Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC). State failed to prove Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because it failed to present sufficient evidence that he possessed a firearm as defined by Criminal Code. Conviction was based solely on testimony of witness that from 50 feet away she observed Defendant walking in the street holding what appeared to be a gun in his hand. The only detail that witness could provide about the gun was its color. That testimony, standing alone, was not sufficient to sustain conviction.(PIERCE, concurring; MIKVA, specially concurring.)

Court properly dismissed Defendant's pro se petition at 1st stage of postconviction proceedings because his vagueness challenge to the armed habitual criminal (AHC) statute has no arguable basis in the law. Defendant's guilty plea did not serve as waiver of his claim on appeal, and thus did not bar Defendant from challenging on direct appeal the constitutionality of the statue which served as basis for his conviction. Plain language of AHC statute clearly defines the unlawful conduct, which does not contain any limiting language as to sequence or separate entry of the predicate convictions. No arbitrary enforcement occurred, as Defendant was convicted of 2 separate offense in 2 separate cases stemming from his actions in 2 separate incidents that occurred over 1 month apart. (ROCHFORD and HOFFMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful failure to report as a sex offender. Court did not err in denying Defendant's request for 2 Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions where he asserted affirmative defense of mistake of fact and testified that he mistakenly believed that required reporting date was after the actual 90-day deadline. Court correctly determined that what allegedly occurred was a lapse of memory and not a mistake of fact. Evidence was insufficient to support a mistake-of-fact defense. (McLAREN and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 15 at time of offense, was convicted of 1st degree murder, and was sentenced to 50 years. Defendant's pro se postconviction petition, arguing that sentence was a de facto life sentence and violated the 8th amendment, set forth an arguable basis in law and fact. Court's extremely brief reference to Defendant's youth was arguably an insufficient consideration of youth and its attendant circumstances.(O'BRIEN and WRIGHT, concurring.) 

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of criminal sexual assault of his daughter, then age 16. Court did not err in admitting into evidence the results of DNA paternity tests showing that there was a 99.9999% probability that he was the father of his daughter's 2 children, who were born when she was 17 and 19. Defendant failed to show that the use of a prior probability necessitated an assumption that he had sexual intercourse with his daughter. (HOLDRIDGE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and also alleged Defendant was within 1000 feet of a school at the time of the offense. Court did not err in referring jury back to its instructions, and in refusing to answer directly jury's question during deliberations:  "If we have a hung jury, with the defendant be found not guilty on all charges?". Disposition after a verdict involves matters the jurors are not called upon to deliberate. Court did not err in allowing State to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior conviction for possession of cannabis with intent to deliver as other-crimes evidence of Defendant's intent to deliver the cocaine.The other-crimes evidence was reliable because it was a conviction. The fact that a different drug was involved in the prior offense did not make the prior offense and the current offense dissimilar. (O'BRIEN and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

After bench trial, in dispute over bets in fantasy sports contest through a website, court entered decision in favor of Defendant. Court properly found that Section 28-8 of Loss Recovery Act, which provides a cause of action for damages to the loser of certain illegal bets against the winner of the bets, does not allow recovery when the gambling is conducted through a 3rd-party website, rather than a wager directly between 1 person and another. (CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of one count of tattooing the body of a minor. Because language in pertinent statute, as to a person licensed to practice medicine, was an exception to, as opposed to a description of, the offense of tattooing a minor, the State was not required to prove that Defendant did not have such a license. State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew that the victim was under age 18 when he tattooed her. (JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)