Criminal Law

Court properly denied Defendant's petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). Defendant was placed under lawful arrest for DUI. Officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol. Appellate court defers to court's factual findings that Defendant refused testing and that officer read required warning to him. Hearing commenced within the prescribed 30-day time window, and no misconduct in State moving for a continuance. Exclusionary rule, in context of an alleged Miranda violation, is inapplicable in SSS hearings. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/31/18.) Defendant was arrested for DUI, and court granted his petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). Officer stopped Defendant for speeding, and had probable cause, or reasonable grounds, to believe that Defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Field sobriety tests were given when weather was clear and pavement was dry and level, Defendant's breath smelled of alcohol, he had open cans of beer in the car, and he admitted that he had been drinking. (McDADE and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

Defendant, and 4 codefendants, participated in organized scheme to commit mortgage fraud. Straw buyer in this transaction was an undercover federal agent, and part of a sting operation. Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of loan fraud, financial institution fraud, attempted theft, wire fraud, and forgery. Defendant's knowledge of conspiracy and agreement to participate were evidence from his statements during and immediately after raid when federal agents stopped the closing. His words and actions showed that he knew about mortgage fraud conspiracy and he agreed to become part of it when he completed loan application for purported buyer, whom he knew would not be living in the property (which was fraudulent for FHA loans). Coconspirator statements made outside of a defendant's presence or before Defendant agrees to participate in transaction are admissible under the co-conspirator's exception.Sufficient evidence showed Defendant's intent to aid and abet co-conspirators in accomplishing the mortgage fraud. Defendant's failure to possess a loan originator's license was relevant for background purposes, and was not overly prejudicial. (PUCINSKI and HYMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Officers stopped vehicle, in which Defendant was a passenger, for failing to stop at a red light before making a right turn. Officer observed Defendant "moving around" with a handgun sticking out of front pocket of his sweatshirt. Officer took possession of handgun, after Defendant exited vehicle. Officer had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed in seizing gun, as he viewed Defendant in possession of gun. Court did not coerce a guilty verdict by instructing juror to keep deliberating after jury sent out a note "9 guilty, 3 not guilty. What next?". No error in court answering jury's note asking if the transcripts were available by saying that the transcripts were unavailable "today", as defense counsel specifically asked for this response to be given.  No ineffective assistance of counsel in this request, as it was a strategic decision. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 3 counts of aggravated battery, for having punched a person in the face who was attempting to board a CTA bus, and for having grabbed the bus driver when he refused to drive. Evidence sufficient for jury to infer Defendant acted knowingly when he committed the batteries. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as no prejudice resulted from counsel failing to call 2 witnesses mentioned in opening statements. Denial of Batson challenges, which raised only that Defendant and venirepersons were African-American, was not against manifest weight of evidence. When defense counsel raised obj (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant, age 18 at time of offense, was convicted of 2 counts of attempted 1st degree murder. As Defendant did not raise his constitutional claims in trial court, there was no evidentiary hearing and court made no findings of fact to determine whether 8th amendment protection for juveniles apply to Defendant's circumstances. As record is insufficient to address either as-applied challenge, claims under proportionate penalties clause and 8th amendment are premature, and are more appropriately raised in postconviction petition. Court considered mitigating circumstances and seriousness of crime, and sentence is not abuse of discretion. (HOFFMAN and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant, age 23 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual assault with a firearm and aggravated kidnapping with a firearm and sentenced to 2 consecutive 22-year prison terms. Evidence was sufficient to support jury's finding that Defendant was armed with a firearm, as gun was visible, and within his reach, in back seat of car while he assaulted victim in front seat. Admission of Defendant's prior conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) for impeachment purposes was harmless error. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as evidence against Defendant was overwhelming. Sentence was not excessive, and as Defendant waived his right to remain silent, court could properly consider his failure to express remorse at sentencing. (LAVIN and HYMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with numerous offenses, including felony murder, after the car he was driving crashing into another vehicle, killing its occupant. Later, State amended felony murder charge to knowing murder and added a count of reckless homicide. Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of reckless homicide, and was found not guilty on all other charges. Defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated by addition of knowing murder and reckless homicide charge. The later indictment gave Defendant notice that State would proceed under knowing theory of murder instead of felony murder theory. The reckless homicide count was not "new and additional". Evidence at trial was sufficient for finder of fact to conclude Defendant knew he was fleeing from the Chicago police. (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 2 counts of armed robbery and sentenced to concurrent terms of 34 years. Court plainly erred by insisting that Defendant cooperate with the Presentence Investigation (PSI) and then using this information against him, as this deprived him of his 5th amendment rights and deprived him of a fair sentencing hearing.Conviction for armed robbery with possession of a firearm must be vacated as it is predicated on same physical act as his conviction for armed robbery with personal discharge of a firearm, under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. Remanded for resentencing before a different judge with a new PSI. (WALKER, concurring; PIERCE, specially concurring.)

Amendment increasing the minimum age for automatic transfer to criminal court from 15 to 16 years of age is procedural, and applies retroactively to "ongoing proceedings" in pending cases.  That amendment applies where Defendant's criminal trial had concluded and guilty verdict was entered, but Defendant had not yet been sentenced as an adult. Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to argue its retroactive application. Remanded, with directions to vacate sentence and to give State 10 days from date sentence is vacated to, if State so chooses, file a petition requesting a discretionary transfer hearing before the judge who tried the case. (GRIFFIN and WALKER, concurring.)