Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated stalking. Section 12-7.3(a)(2) of the Stalking Statute, which provides that a person commits stalking when he or she "threatens" a specific person 2 or more times, and knows or should know the threats would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress, is overbroad on its face unconstitutional. That subsection lacks any requirement that a person threaten an act of unlawful violence, and as written, a person who "threatens" to commit a lawful act, or an act which is not violent, may be prosecuted.(MIKVA and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant and 5 codefendants were convicted of a 2007 murder and robbery.Defendant made an arguable claim that State violated U.S. Supreme Court's 1963 Brady v. Maryland decision by failing to disclose the existence of an agreement with State's main witness about immigration assistance in exchange for his testimony. First-stage dismissal of Defendant's postconviction petition is reversed, and remanded for 2nd-stage proceedings. (MASON and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 22 at time of offense, was sentenced to life for murder of gun shop owner. Defendant, who then had 12 prior convictions including 4 felonies, was an accomplice to the murder but had an extensive and crucial role in planning and facilitating the murder, which was especially prolonged and sadistic. Defendant's postconviction petition that his sentence violated 8th amendment and the Illinois Constitution's proportionate-penalties clause did not satisfy the cause or prejudice prong of Seciton 122-1(f) of Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 2nd degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and sentenced to consecutive terms of 15 and 10 years. Section 3-6-3 of Unified Code of Corrections permits awarding enhanced programming credit against the part of a consecutive sentence that punishes an inmate for a crime not specifically listed as requiring exclusion from that credit.Due to Defendant's participation in qualified educational, vocational, and other programming while in the Cook County Department of Corrections, he is entitled to an additional 462 days of credit against his 15 year sentence for 2nd degree murder. (PIERCE and GRIFFIN, concurring.) 

 Defendant was driving a rental car when he was pulled over for speeding. During the stop, trooper prolonged the stop while he contacted the rental car company, who told him that Defendant was not an authorized driver under the rental agreement. Detention became unlawful once it was prolonged beyond the issuance of the speeding ticket. The prolongation was solely to enable trooper's inquiry to rental car company, for reasons that were clearly unrelated to the stop. Narcotics discovered in vehicle was the product of unlawful detention, and thus was properly suppressed.  (HARRIS, concurring; CONNORS, dissenting.)

Defendant, then age 18, was convicted, after jury trial, of various offenses. Defendant had sped away after traffic stop, vehicle crashed and rolled over; and he then fled on foot and then in stolen pickup truck with his girlfriend, age 15; he then attempted to flee in a stolen dump truck. Defendant was arrested and transported to a hospital, where he tested positive for cocaine and heroin and had BAC of 0.13. State proved Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of failing to report a motor vehicle accident involving personal injury, as he had abandoned his girlfriend who was injured and unconscious after pickup truck rolled over; and he was not so incapacitated that he could not have reported accident. Court within its discretion in admitting hospital’s chemical test results, as they were ordered in the regular course of providing emergency medical treatment.  (BIRKETT and ZENOFF, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/13/19.) Defendant killed a person after an argument; he argued that the man was killed during a struggle for the gun and thus that he cannot be guilty of anything more than involuntary manslaughter. Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder. Court did not abuse its discretion in not directly answering the jury's question ("If we are to select the charge of 2nd degree murder, do we still have to consider the additional gun charge or does that only apply to the murder one?"), as the answer to the question was repeatedly and conspicuously expressed in the jury instructions.Even if jurors were confused about firearm enhancement, there is no question that they were confused about what must be proved to support guilty verdict of 1st degree murder as opposed to 2nd degree murder. Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined Defendant's request to introduce the compound and cumulative impeachment by playing a video of witness' police interview. A rational trier of fact could have found that Defendant shot the victim and that his actions were intentional, not reckless. (MIKVA, concurring; WALKER, specially concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/12/19.) Defendant was convicted for unlawfully possessing a weapon. Defendant argues ineffective assistance of counsel. As no pretrial hearing occurred as to probable cause, record is inadequate to permit review of whether a motion to quash arrest would have had merit. A direct appeal of his conviction is not the appropriate vehicle for Defendant's claim Defendant cannot meet his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel without presenting evidentiary facts or nonexistence of such facts pertaining to the officers' probable cause determination. (PIERCE and WALKER, concurring.)