Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery.Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that victim suffered great bodily harm as a result of the battery. The item that struck victim's head weighed 5-10 pounds, he incurred a 3 1/2" gash on side of his head, and a swollen eye, and per witness accounts he was bleeding significantly from injury; and evidence was sufficient to support inference that victim suffered memory loss as a result of injury. Remanded for court to apply a presentence incarceration credit against applicable fines. (LYTTON and McDADE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, and sentenced to 60 years. Court did not err in admitting testimony of Defendant's 2 former girlfriends as evidence of his propensity to commit domestic violence, as his violent treatment of them was comparable to his violent treatment of victim, who was his girlfriend. Factual differences do not greatly reduce probative value of former girlfriends' testimony, as all were extreme domestic violence. Propensity evidence was not so extensive as to distract jury from issues or to unduly prolong the trial. Court's consideration, as an aggravating factor, the grief of victim's family member, as this is not implicit in murder itself but is a frequent consequence of murder; thus, no violation of rule against double enhancement.(DeARMOND, concurring; TURNER, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of driving under combined influence of alcohol and cannabis, and driving while license revoked. Defendant admitted to officer that before accident, he had consumed beer and smoked cannabis. Evidence was sufficient to support convictions. Three officers observed Defendant to be highly intoxicated, and it would be reasonable to infer that he refused to undergo field sobriety test and a breath test because he knew they would confirm he was under the influence. Sufficient circumstantial evidence that Defendant had been driving the vehicle while he was intoxicated; his cell phone and flip-flop were on driver's side floorboard, and said that another person was driving but could not say how long he had known that person or where he could be found. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 2 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a 14-year-old in 2014, and was required to register as a sex offender because of his 1983 conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault. Court's order sentencing Defendant to 4 1/2 years does not require him to register as a sex offender under the Registration Act. Thus, his constitutional challenges to the Act are beyond scope of appellate court's power to grant relief under Supreme Court Rule 615(b). Fines and fees order corrected. (MASON and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Respondent was convicted of raping 2 women in 1973, and during year he was paroled was convicted of committing deviate sexual assault. Given expert's 2016 initial report, in which expert opined that Respondent is no longer a sexually violent person, and that his opinion was based on new evidence not previously available, and additional support in his 2017 reexamination report, Respondent is entitled to evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is still a sexually violent person. (REYES and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of domestic battery but not guilty of home invasion. Apparent inconsistencies in evidence are not dispositive. Jury might have regarded discrepancies as genuine but insufficient to make victim unbelievable as to the beating she said she received from Defendant. Court committed no error by replaying the 911 recording in the courtroom, at request of jury during deliberations. Court may exercise its discretion to bring jury into courtroom for replaying in such situation. Counsel's agreement to replay 911 recording only once, in the courtroom, in lieu of in jury room where it might have been played many times, was a reasonable strategic decision. (HOLDER WHITE and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of criminal sexual assault and home invasion. Court erred in failing to properly instruct jury as to Zehr principles, but evidence was not closely balanced, and thus no plain error. As counsel did not promise the jury a consent defense, he cannot be ineffective for failing to raise issue of impeachment sooner. Defendant failed to show that his counsel's actions were objectively unreasonable, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel. Remanded as court failed to make any inquiry into Defendant's subsequent claims of ineffective assistance. As it is possible to commit home invasion without committing criminal sexual assault, the convictions did not merge. Thus, convictions for both offenses may stand. (CARTER and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Court properly entered first-stage summary dismissal of postconviction petition, as petition did not show even the gist of a meritorious assertion that Defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged defective performance. Defendant pled guilty to criminal sexual assault, and would serve term of mandatory supervised release and would have to register as a sex offender. Defendant is subject to possibility of a delay in his release from prison, based on a serious but uncertain risk that he will not find suitable housing and will be violated at the door by Prisoner Review Board. For this deprivation to be permanent, the denial would have to be repeated many times. Thus, the provision of more complete information about housing requirement would not have induced Defendant to go to trial in face of strong evidence and substantial risk of a prison term decades longer than the one to which he agreed.(ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)