Criminal Law

After a shooting incident, Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted murders of 5 people. No ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to move to suppress off-duty police officer's identification of Defendant, as evidence against him, even without the ID, was overwhelming. Court did not err in admitting, as an excited utterance, statement of one intended victim that another intended victim told him that "Lil Dave from [the] hood" was the shooter. Court did not err in barring Defendant from introducing alternate-suspect evidence. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual abuse, unlawful restraint, and battery. Defendant's conduct consisted of multiple separate physical acts that took place in an abandoned house. Each of the countless but separate acts of physical contact with victim constitutes an overt or outward manifestation that supports a different; thus, Defendant committed multiple physical acts, not a single act. Thus, convictions do not violate the one-act, one-crime rule. (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring.)

In 2018, Defendant was convicted of murder with the 1973 death of his wife, and sentenced to 75 to 150 years. The degree of prosecutorial involvement in securing the warrant for Defendant's arrest was not significant enough to trigger Defendant's 6th amendment right to counsel. Even if Defendant had a 6th amendment right to counsel at the police interview, he validly waived that right. Defendant was sufficiently aware of the gravity of his situation to support a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Prosecutor's improper question, which was isolated and fleeting, did not deny Defendant a fair trial. The promptly sustained objection and subsequent jury instruction effectively cured the error and prevented any prejudice to Defendant. (GORDON and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 18 at time of offenses, confessed that several days earlier he had sexually assaulted and murdered a woman in Grant Park. Defendant pled guilty to 1st degree murder in exchange for a sentencing recommendation by the State of natural-life imprisonment. Defendant did not and could not have known at the time of his guilty plea that he could argue his natural-life sentence was constitutionally disproportionate as applied to him. Thus, Defendant did not knowingly waive his right to bring an as-applied proportionate penalties claim. Thus, court erred in denying Defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor domestic battery. State originally charged Defendant with 2 counts domestic battery based on physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature. A third count, added later, charged Defendant with domestic battery based upon "bodily harm." Counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a motion to dismiss the third count. The same speedy trial clock applicable to counts I and II was applicable to count III. Defendant was brought to trial of count III well outside of the 160-day statutory period. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, under section 17-57(a)2) of Criminal Code, of defrauding a drug or alcohol screening test (required by terms of his probation) by substituting a sample with the intent of defeating that test. Conviction for that offense does not require proof that the substance submitted during a screening test is not the urine of the person being tested. A trier of fact if not barred from inferring that a person who uses a device designed to thwart screening tests to provide a urine sample has made a substitution under the statute. (BRIDGES and BRENNAN, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to robbery. Court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Court denied Defendant's right to counsel when appointed counsel participated only by telephone at the hearing at which Defendant was arraigned and was allowed to proceed pro se. Just before court was going to give Defendant admonishments, the prosecutor interrupted and said that he wanted to file an amended information. Defendant needed to be arraigned on the amended information, of which Defendant and his counsel did not have advance notice. At this critical stage of the prosecution, presence of counsel on speakerphone, without opportunity for confidential communication with the client, deprived Defendant of his sixth amendment right to counsel. (O'BRIEN and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and 2 counts of aggravated kidnapping. State prosecuted Defendant under an asportation theory, alleging that Defendant by force or threat of imminent force carried victim from one place to another with intent secretly to confine victim against her will. Defendant, without permission, entered car which was in restaurant parking lost, and where victim was sleeping, and drove to a vacant lot while carrying a firearm, and forced her to perform sex acts. A victim need not be aware that they are being kidnapped during an asportation. Aggregate sentence of 60 years was not manifestly disproportionate to serious nature of offenses. (GORDON and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of cannabis and sentenced to 3 years. Defendant’s ex-girlfriend had made a 911 call and indicated that Defendant was suicidal. Two officers arrived at Defendant’s residence, made contact with Defendant outside, then entered residence and observed cannabis plants in plain view. They then obtained a warrant and seized the plants. Court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. When police have a reasonable basis to believe that someone else in a residence might be in need of assistance, the community-caretaking doctrine authorizes the limited sort of intrusion that was made. Police had a photo of a person dressed in a manner different Defendant, with a knife, and thus the situation was ambiguous. It was reasonable to conduct a limited sweep of the residence to ascertain if someone else needed assistance. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, CONCURRING.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of retail theft and sentenced to 4 years. Court denied leave to substitute counsel (from public defender for private counsel), as private counsel was not ready for trial that day. Case had been pending for 5 months, had never been continued, and Defendant had never previously sought to change attorneys. Court made no findings that Defendant was attempting to thwart his prosecution and did not indicate Defendant had been uncooperative with his counsel. Court erred in denying request to substitute counsel without making further inquiry. ((GRIFFIN and PIERCE, concurring.)