Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted unlawful clouding of title, based on a lien Defendant attempted to record, alleging that a bank owed him $400,00 for 2 properties he had lost in foreclosure proceedings more than 20 years earlier. Court's questioning of potential jurors did not substantially comply with requirements of Zehr case and Rule 431(b). None of the jurors were told that the Defendant is not required to testify, and none were asked whether they both understood and accepted principle that Defendant was presumed innocent. Evidence was not close enough that failure to comply with Rule 431(b) threatened to tip the scales of justice against Defendant. (OVERSTREET and WELCH, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 1/8/19.) Defendant was stopped for improper lane usage (ILU) and was charged with DUI. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to quash her arrest and suppress evidence. The ILU statute is not ambiguous and was or should have been within officer's knowledge, and thus officer did not have a reasonable basis to stop Defendant. If the purpose of a line in roadway is to divide 2 lanes, then a vehicle has not changed lanes until it has crossed the line. A stop for ILU is valid when an officer observes multiple lane deviations for no obvious reason. Even if Defendant's multiple touches could be considered "lane deviations", the road's twists and turns provided an innocent explanation for those brief touches. (BIRKETT and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted of 1st degree murder, after 2 persons were hit on the head with a club; one survived but one died due to multiple brain injuries.Defendant's sentence of 50 years, with day-for-day sentencing credit, is not a de facto life sentence, as he is scheduled to be paroled at age 41. Case does not fall within the category of cases considered by U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller and its progeny, that life sentences for juvenile defendants violate the 8th amendment. Mitigating evidence was presented, and there was no indication that court did not consider it. Court did not err in denying in denying, at 3rd-stage, Defendant's successive postconviction petition which claimed that sentencing court failed to consider his youth in determining sentence. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor battery. Court properly admonished Defendant prior to her guilty plea, pursuant to statute in effect at that time. While appeal was pending, admonishment requirements changed. It would be inappropriate to remand solely for the retroactive application of amended statute. Defendant failed to testify that she did not previously understand consequences of her plea, but only that she had, over the weekend, thought more about the consequences of plea, which is not a proper ground for withdrawal of a guilty plea. (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with 2 counts of domestic battery and case proceeded to jury trial. After both sides gave closing arguments, but prior to State's rebuttal argument, court declared a mistrial. Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. Defense counsel, in closing argument, stated that victim (Defendant's estranged husband) had a very powerful reason to lie, as he filed for divorce and want their children to be taken from Defendant. Court made a hasty decision to then declare mistrial. Defense counsel's comments, although improper, did not justify declaration of mistrial. As State failed to show a manifest necessity for mistrial, case dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. (CARTER and LYTTON, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/4/18.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced him to natural-life imprisonment. Court committed reversible error by denying Defendant's motion for severance of charges. One victim (friend of Defendant's stepdaughter) is alleged to have been assaulted in 2015, and another victim (Defendant's stepdaughter) in 2012. These were 2 separate and distinct incidents involving 2 separate and distinct persons, and not parts of same comprehensive transaction. As charges were misjoined, much bolstering hearsay evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible if charges were severed. These cumulative hearsay statements could have persuaded jury to overlook weaknesses in State's case, and were prejudicial to Defendant. (HARRIS, concurring; STEIGMANN, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder.  Any error in prosecutor's statements during closing argument was not so serious that it affected fairness of trial. Jury sent note, during deliberations, stating, "Can self-defense be a mitigating factor? (Definition of mitigating factor is unclear on sheet)."  Court responded, after concurring with counsel, that jurors heard the evidence and have the instructions of law and were to continue to deliberate.Jury instructions included IPIs on 1st degree murder, 2nd degree murder, definition of a mitigating factor, and the use of force in self-defense.  Court did not abuse its discretion by determining that any additional "clarification" could confuse or sway jurors. Record was corrected, based on court reporter's recollection and notes and judge's recollection, to reflect that one juror answered "yes" during jury polling, rendering moot Defendant's claim that verdict was not unanimous. (GORDON, specially concurring; LAMPKIN, dissenting.)