Criminal Law

Plaintiff was convicted, in 2004, of 1st degree murder for killing of a Chicago police officer, and was sentenced to natural life. . Court dismissed Plaintiff's mandamus action, seeking order directing circuit judge to vacate his 1st degree murder conviction.  Plaintiff's conviction had not been determined to be void. A judgment is void for purposes of mandamus only if the court lacked power to enter the order due to an absence of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or the judgment is based on a facially unconstitutional statute that is void ab initio. Court propely dismissed mandamus complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (KNECHT, concurring; DeARMOND, specially concurring.)

Defendant was charged with 6 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child in connection with sexual abuse of his 3 young daughters. State appealed court's denial of its request to admit into evidence video-recorded interviews with all 3 girls pursuant to section 115-10 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Rule 604(a)(1) allows State to file appeals in criminal cases under limited circumstances when substantive effect of an order or judgment is to suppress evidence, such that it prevents State from presenting facts or opinions to the jury. The recorded interviews would not allow jurors to see the charged offenses as they occurred, but would only see two minors describe the events long after they occurred. Thus, appellate court is without jurisdiction. (WELCH and MOORE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of home invasion and unlawful restraint, on charges filed in 2009. When State, on 9/21/09, nol-prossed Defendant's 2008 charge of criminal damage to property, State was obligated to bring the case to trial within 120 days. However, Defendant was released from custody on 12/11/2009, at which point the 120-day speedy-trial period of section 103-5(e) no longer applied. Defendant demanded a trial within 160 days, pursuant to section 103-5(b), and on day of trial he moved to dismiss on basis that the 160-day period had lapsed. As Day 160 was a Sunday, the State was entitled to bring the case to trial on the next day that court was in session. No violation of right to speedy trial.(BIRKETT and HUTCHINSON, concurring.) 

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder.  Counsel was not ineffective for failing to ask court to instruct jury that a witness is not required to speak to an attorney or an attorney's investigator before testifying.  The testimony at issue did not show that witness refused to speak with the prosecutors or their investigators, ut instead showed that she did speak with them and that she told a story inconsistent with her trial testimony. This testimony was unlikely to unfairly lead jurors to hold Defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent against him. Defendant's unsolicited statement to detective was admissible in spite of his invocation of his right to remain silent until counsel was present. State's commentary on this admissible statement was not improper. Defense counsel's decision to counter State's argument, rather than object, was sound trial strategy. (WELCH and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after separate jury trials, of 3 weapons offenses and 3 drug offenses. Court erred by admitting irrelevant evidence that he possessed a large amount of cash when arrested, but the error was evidentiary, and not constitutional, and harmless because no reasonable probability existed that the jury would have acquitted Defendant absent the error. In drug trial, court improperly imposed an extended-term sentence for the least serious drug offense. Sentence is reduced to the maximum nonextended term for that offense. (McLAREN and HUTCHINSON, concurring.) 

Defendant was charged with armed habitual criminal, possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon after police searched his apartment. Defendant moved to quash warrant and suppress evidence because affidavit for warrant listed an incorrect number of bedrooms in his apartment. An informant's false statements alone, even if told to unsuspecting affiant officer and averred to an issuing judge, can be the basis for granting a Franks hearing. Defendant did not show deliberate misstatements, a reckless disregard for truth or a falsity material to the probable cause determination. Defendant failed to make a substantial preliminary showing and was not entitled to a Franks hearing. Thus, court's order granting motion to quash search warrant and suppress evidence is reversed. (HYMAN and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 21 at time of offenses in 1982, was convicted, after jury trial, of murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, home invasion, and rape. No Illinois cases have held that a life sentenced imposed on a person age 21 or older is unconstitutional as applied to that offender under proportionate penalties clause or 8^th amendment. Defendant played an active role in the offenses, including rape. Court imposed a discretionary sentence of natural life, and made a specific finding, based on all evidence presented, that Defendant was beyond rehabilitation.    (CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)