit robbery and battery. The pizza box was brought to the victims' residence and was used as a tool in the home invasion, and Defendant's fingerprint on the pizza box connected him to the crime. Phone calls made to Defendant's phone were made in the area where the victims' residence was located. A trier of fact could reasonably find that about the time the offenses were committed, Defendant was at or near the victims' residence. A rational trier of fact could find the elements of the offenses, either on a theory that Defendant was one of the principal perpetrators or on a theory that he was accountable for the crimes of the principal perpetrators. (KNECHT and HARRIS, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 12/15/20.)Defendant and her boyfriend, codefendant, following simultaneous but severed jury trials, were convicted of 1st degree murder of a woman and intentional homicide of her unborn child. Defendant, age 19 at time of offenses, was sentenced to natural life in prison. Defendant was not in custody until she was arrested for obstruction of justice. She voluntarily chose to accompany codefendant to the police station the day before; she was neither handcuffed nor denied access to her personal belongings, and was driven in a separate police vehicle from codefendant, and vehicle did not have a barrier between the front and rear seats.  Court's findings that Defendant was not in custody before she confessed and that her confession was voluntary were not against manifest weight of evidence. Court properly denied her pretrial motions to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to admit evidence of codefendant's past crimes , as the evidence was not relevant to her defense.  Court properly denied motion to admit out-of-court statements made by the victim to her friend, as statements were hearsay and victim was not abused by a family or household member.(FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of 2 counts of fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer. Defendant's presence at viewing of officer's dash camera video footage would not have contributed to his opportunity to defend himself against the charges where he had no objection to court viewing the videos outside of his presence, he saw the videos himself, witnesses in videos testified in open court where Defendant had opportunity to confront and cross-examine them, and Defendant was aware of all State's evidence when he decided to testify in his own defense. Thus, his right to be present was not violated. Trial occurred within 160 days of Defendant's written demand for a speedy trial, and thus no speedy trial violation occurred. Defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to seek revocation of his bond. Defendant committed separate acts (speeding and failure to stop for traffic control devices) which support separate offenses, although they share the common act of refusing to stop at the direction of an officer; and neither conviction is a lesser included offense of the other. Thus, no violation of the one-act, one-crime doctrine. (BARBERIS and WHARTON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of escape, obstruction of a peace officer, and aggravated assault. Officers held Defendant by the arms and walked him toward squad car before he broke free of their grip. There was sufficient evidence to prove that he was in lawful custody before breaking away. Court explained all 4 Zehr principles to jurors and asked if they accepted the 4 principles, but court failed to fully comply with Rule 431(b) as court did not ask whether jurors understood the principles. Defendant failed to object during voir dire, and no plain error as evidence was not closely balanced. Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, rather than simple assault, because victim was a police officer. A threat of serious harm is not inherent in that charge. Court most likely found that Defendant's conduct threatened serious harm because he ran across the street, putting officers in danger from vehicles as they pursued him. (CATES and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and of being an armed habitual criminal. Defendant was arrested after a foot chase partially caught on body camera video. Court erred in admitting video, as audio included inadmissible hearsay statements officer made on his radio, telling other officer where the gun was, what it looked like, where Defendant dropped it, where after putting Defendant in custody. (WALKER and COGHLAN, concurring.)

Section 2-702 of Code of Civil Procedure doe not permit the issuance of a Certificate of Innocence unless the petitioner is deemed innocent of all charges in the indictment for which the petitioner was convicted. (HOWSE and McBRIDE, concurring.)