Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, and found that Defendant personally discharged firearm that caused victim's death. Defendant claimed that his defense counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him of mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement, leading him to reject a 27-year plea offer. Defendant cannot show reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's deficient advice, he would have accepted plea offer. Even without mandatory enhancement, Defendant knew he was facing a possible 60-year sentence for murder, and the 53-year sentence he received was less than this maximum.(McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon but was acquitted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Totality of circumstances fails to establish a nexus between supplier's drug deals and Defendant's home. Magistrate had no substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed to believe that evidence of the crimes charged would be found in a search of Defendant's home, and thus search warrant was not supported by probable cause and was thus invalid. Complaint for search warrant is a bare-bones affidavit, as it is conclusory, asserting only officer's belief that probable cause existed. Statements in complaint, that supplier drove a vehicle registered to Defendant's residence address to 1 drug deal and 19 days later walked to another drug deal from that address, are completely devoid of facts to support officer's judgment that probable cause existed. Good faith exception to exclusionary rule does not apply to this bare-bones affidavit. (KILBRIDE, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring; GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, dissenting.)
Dist.Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s section 2241 petition seeking to challenge his 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for drug and firearm offenses, where original Dist. Ct. inKentucky had applied Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement based on defendant’s three Kentucky state-court convictions on charge of second-degree burglary. Under Malone, 889 F.3d 310, defendant’s second degree burglary convictions qualified as “generic burglaries” for purposes of applying enhancement under ACCA, because said statute applied to buildings generally, and not to vehicles or watercraft. As such, defendant was properly sentenced under ACCA.
Dist.Ct. did not err in imposing $79,325 restitution order as part of defendant’s sentence on charge of preparing false tax returns for her clients, where said amount reflected what had not been collected at time of presentencing report from defendant’s clients who had submitted said returns. While defendant argued that said figure was improper because prosecutor should had told sentencing judge how much more it might collect from defendants’ clients, and that said amounts should have been revealed as exculpatory material under Brady, 373 U.S. 83, no Brady violation occurred, since defendant merely had to ask prosecutor how much more had been collected since date of presentencing report, but failed to do so. Moreover, defendant will receive credit against restitution award for whatever govt. collects from clients.
Dist.Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his kidnapping and rape convictions on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview five individuals, who, according to defendant, could have corroborated his claim that he and alleged victim had engaged in consensual sex. State court that examined said issue failed to conduct evidentiary hearing to determine what efforts counsel made to interview said individuals, and what they would have said stated at trial beyond what was contained in their affidavits for purposes of determining whether trial counsel was ineffective. As such, remand was required because Dist. Ct.failed to conduct such hearing.
In prosecution on Hobbs Act robbery and firearms charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress two inculpatory statements in which he admitted to killing driver of getaway car involved in said robbery, even though defendant argued that both statements were involuntary because they arose out of discussions defendant had with “mental health counselor” who was employed at county jail, where said individual was not licensed mental health professional, and where said individual pledged confidentiality to defendant, but then urged defendant to talk to police after hearing his confession to said killing and elicited inculpatory statements from defendant during both of defendant’s statements given to authorities. While counselor functioned as agent of law enforcement which would typically cut against finding that defendant’s statements were voluntary, record showed that defendants’ statements were voluntary, where: (1) defendant reached out to counselor on his own initiative and confessed to killing driver; (2) counselor never reached out to police about defendant’s confession prior to defendant making statements to authorities; (3) defendant’s statements to authorities came only on defendant’s initiative; and (4) defendant’s confession to authorities about killing came shortly after defendant spoke to girlfriend about killing. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that counselor was required to give defendant Miranda warnings during his initial conversations with counselor.
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of Class 2 felony delivery of a controlled substance, and was ordered to pay a total of $1,549 in fines, fees, and costs. Defendant appealed the imposition of certain monetary charges imposed by circuit court. A fine is punitive in nature and is imposed as part of a sentence for a criminal offense, and a fee is assessed to recover expense incurred by State in prosecuting the defendant. The $2 Public Defender Records Automation Fund fee, the $2 State's Attorney Records Automation Fund fee, the $15 Court Document Storage Fund fee, the $190 "Felony Complaint Filed" fee, and the $15 court automation fee are all fees that compensation State for a cost related to the Defendant's prosecution. (KARMEIER, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, and THEIS, concurring; NEVILLE and BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated domestic battery. Defendant filed pro se a motion to reduce sentence that also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective. Court erred in addressing merits of Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims instead of determining whether new counsel should have been appointed, as court had previously allowed appointed counsel to withdraw because of a potential conflict. Court committed reversible error when it conducted Krankel hearing and concluded, on the merits, that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. The sole issue to be decided at a Krankel hearing is whether to appoint counsel. Remanded with directions to appoint new counsel for Defendant, so that new counsel may take whatever action the new counsel deems appropriate as to Defendant's pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (HARRIS and KNECHT, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Court erred in making arbitrary blanket evidentiary ruling denying Defendant the right to recross any witness, because it allowed State to present evidence of new matters, on redirect, that Defendant was unable to confront. Court's ruling affected the entire proceeding and was clearly prejudicial to Defendant's case. (BARBERIS and OVERSTREET, concurring.)
Defendant, age 19 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of 1st degree murder and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. State presented ample evidence to prove Defendant guilty of 1st degree murder, as a principal as to death of one victim and under theory of accountability as to the death of the other victim. Presentence investigation report (PSI) discussed Defendant's history of mental illness and susceptibility to peer pressure, but there was no sworn testimony or factual findings as to these matters.Defendant's argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to his sentence is premature, and better suited to postconviction proceedings. (CARTER and O'BRIEN, concurring.)
