Criminal Law

Defendant and a codefendant were convicted, in a combined trial before a single jury, of murder in the shooting death of a taxi driver.Court found that firearm allegation was proven only as to Defendant. Defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. It was reasonable for defense counsel not to seek severance, as he could have calculated that jury would be more likely to convict codefendant and acquit Defendant.Defendant suffered no prejudice from alleged hearsay testimony about his clothing on the night of the murder, as other evidence overwhelmingly established his presence at crime scene.  Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial based on an outburst by the victim's family. Outburst was an isolated incident in 3-day trial, and judge promptly admonished jury to disregard the incident, and no jurors indicated that they were unable to follow judge's instruction. (LAVIN and HYMAN, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 6/10/19.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder, based on acts committed with his codefendant, who fatally shot a man outside a convenience store. A rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was accountable for the 1st-degree murder. Court properly denied Defendant's motions to dismiss indictment. Evidence was sufficient to support indictment, even without the challenged testimony that Defendant confessed to police and flashed gang signs at victim.Court properly excluded codefendant's statement that Defendant should not be charged. State's closing argument, which contained many references to codefendant serving as "security" for the Latin Kings gang, was not reversible prosecutorial misconduct. Nothing in record indicates that jury was misled by State's closing argument, and it need only have been arguably reasonable. (JORGENSEN, concurring and specially concurring; McLAREN, dissenting.)

Defendant pled guilty to charges of burglary and unlawful use of a credit card and was released on bond pending the imposition of sentence. While awaiting sentencing, Defendant was found guilty of knowingly failing to report to the county jail as required by her bail bond. Given Defendant's probation record, it was reasonable, and within the discretion of the prosecutor, to charge Defendant with escape by failure to report to jail upon her departure from a halfway house, rather than wait for 30 days to charge her with violation of bail bond. Through probation, circuit court retained jurisdiction to provide her with opportunity to receive treatment, but she repeatedly violated her probation. State is not required to show that a convicted felon was in "custody" to prove that he or she violated the failure to report provision in section 31-6(a) of Criminal Code.(THOMAS, KILBRIDE, and GARMAN, concurring; BURKE, KARMEIER, and THEIS, dissenting.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/5/19.) Court denied Petitioner leave to file his 3rd successive pro se petition. Petitioner cannot establish that he is so mentally ill that he is incapable of advancing past the first stage of postconviction proceedings, to make a showing of an arguably meritorious claim, without the assistance of counsel. Petitioner must, but cannot, state a nondelusional constitutional violation. Court is without supervisory authority to decide his as-applied constitutional claim, as he did not raise it in his original or amended petition. (CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/5/19.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed violence and the predicate offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. As there was no finding, and no evidence, that Defendant caused anyone great bodily harm, he is eligible to receive day-for-day credit on his sentence for armed violence. At the moment that Defendant had "immediate access to or timely control over" his weapon, he was in possession fo the narcotics, which were only a few feet away from him, and thus his armed-violence conviction is affirmed. State's experienced narcotics investigator could testify only from his specialized training, rather than his personal observations, in narcotics investigation, as a proper foundation for expert testimony. As State never tendered him as an expert in drug distribution, admission of his testimony as to drug paraphernalia, as lay opinion, was error. However, error was harmless, because State easily proved that Defendant intended to sell the cocaine. (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)