Criminal Law

Defendant entered guilty pleas as to home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault in one case, and as to home invasion in a separate offense involving a different victim. Court properly dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition. Defendant presented an affidavit of a non-eyewitness, averring that deceased victim had, 13 years prior, previously admitted to misidentifying Defendant and had named another man as the offender. Evidence is not of a character that would support an actual innocence claim. A defendant may bring actual innocence claim after a guilty plea, without challenging validity of the plea. Entire record, including evidence related to offense against other victim, may be considered against allegations in postconviction to determine whether Defendant has not shown a substantial deprivation of constitutional rights to warrant a 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing.(GORDON and ELLIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of a controlled substance (heroin) and sentenced to 5 years. State invoked surveillance location privilege at trial.  Officer's testimony established the need for an elevated and undisclosed vantage point from which to observe a known drug-trafficking area. Officer provided, at trial, extensive detail about the location and its fairly close proximity especially in light of officer's use of binoculars. Court did not abuse its discretion in applying the qualified privilege. Officer's surveillance testimony was corroborated by physical evidence seized and which officer had observed. Certain assessments should be offset against Defendant's per diem credit.  (McBRIDE and REYES, concurring.)

Court granted Defendants' motions to quash search warrant and suppress evidence. Complaint for search warrant alleged that an unknown person possessed what Doe (a confidential source) believed to be heroin, based on Doe's unspecified prior experience, at the location described in the complaint. Complaint was insufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that evidence of unlawful possession or delivery of a controlled substance was at the described location. Allegations were so generic and lacking in any indicia of reliability that officers who executed search warrant could not have reasonably believed that warrant was valid. Thus, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. (McDADE, concurring; CARTER, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI. Court committed structural error when, in response to jury's request during deliberations to view video of Defendant's field sobriety tests for a 2nd time, the court had the jury watch the video in the courtroom while the court, the Defendant, counsel for Defendant and for the State, and 2 alternate jurors were present. The presence of these persons was inherently intimidating and necessarily impeded or inhibited jurors' free discussion and deliberation. Court abuses its discretion if it allows jury to review evidence in a manner that improperly inhibits the jury's deliberations. If a court grants a jury's request to review audio or video evidence during deliberations, the only acceptable practice is to arrange for the jury to view the evidence in private by bringing a device such as a laptop into the jury room, as the viewing constitutes a part of the deliberations. (McDADE, concurring; CARTER, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of Class 2 felony of unlawful possession with intent to deliver more than 500 grams but not more than 2000 grams of a substance containing cannabis, and was sentenced to 4 years and 2 years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Although State presented evidence that the tested sample was cannabis to sufficiently prove that Defendant had some amount of cannabis in his possession, there was no evidence as to weight of sample that was tested. Thus, State failed to prove Defendant possessed any specific amount of cannabis beyond a reasonable doubt. Conviction must be reduced to a lesser included offense:  a civil violation, vacating sentence and term of MSR, and resentencing. Defendant to a $100 fine. State conceded its failure to prove intent to deliver beyond a reasonable doubt.(HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 9 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (his minor daughter).Defendant's confession corroborated victim's testimony. Victim willingly answered all questions put to her by prosecutor and defense counsel.A defendant's right to confront witnesses cannot be recast as the State's burden to confront witnesses. As victim was available for cross-examination, her prior statements to her teacher and to interviewer were properly admitted.(JORGENSEN and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault and violation of an order of protection (OP). On appeal, defense counsel moved to withdraw under the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Anders v. California and the 1967 Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Jones. Trial court lacked jurisdiction of Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, and appellate court lacks jurisdiction to reach merits of his appeal, because Defendant filed an untimely motion to withdraw his plea. Once the trial court entered its final judgment and ruled on Defendant's timely motion to reconsider his sentence, it could not exercise jurisdiction of Defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his plea. (SCHOSTOK, concurring; McLAREN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/21/19.) Defendant pled guilty to threatening a public official and was sentenced to 30 months' probation. The next month, he was indicted for armed robbery and resisting a peace officer, and State filed petition to revoke his probation. Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery and resisting a peace officer, and court granted State's petition to revoke probation. Court erred by ordering restitution without stating whether it was to be paid in a lump sum or by installments.  Court was required by statute to include when and how restitution was to be paid. Court's discussion of Defendant's background, conduct in the jail, and conduct that led to revocation of probation was appropriate because it illustrated why court's initial decision to place Defendant on probation for threatening a public official was the wrong response.  (HOLDER WHITE and CAVANAGH, concurring.)