Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly sentenced 16-year old defendant to 130-year term of incarceration on aggravated criminal assault and home invasion charges. Appellate Court, in remanding matter for new sentencing hearing for consideration of defendant’s 8^th Amendment issues, found that: (1) defendant could assert instant sentencing issue in second petition for post-conviction relief, where issue regarding proper sentencing factors applicable to juvenile offenders arose under Miller, 567 U.S. 460, which was decided after defendant’s first unsuccessful petition for post-conviction relief; (2) defendant’s 130-year sentence was de facto life sentence; and (3) sentencing court did not explicitly state that it considered defendant’s mitigating evidence contained in presentence investigation report, which prevented Appellate Court from determining whether trial court had actually considered any evidence related to Miller factors. Dissent would find that trial court actually considered defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances when imposing instant sentence.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly sentenced defendant, who is mentally disabled, to 50-year term of incarceration on predatory criminal sexual assault of minor charge, where defendant had prior conviction for aggravated criminal assault. Appellate Court, in remanding matter for new sentencing hearing, found that said sentence violated proportionate penalties clause of Ill. Constitution, where: (1) said sentence was effectively de facto life sentence; (2) trial court lacked information about state of defendant’s intellectual disability at time of sentencing or about whether defendant’s cognitive ability to comprehend consequences of his actions had changed in his 10 years of current incarceration; and (3) trial court lacked facts to determine whether defendant could be restored to useful citizenship. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that Appellate Court improperly barred trial court from applying legislatively mandated de jure or de facto natural life sentence to intellectually disabled offenders based on their prior criminal history.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress drugs found in his motel room after police dog conducted free air sniff of door handle and seams of door to defendant’s motel room, and after officer had obtained search warrant based on dog’s alert to presence of drugs inside defendant’s room. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that dog sniff in common area outside defendant’s motel room violated defendant’s 4^th Amendment rights, since he had reasonable expectation of privacy, under circumstances where drug smell was undetectable by officer outside of defendant’s room, and where officer used extra-ordinary means to detect what was inside defendant’s motel room. (Partial dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court committed reversible error by allowing prosecutor to have input during court’s preliminary examination of defendant during Krankel hearing on defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective during defendant’s murder trial. While Appellate Court agreed with defendant that prosecutor’s involvement in initial inquiry was more than de minimus, since it included some adversarial advocacy, it further found that any error was harmless, where: (1) record showed that prosecutor did not question defendant or his defense counsel, and thus likely had little or no influence in court’s ultimate decision on ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (2) trial court made correct ruling on said claim, where defendant’s allegations pertained either to matters of trial strategy or to matters that would not have altered unfavorable DNA testimony. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that new counsel should have been appointed to investigate defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

This case presents question as to whether trial court should have conducted Krankel hearing, where defendant’s counsel asserted in request for new trial on defendant’s home invasion and aggravated sexual assault charges that he was ineffective by failing to adequately review certain victim and forensic evidence. Appellate Court found that no Krankel hearing was required, since Krankel hearing is required only in post-trial claims raised by pro se defendants. Appellate Court further noted that statements made by defendant’s counsel did not constitute clear admission of ineffective assistance of counsel, because counsel did not explicitly state that his performance was objectively unreasonable or prejudicial.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly admitted “crime-scene-analysis” testimony from former FBI profiler in defendant’s first-degree murder trial, where said profiler gave opinion as to cause of victim’s death. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction, found that profiler was not qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to give opinion as to cause of victim’s death. Ct. further found that profiler improperly gave opinion on subjects that jurors could have decided for themselves, and that profiler should not have testified about characteristics of persons who stage crime scenes, where said testimony could only have identified defendant as culprit.