Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual criminal. Court properly denied leave to file a 2nd postconviction petition. State's participation in trial court's determination whether to grant leave, at the cause-and-prejudice stage, was improper, but Defendant failed to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test. Defendant was tried within the original speedy-trial period, and State did not attempt to have the speedy-trial period run anew. (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of attempted 1st degree murder, 2 counts of aggravated battery, and mob action. Court properly summarily dismissed Defendant's pro se postconviction petition, as record positively rebuts claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Record rebuts his claim that counsel refused to allow him to testify, as State asked court to admonish Defendant to admonish him as to his right to testify, and throughout the admonitions Defendant did not mention any pressure from counsel. Trial counsel discussed at great length Defendant’s decision not to testify, and Defendant's decision not to testify must be viewed as a strategy with which he agreed. Court assessed statutory State's Attorney fees, which are not limited to direct appeals following conviction and apply in appeals in postconviction proceedings.(BURKE, concurring; McLAREN, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery of woman in her home, while armed with a box cutter and threatening the imminent use of force. Court properly allowed jury to consider fingerprint evidence, as identification was made by comparing, and matching, latent fingerprints with the known fingerprints of Defendant.Court agreed that fingerprints would be admitted but with caveat that State should not discuss their source. Court's error in admitting unqualified expert testimony was immediately cured when defense counsel elicited witness' qualifications on cross-examination. State's commentary was a fair criticism of Defendant's position and not shift the burden of proof. Court was within its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences (for armed robbery and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon), as Defendant had a record of numerous and constant criminal convictions, including some which were crimes of violence.(SCHMIDT and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder but acquitted of aggravated discharge of a firearm, and sentenced to 30 years. State proved by a preponderance of evidence that conspiracy did not end with victim'[s death but was still ongoing when 3 other gang members made statements implicating Defendant as the shooter immediately after the shooting and in the following days. Evidence showed that Defendant, upon learning that he had shot a chief of the Latin Kings Gang, smiled, laughed, and flashed his gang sign. Court was not unreasonable in finding statement were made in furtherance of the ongoing conspiracy. Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing State to introduce statements as nonhearsay coconspirator statements. (McBRIDE, concurring; GORDON, dissenting.)

Defendant was pulled over by police while driving, and consented to being searched. Court properly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from search. After stipulated bench trial, court found Defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Officers did not prolong the stop beyond the time necessary to complete the mission of the stop. No evidence that officer delayed or hindered other officer's efforts to question and search Defendant so that other officers could investigate matters unrelated to the traffic stop. Sentence of 16 years was not an abuse of discretion, not manifestly disproportionate to nature of offense, and court carefully considered Defendant's rehabilitative potential and past criminal history. Prosecutor's having asked for 13 years initially in plea offer, then seeking 20 years after trial, is not a "trial tax" upon Defendant for rejecting plea offer. (KNECHT, concurring; TURNER, specially concurring.)

Plaintiff filed postconviction petition alleging several constitutional violations occurring at his trial. Court appointed counsel for him, but he reluctantly sought to represent himself after extensive delay and upon postconviction counsel raising only 2 claims on his behalf. Court erred in denying Defendant his requested access to his trial counsel's file. As Defendant raised claims as to his trial counsel's strategic decisions, the work product doctrine does not bar him from access to trial counsel's file. Trial court should have adopted, as nearly as practicable, an open-file policy as to Defendant's access to his own trial counsel's case file, only narrowly limiting access to documents that were confidential when disclosed to trial counsel.(PUCINSKI, concurrring; MASON, dissenting.)