Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of a firearm while in violation of Cannabis Control Act. Breadth of the Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon (AUUW) provisions and their burden on the 2nd amendment are moderate to minimal. State provided sufficient information to support conclusion that persons who simultaneously possess a firearm and cannabis are likely to misuse firearms, thus creating an issue of public concern. Legislature sought to prevent reckless discharge of firearms from persons under influence of cannabis or other specified illegal drugs in AUUW statutes, thus imposing burden on 2nd amendment right. State's justifications for doing so are sufficient to support modest burden on that right, and AUUW statutes are not facially unconstitutional. (HOWSE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of his daughter, then age 11. Court never asked whether jurors understood the State's burden to prove Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or the fact that Defendant was not required to present evidence on his own behalf. Thus, the court committed error.Statements by 2 witnesses were hearsay statements made by child victim. Court erred in failing to give IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.66. State erred when it said, in rebuttal, that the cunning nature of sexual predators is something "we" see on a daily basis, and when it asked jury in closing what kind of message it would send to victims if Defendant was acquitted. Cumulative effect of errors, as case is closely balanced, requires new trial.(STEIGMANN and KNECHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of felony murder predicated on aggravated kidnapping. Defendant was not prosecuted for aggravated kidnapping, and the term "kidnapping" was employed in a general, nontechnical context, and need not be defined. Jury was presented with evidence that Defendant and codefendants duct-taped victim's limbs, forcibly removed him from his business, held him in basement of a residence, and transported him to Indiana against his will. Thus, there was no serious risk the jury did not understand definition of kidnapping. Jury would not have been misled or confused by jury instructions presented, although definitional instruction for "kidnapping" was not provided to jury. (McBRIDE and GORDON, concurring.)

After retrial, 2 separate juries found Defendants guilty of 1st-degree murder of 1 person and 2 counts of attempted murder as to 2 other persons. Court erred in denying Defendants' requests to impeach testimony (of 1 shooting victim) from 1st trial with his affidavit recanting his identification of Defendant as the person who shot him. Court's skepticism of victim's recantation was not a proper basis to exclude the affidavit. As circumstantial evidence was weak and eyewitness accounts were problematic, exclusion of affidavit was not harmless. Court erred in admitting witness' prior consistent statements as to circumstances of her out-of-court identifications of both Defendants. Statement was intended to bolster witness' identical direct examination and to cause jury to disregard her admission that she could not see the facial features of the offenders. (BIRKETT and McLAREN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of one person, attempted 1st degree murder of another person, and aggravated discharge of a firearm in the direction of another person. Court properly allowed jury to hear evidence of prior bad acts committed by his cousin weeks prior to shooting. Evidence of prior arson threat and attempt were necessary to explain why cousin would order Defendant to fire at the family. Cousin's motive was relevant, regardless of whether Defendant was aware of it, as State presented specific evidence that Defendant was doing cousin's bidding. Evidence had great probative value as it explained an otherwise inexplicable shooting. No ineffective assistance of counsel in defense counsel's failure to present witness testimony he promised in opening statement, as witnesses may have substantially changed their account of events without warning. (MASON and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

After a separate but simultaneous bench trial, Defendant, age 19 at time of offense, was convicted of 1st degree murder from his and a codefendant's brutal beating of a man who sustained severe brain injuries, lived in a semicomatose state for 13 years, and then died. Nature of injuries that led to death confirms that Defendant's actions were knowing, and evidence shows his knowing conduct was not so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive as to leave a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Evidence was sufficient to prove him guilty of 1st degree murder. (PUCINSKI and HYMAN, concurring.)

Defendant filed postconviction petition and, while awaiting evidentiary hearing, he completed his sentence. Court erred in dismissing petition as moot. Despite Defendant's release from custody, he still has a personal stake in outcome of postconviction proceeding, sufficient to prevent his case from being moot. Defendant had standing under Section 122-1(a) of Post-Conviction Hearing Act because he was in prison when he filed his petition. Any date subsequent to filing of petition is irrelevant to his standing.(STEIGMANN and KNECHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of aggravated domestic battery and 2 counts domestic battery of his girlfriend. Court did not err in allowing State to use Defendant's 2011 conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon for impeachment, as it was relevant to and probative of Defendant's credibility. State's reference to Defendant's felon status did not contravene Supreme Court's rejection of "mere-fact" impeachment, as reference was a necessary part of the felony that State used to impeach his credibility. Any error in court's use of IPI criminal no. 3.12 was harmless, as it did not affect outcome of trial. (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and concealment of a homicidal death. Defendant appealed, arguing that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for reconsideration of pretrial order granting State a continuance and motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Court failed to make any type of preliminary inquiry to determine whether Defendant raised a "colorable claim" of ineffective assistance of counsel. Remanded with instructions to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. (SCHMIDT and WRIGHT, concurring.)

After Defendant was involved in auto accident, a detective directed medical personnel to draw Defendant's blood for chemical testing while he was unconscious. Defendant was later charged with aggravated DUI. As neither exigent circumstances nor implied consent applied, no recognized exception to requirement of a warrant was applicable. Thus, the warrantless blood draw violated the 4th amendment. Thus, court correctly suppressed evidence of test results. (WELCH and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)