Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where the only evidence against him was eyewitness testimony and where there was no physical evidence or testimony regarding a motive. The appellate court reversed, finding that the eyewitness testimony was “fraught” with inconsistency, contradictions, and the risk of errors. (ODEN JOHNSON, concurring and specially concurring and TAILOR, dissenting)

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of home invasion and a single count of criminal sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued that, under the one-act, one-crime rule, the criminal sexual assault conviction and one of the home invasion convictions must be vacated, that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve 85 percent of his sentence, and that the trial court erred in ordering him to register as a sex offender. The appellate court vacated one of defendant’s home invasion convictions and his criminal sexual assault conviction as well as the sentencing order requiring him to serve 85 percent of his sentence, but affirmed the requirement that he register as a sex offender because he was convicted of home invasion predicated on a sex offense. (BIRKETT and KENNEDY, concurring)

Defendant, who was charged with attempted first-degree murder and aggravated battery, appealed from a trial court order denying him pretrial release pursuant to the Pretrial Fairness Act. On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate any safety threat that he posed. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court also affirmed, finding that the circuit court did not err in denying pretrial release where it heard all of the evidence and determined that, because defendant had failed to comply with his doctor’s directives to take prescribed medications, he would not comply with conditions of release. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of five counts of felony disorderly conduct for falsely reporting to law enforcement that he had been the victim of a hate crime. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction and the supreme court allowed his petition for leave to appeal. The main issue before the court was whether double jeopardy precluded his conviction because he previously had entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the State. The supreme court reversed, finding that under the circumstances of this case the dismissal of the original charges by nolle prosequi did not allow new charges to be brought. The court explained that it would be fundamentally unfair to allow for a prosecution to renege on a deal with the defendant when the defendant had relied on the agreement to his detriment. (NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, O’BRIEN, concurring. THEIS and CUNNINGHAM took no part in the decision)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder and was sentenced to 31 years in prison. On appeal, he argued that his counsel was ineffective for not seeking a reduced sentence under a statute that allows a defendant convicted of attempted first degree murder to be sentenced for a Class I felony instead of a Class X felony if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that they were acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from provocation by the victim. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for re-sentencing. The supreme court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, finding that provocation was inapplicable under the facts of the case because the defendant was the aggressor and, as such, he could not rely on the victim’s response as evidence of "mutual combat." (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and O’BRIEN, concurring)