Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition at the second stage of proceedings, arguing that his counsel did not give him reasonable assistance because she added and amended several claims but did not include key information and that this resulted in his claims being dismissed. The State conceded the error but argued that it did not prejudice the defendant. The appellate court vacated and remanded, finding that counsel failed to provide reasonable assistance in preparing the petition and that prejudice was not required. (JORGENSEN, concurring and KENNEDY, specially concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 53 years in prison. Defendant raised a number of issues on appeal, including the allegation that he was improperly denied access to counsel by the trial court during an overnight recess during trial and that this denial required reversal without a showing of prejudice. The State conceded that an order forbidding defendant from consulting with his attorney during the recess violated the Sixth Amendment, but argued that the trial court’s order did not completely restrict defendant’s access and was reasonable and defendant had waived the issue. The appellate court found that an unconstitutional denial of access occurred and reversed. (MIKVA and NAVARRO, concurring)

The Illinois Supreme Court held that the odor of raw cannabis coming from a vehicle is sufficient to provide police officers with probable cause to perform a warrantless search of the vehicle, so long as the officers are trained and experienced in distinguishing between the odor of raw and burnt cannabis. Earlier this year the court held that the odor of burnt cannabis alone is not sufficient to establish probable cause. (OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring and O’BRIEN, dissenting. HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision)

The State appealed after the circuit court dismissed with prejudice charges related the offense of aggravated driving under the influence without a valid driver’s license for failure to state an offense, arguing that the trial court disregarded existing precedent and relied on an unpublished opinion with no precedential value. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court properly relied on an unpublished opinion interpreting the language of the DUI statute where the court’s reasoning was consistent with the language of the statute and that the State had failed to prove the aggravating element where defendant’s license was suspended. (WELCH and CATES, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and, after his initial conviction was reversed on appeal, was found guilty in a subsequent re-trial and was sentenced to 50 years in prison. The defendant brought a post-conviction petition alleging inadequate assistance of trial and appellate counsel and due process violations. He also asserted actual innocence based on newly-discovered evidence. The trial court dismissed his petition at the second stage and defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant failed to show that he was denied due process, that defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's alleged deficiencies, and that the actual innocence claim failed because it was not based on newly discovered evidence and that the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. (KENNEDY and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the revocation of his pretrial release. His pretrial release was revoked because he was charged with committing another felony and additional Class A misdemeanors while on pretrial release for two felony charges and a Class A misdemeanor charge. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s findings on conditions was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that its decision to revoke defendant’s pretrial release was not an abuse of discretion where defendant demonstrated that he would ignore court-imposed conditions and be charged with subsequent violations of the criminal code. (SCHOSTOK and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and that he personally discharged a firearm. Post-trial counsel, who also represented defendant on direct appeal, filed a post-trial petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition at the second stage by finding that the claims could have been raised on direct appeal. Defendant retained new counsel and appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to advance his petition to third-stage proceedings, that post-conviction counsel had a conflict of interest because he did not allege his own ineffective assistance as appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues on direct appeal, and that post-conviction counsel failed to properly present defendant’s claims. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the forfeited post-conviction claims would not have had merit if they had been raised on direct appeal and that defendant did not make a substantial showing that post-conviction counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest. (LANNERD and KNECHT, concurring)