Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of domestic battery and violation of an order of protection, and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 6 and 3 years. Given Defendant's criminal history, court was not authorized to impose an extended-term sentence. Remanding for resentencing is unnecessary as record establishes the trial court's intent to sentence Defendant to maximum available sentence for both convictions. Court considered all relevant factors, including evidence in mitigation, and no error in court's finding that aggravating factors and seriousness of offenses outweighed mitigating evidence. Sentence for domestic battery is reduced to maximum nonextended term of 3 years, and remanded with directions to modify order setting forth imposed fines to show $475 monetary credit. (KNECHT, concurring; STEIGMANN, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery and sentenced to concurrent terms of 15 years. Sentence was not excessive, as court considered appropriate factors in aggravation and mitigation during sentencing hearing. Record does not support argument that court penalized Defendant for exercising his right to stand trial. (MASON and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

A person who enters the dwelling place of another in violation of a court order thereby enters the dwelling "without authority" under the home invasion statute. The "without authority" element must include the mental state of knowledge. State met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew he entered victim's home without authority, as Defendant testified that he knew circuit court ordered him not to entered victim's home and that he violated that order. (KARMEIER, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring.)

A defendant who enters into a negotiated plea agreement may not challenge his sentence on the basis that the court relied on improper statutory sentencing factors. Such challenge is an excessive sentence challenge, for which recourse is to seek to withdraw the guilty plea and return the parties to the status quo before the plea. Appellate court erred in addressing the merits of Defendant's sentencing challenge. (KARMEIER, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with 1 count of unlawful possession of a cocaine. Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Officer stopped vehicle after he observed it quickly decelerate to well below the speed limit, causing traffic to back up, and observed passenger was reclined in the car with his head mostly obstructed, and believed passenger to be a person wanted on a traffic warrant. Officer's suspicions were reasonable under the circumstances, and court's decision to grant motion to suppress due to a lack of certainty as to identity of passenger or lack of other corroborative facts was erroneous as it placed additional burden on officer. Once officer smelled odor of cannabis, probable cause for the search existed, and search was then clearly justified. (HOLDER WHITE, concurring; TURNER, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts each of 1st-degree murder and home invasion.Court properly entered summary dismissal of Defendant's pro se postconviction petition. No ineffective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal. Appellate counsel failed to argue that trial court erred by restricting cross-examination of a witness who testified that Defendant admitted committing the murders. OUtcome of direct appeal would have been no different if appellate counsel had challenged limitation of witness' cross-examination, as not raising the issue engendered no prejudice. Thus, claim was based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. (BIRKETT and ZENOFF, concurring.)